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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks are a relatively new technology, actively re-
searched by many groups around the world. This project is a continuation
of a former project at the University of Oslo, focusing on WirelessHART.
Our aim were to gain an understanding of the WirelessHART protocol, be-
fore further developing and improving the implementation.
This report provides the reader with an introduction to Wireless Sensor
Networks to build a general knowledge. This knowledge is then used to
help describe the WirelessHART standard in detail, where functionality
and structure of each layer are presented. A WirelessHART network
consists of several devices performing different tasks, each introduced
in turn. After the WirelessHART protocol we present the hardware and
software used to build a test network for evaluating our implementation.
The aim of the project changed as the devices used were found unsuitable
and out-of-date. We changed the direction of the report to focus on the
Network Manager and less on the nodes as they were already thoroughly
researched.
The implementation part presents a total restructuring of the Gateway,
where communication between the different layers are achieved through
interfaces. The Gateway correctly propagates advertise packets, initiating
a complete join sequence between a node and the Network Manager.
The Network Manager generates routes using a graph routing scheme.
These routes are used by devices to transmit packets through the network.
Security mechanisms and packet construction are implemented according
to the standard, providing a packet structure according to the layered
approach. We conclude the report with an evaluation of the project,
comparing the results to our project goals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks are used in every aspect of our lives today and are
therefore required to provide a reliable and secure service, often without
any interaction or help from humans over longer time. The thesis explores
the WirelessHART standard used in sensor networks where monitoring of
industrial processes are required. The thesis is a continuation of the thesis
“WirelessHART - Gjennomgang og implementering” by Håvard Tegelsrud
and Jørgen Frøysadal, and “Design and Implementations of a Rudimentary
WirelessHART Network” by Anders Asperheim, Rune V. Sjøen and Kaja F.
L. Skaar.
WirelessHART is implemented on small nodes with limited resources
when it comes to storage, processing power and energy. Sensor nodes are
small devices capable of gathering and processing sensor measurements
and communicate with other devices1. As sensor nodes are energy
constrained due to their size and small power supply, we need to find a
routing protocol that is optimised for these conditions. In the case a device
should fail, the network is also required to dynamically repair itself as
expected of a robust industrial network.
1.1 Previous Work
Our work is a continuation of the work performed by previous master
students at University of Oslo. During the time period of August 2009
and until May 2010 the students Håvard Tegelsrud and Jørgen Frøysadal
worked with Statoil in order to develop the foundation of a WirelessHART
network running on nodes produced by Atmel. Statoil wanted to use the
nodes to communicate between their industrial installations in the North
Sea. During this time they were able to develop the code needed on the
Physical Layer for the network components to create a working network.
During the autumn of 2010, the master students Anders Asperheim, Rune
V. Sjøen and Kaja F. L. Skaar continued developing code on the Link Layer.
They worked until August 2012, when they submitted their research. At
1A device generally consists of a microcontroller, transceiver, memory unit, power
source and sensors.
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the end they were focusing on the Network Layer and implementing the
procedure of packet transmission on the Network Manager.
1.2 Motivation
The overall goal of the project is to implement the fundamental structure
required for a functioning WirelessHART network. The project is a
continuation of a previous master thesis, so their implementation will
be evaluated and function as a platform for further development. The
WirelessHART protocol provides a complex network, where portions of
the network management is far from optimised. We hope to develop a fully
running network, where progress can be made on the general mechanisms
such as join process, routing capabilities and security.
1.3 Thesis goal
The goal of our project was to develop the general structures needed to
run a WirelessHART network. Parts of the system have been developed by
Asperheim et al. in the previous project, so we aim to further implement
critical functionality mainly at the Gateway and Network Manager. Our
project goals are further specified in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 on pages 65
and 67.
1.4 Thesis relevance
After four years of development on network devices, the thesis of
Tegelsrud and Frøysadal has become less relevant. The work done in the
previous projects has not made any major progress on the devices, which
as a direct consequence has lead to a stalemate while the industry has
completed developing the device part. Because of this, our project goals
have changed to focus on a field that is largely undiscovered and therefore
more interesting. The work performed by major industrial companies on
Network Managers has grown over the last years but is far from complete,
meaning routing and quality of service (QoS) scheduling is highly relevant
for the development area. Progress made during the project can supply
this field of development with a useful implementation and information.
This makes our master thesis more relevant in the development area if any
major progress can be made.
1.5 Interested parties
The following sections provide a brief introduction of the interested parties
in the project.
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1.5.1 Statoil
Statoil is an international energy-company dealing in oil and gas that were
established in 1972 following the discovery of oil in the North Sea. They
have operations in 37 countries and their headquarters are in Stavanger,
Norway.
Statoil has had a large interest in pushing for the HART and WHART
standards, as can clearly be seen by winning the "Hart Plant of the Year
2007" [16]. In order to be nominated for this award, a company needs to
present an objective and a solution to complete it. The solution being most
cost-efficient and fully utilising the HART protocol is declared the winner.
Statoil’s objective were to find a way that 24 wells in an oil field could send
data to a 1200 kilometre long underseas pipeline, while at the same time
minimising the amount of staff needed.
Their solution were to use a distributed control system with secondary
controllers closer to the field devices to handle their interfaces. For the full
system, 1400 field devices were used for monitoring. A video conferencing
application were also used in order for experts to cooperate in discovering
and fixing problems bound to arise. As a direct consequence, the HART
implementation helped the company meet their challenge for higher
efficiency, better availability and safety of their assets through analysing
the data. By using the full-time connection provided by the network, Statoil
were able to track traffic in order to troubleshoot and diagnose problems
instantly instead of waiting for the problem to be discovered at a later point.
1.5.2 Atmel
Atmel is a worldwide corporation that specialises in designing and manu-
facturing of "microcontrollers, capacitive touch solutions, advanced logic,
mixed-signal, non-volatile memory and radio frequency (RF) components"
[4]. The company is able to deliver complete solutions to any need within
these areas, making them highly desirable for our project. Their headquar-
ters are in San Jose, California, but we had contact with their office in Trond-
heim, Norway. In section 7.1 we introduce the hardware they provided and
chapter 5 elaborates why certain hardware had to be dropped.
1.5.3 ABB
ABB is a multinational company operating in robotics and specifically with
power and automation technologies [18] . The company specialises in
cost-effective, reliable and environment-friendly solutions [2]. ABB was
one of the founding members of HART Communications Foundation, and
participated actively with the development of the WirelessHART protocol
released in 2004. ABB has developed a fully functioning WirelessHART
network, where the sensor devices are proprietary and cannot be modified,
while the Network Manager and analyst can be configured according to the
needs of the user. The process of including ABB in our project is discussed
in chapter 5, and the hardware provided is introduced in section 7.1.1.
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1.6 Methodology
Within software development there are several frameworks used to
structure, plan and control the development process of an information
system. The frameworks are suited for different types of projects,
depending on type, scale and development process. The most common
frameworks are presented in the following sections.
Waterfall
The Waterfall framework is a sequential development model, where the
process is split into clearly separated phases. Once a phase is passed, the
phase is over and can not be returned to except for minor instances. The
phases are split into requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing,
integration and maintenance. Due to strict control and separation, the model
is unqualified for larger projects.
Prototyping
Prototyping is not a standalone development process, but an addition to
handle parts of a larger system developed using incremental, spiral or
rapid application development. Prototyping reduces risk by breaking a
project into smaller segments to make the system development easier and
more flexible. Prototypes are often discarded as they prove to be inefficient,
but some turn out to be implemented.
Incremental
The incremental approach breaks a project into smaller parts, where every
part goes through a mini-waterfall process before proceeding to the next
part. Overall requirements are defined before developing the minor parts.
Spiral
The spiral model combines design and prototyping elements, by separat-
ing the process into the phases analysis, evaluation, planning and develop-
ment. The cycle starts off with determining the objectives, alternatives and
constraints of an iteration. Next, every alternative and risk are evaluated.
The third part concerns developing and verifying the deliverable. Part four
is to plan the next iteration. After one cycle, the phases start over. The
framework aims to progress at a steady pace, while maintaining control
and reducing risk.
Rapid Application Development
RAD is a combination of iterative development and prototyping. The
framework aims for fast delivery and low risk by breaking the project into
smaller segments. RAD introduces project control by defining deadlines.
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If a deadline is about to slip, the deliverable is reduced rather than extend-
ing the deadline. It produces software iteratively, where prototypes are not
thrown away. Documentation is attached where necessary for future de-
velopment.
In our project we followed a pattern similar to the RAD framework.
We started out with a set of goals, where every goal were split into smaller
development processes. Once a module of the program were implemented,
we documented the module and moved on to the next one. We were
set back at several occasions described in chapter 5, resulting in reduced
deliverables as the deadline could not be extended.
1.7 Software Patterns
Software Patterns are predefined solutions to commonly occurring prob-
lems within software development. In this section we will describe the
different patterns we decided on implementing, and also mention where
the patterns have their uses.
Factory Method The Factory Method pattern is used to implement the
factory that deals with the creation of objects without specifying
the exact class. The factory can then choose the best fitting object.
This pattern is implemented in our queue, sessionFactory and
commandFactory systems.
Singleton The Singleton pattern restricts a class from being constructed
more than once. This is very useful if you do not want to send objects
around in your implementation. We have been using this pattern a
lot, in classes like the main layers, queueHandlers and other classes
that is initiated once. The basic skeleton of a singleton can be seen in
listing 1.1.
Builder This pattern is used to delay the creation of objects, calculation
of values or some other process that either is expensive to calculate
or is impossible at the time of initialization. We used this pattern
for creating objects we do not know what will contain upon creation,
like AdvertisementDLPDUs and the command ReportNeighborSig-
nalLevels.
1 public class Singleton {
2 private static Singleton singleton = null ;
3 public static Singleton getSingleton () {
4 if(singleton == null)
5 singleton = new Singleton () ;
6 return singleton ;
7 }
8
9 private Singleton () { }
7
10 }
Listing 1.1: The Singleton pattern
1.8 Thesis overview
The thesis is organised as follows: part two first introduces the user
to wireless network technology and terms in order to understand how
a network is designed and performs communication between different
devices. Next, the most common protocols and standards related to
sensor networking are explained. Differences and use-areas are mentioned,
before a thorough investigation of the WirelessHART protocol follows.
Part three starting at page 25 presents the reader to the development
environment, thesis goals, previous work on the topic and lastly what has
been implemented throughout the project time. The last part holds an
overview of results achieved, along with an evaluation of the results and
the project work. A conclusion follows, before future work is suggested at
the end.
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Part II
Theory
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Chapter 2
Wireless networks
The following chapter introduces the reader to fundamental principles in
wireless networking. The reader is first presented with the methods Time
Division Multiple Access and Carrier Sense Multiple Access for accessing
a shared medium. In section 2.1.4 the different topologies of a network
are discussed, before general routing protocols are presented in section
2.1.5. To prevent discussing terms several times, some mechanisms are first
introduced in chapter 4 WirelessHART on page 23.
2.1 Channel Access
One of the major challenges of wireless networking is detecting and
handling collisions when communicating. As nodes in the network are
either set to listen for traffic or to send traffic, a node cannot send and
receive at the same time. Combined with the fact that all nodes use the
same frequency band, only one node in an area can transmit at a time
without the risk of creating problems. If more than one node transmit
inside the same area1, a collision might happen and the transmission
is corrupted. CSMA (Carrier sense multiple access) and TDMA (Time
Division multiple access) are two methods for allowing multiple nodes in
a network to transmit data without these collisions happening.
2.1.1 Time Division Multiple Access
Time division multiple access (TDMA) is a method for multiple nodes
to use a shared medium based on timeslots. As can be seen on Figure
2.1 the transmission window is divided into timeslots that each node can
use. If a node does not need its timeslot, the shared medium will be idle
during that nodes timeslot. It is a well-developed technology that does
not need contention-periods like CSMA. This gives TDMA a potentially
higher utilisation and throughput. TDMA is a straightforward protocol to
implement and is suitable for ensuring Quality of Service (QoS). One big
problem with this channel access method is that all the node clocks need to
be synchronised. This means that overhead will be needed in order to keep
1the receiving node are in range of both senders
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Figure 2.1: A TDMA based network
the clocks up to date. Another problem is to dynamically allocate timeslots
to different nodes, particularly when the network grows and the travel time
from the Gateway (see section 4.2.3 on page 26) increases. Mobile nodes
further complicate the allocation problem.
2.1.2 Carrier Sense Multiple Access
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) is a probabilistic medium access
protocol that uses different techniques in order to verify the absence
of traffic on the shared medium before transmitting. CD (Collision
Detection) is used to improve the performance of CSMA by terminating the
transmission if a collision is detected, and it also reduces the probability
for a collision on the second try. CA (Collision Avoidance) is waiting
a random amount of time before retrying transmission if the medium is
busy. As radios are not able to listen for traffic while transmitting, Collision
Avoidance is the only possibility for wireless communication.
There are several access modes;
• 1-persistent - When the sender node is ready to send, it checks if
the medium is busy. If it is busy the node listens continually until
the medium is idle before sending its data. If a collision occurs, the
sender waits a random amount of time before trying to resend. This
is the most widely used version of CSMA/CD, and is used in wired
Ethernet like 10BASE5 and early versions of twisted-pair Ethernet.
• P-persistent - This version of CSMA listens continually as 1-
persistent, but when the medium becomes idle it is a probability p
that the node will try to send. If the node chooses not to send, it waits
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Figure 2.2: A CSMA based network
for the next timeslot. The process is repeated until the node, or an-
other node starts sending on the medium. This is the most widely
used version of CSMA/CA, and is used in Wi-Fi and Packet Radio
Systems.
• Non-persistent - Like 1-persistent, except that if the medium is busy,
the node waits a random amount of time before retrying to send after
a collision. This leads to better channel utilisation, but also longer
delay than 1-persistent. It will also help save some battery power if it
is implemented on a sensor network.
A B C
Figure 2.3: Hidden node
There are two problems that must be highlighted when discussing
CSMA, namely the “Hidden Terminal Problem” shown in figure 2.3 and
the “Exposed Terminal Problem” in figure 2.4.
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The Hidden Terminal Problem is present in most wireless networks. If
node A and node C want to communicate with node B but are unaware
of the each other’s existence, they cannot use carrier sense in order to
determine if they can send or not as seen in figure 2.3. The solution for
this problem is to have two control frames called Ready to Send (RTS)
and Clear to Send (CTS) as seen in figure 2.2. The sending node tells all
neighbouring nodes that it is about to send a frame with a RTS signal. The
receiving node sends back a CTS signal, and all other requests for utilising
the link will be denied until the node currently sending is done. This
method is called Virtual Carrier Sense. DCF Inter-frame Space (DIFS) are
the minimum required waiting time between sensing a busy channel and
contention for sending. While Short Inter-frame Space (SIFS) is the time
a device has to wait after receiving a packet before responding. Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) is the minimum time a node will stay silent after
receiving a packet. The timespan depends on the packet detected, as a
variable amount of subsequent packets will follow due to the progress in
the transmission pattern.
A B C D
Figure 2.4: Exposed node
The Exposed Terminal Problem (Figure 2.4) makes the node wait
unnecessary. Lets say node B starts sending to node A. Node C will see
the medium as busy and waits before sending to node D, even though
node D is not in range of node B and could receive from C. There is no
good solution to this problem. Both Hidden- and Exposed Terminal are
lowering overall throughput of the network drastically.
2.1.3 Frequency hopping
Frequency hopping is a technique used by many wireless networks for
better channel utilisation. The method rapidly switches between frequency
channels in a pseudo-random manner known to the transmitter and the
receiver only, distributing the sent packets on different channels. It makes
the network much more robust against “narrowband interference” like
electromagnetic radiation from a microwave. It also protects against
deliberate jamming of the network and is for this reason used in most
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military wireless networks like the Norwegian MRR (Multi Role Radio)2.
For this to work we need good synchronisation of the clocks, which is also
mandatory for implementing a TDMA based network.
2.1.4 Network Topologies
When choosing a routing protocol we have to look at the design of the
network. Is it a static or mobile topology? How many hops are needed to
get from one node to another? There are a lot of topologies we could talk
about, but we will mention the most common, namely Ring, Tree, Star- and
Mesh Topology.
Star Topology
The Star Network topology is one of the most common network topologies.
In its simplest form it consists of a series of nodes with one central node
as seen in figure 2.5. Regular Ethernet networks use this topology, where
every node in the network is connected to a central node acting as a hub or
switch. The central node can either broadcast the packets it receives to all
nodes (including the one it got the packet from), or send the packet only on
the correct link. These methods are called Passive and Active central node.
Figure 2.5: Star Topology
The Star network topology has very good performance as it is always
two jumps from sender to receiver, but it also puts a lot of overhead on
the central node that can create a bottleneck. Another big advantage of the
Star topology is that if a node other than the central node disconnects, it
2http://www.thalesgroup.com/Press_Releases/naval_PR_Norwegian_Navy_chooses_MRR-
3D-NG_radars/
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does not affect the network. However, one major disadvantage is that the
network is very vulnerable to central point of failure. If this happens, the
whole network will break down.
Mesh Topology
The Mesh Network Topology is a more advanced topology that makes
nodes in the network not only send information, but also relay information
from other nodes. This does however require smarter nodes, and a
disconnecting node may reduce performance in the network for some time.
The performance is reduced until the network topology is restructured and
new routes have been calculated.
Figure 2.6: Fully connected Mesh Topology
In a Mesh Network you do not need a central controlling node to make
the network run. If a node disconnects from the network it is the job of
the neighbours to find out that the node has left the network, and relay the
information to other nodes in the network.
The Mesh network can take many forms. A fully connected mesh
network seen in figure 2.6 is a network where all nodes are connected to
all other nodes. This makes the maximal jump distance between two nodes
one hop, providing full redundancy and fault tolerance. The disadvantages
are that it is expensive and difficult to implement and maintain. A partially
connected mesh network seen in figure 2.7, is a network where nodes have
to route through other nodes in order to reach certain nodes in the network.
At least one node has multiple connections, providing the network with
alternative routes in the event of a failure3. Mesh topology is used within
wired networks as well as wireless.
3Unless the fault occurs at the node with multiple connections
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Figure 2.7: Partially connected Mesh Topology
Ring topology
Ring topology is a network topology where every device is connected
to two neighbours, forming a chain of devices shaped as a circle. As
the network only provides one single pathway to any given node, it is
vulnerable to device or link failure as the consequence will be a separated
network. Every packet sent will have to go by every node along the way, be
processed and sent forward, which means that the topology is slow when
maintaining large networks. Compared to star topology, the ring network
does not require a server, it performs better under heavy work load and it is
cheaper to maintain. Ring topology can be further split into two versions:
Token Ring A token circulates the network. If a node has a packet to send,
it seizes the token in order to send. Only the node holding the token
are allowed to send.
FDDI Ring Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) ring is similar to the
token ring. FDDI contains two rings opposed to token ring’s single
ring. One ring goes each way, making the topology fault resistant
against a node breaking down.
Tree topology
A tree topology is a network where one node acts as the root, which
has children nodes. These nodes have children and so it continues. The
tree network requires a minimum of three levels, as two levels would be
equivalent to a star network. The nodes at the higher levels are required
to perform more work than the nodes at the lower levels due to the
connections established. The advantages are that the network is scalable; a
new node can connect to an existing node by creating a new link. Every
device is connected by point-to-point connections, avoiding any loops.
By having a hierarchical approach, the network is easy to manage and
correcting errors are fast due to the structure. The disadvantages are that
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maintenance can be difficult when the network spans over large areas. The
network is also vulnerable to errors at central nodes, making every network
partition isolated.
2.1.5 Routing Protocols
In this section we will discuss two routing protocols required by the
WirelessHART standard called Graph- and Source routing. These are not
the only routing protocols available to Wireless Sensor Networks, but they
are important for this thesis. We will define the protocols here and in
section 4.6.1 on page 42 we will discuss how these routing protocols are
used in WirelessHART.
Graph Routing
Graph routing is a specific term used within WHART on a table-driven
routing protocol. This means that a forwarding table of the entire network
is located on either some or all the nodes in the network. If the lookup
table is located on some, and not all nodes, these few nodes will have the
responsibility to tell the other nodes where to send packets. This is the
case in WirelessHART where the Network Manager is the central node with
information about the network topology.
Source Routing
Source routing gives a single directed route through the network, specified
in the packet itself. If the network topology changes during transmission of
this packet it will result in a packet loss. Source routing allows the sender
to partially or completely determine the route a packet travels through the
network. Although the packet is lost if the route breaks down, the routing
method provides several advantages. Troubleshooting is made easier, as a
timer for every packet sent is kept. The source node can manage network
performance by specifically determine routes, preventing congestion on
heavily used links. Source routing is a well-known routing protocol widely
used in older systems, while Graph routing is less known and restricted to
WHART.
2.2 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have discussed basic mechanisms required in wireless
networks. Methods for scheduling and accessing a medium successfully
has been presented. Section 2.1.4 provided an overview of the different
network topolgies, and what makes one topology favourable over another.
Section 2.1.5 detailed how packets were routed through a network in the
different protocols available.
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Chapter 3
Standards
This chapter presents the most important protocols and standards used
within wireless sensor networks. The protocols IEEE 802.15.4, ISA100.11a,
Zigbee and WirelessHART are presented in turn. Towards the end of the
chapter a comparison between ISA100.11a and WirelessHART is made,
before section 3.5 concludes why WirelessHART is most suitable for an
industrial sensor network.
3.1 IEEE 802.15.4
IEEE1 802 is a collection of IEEE standards for determining local and
metropolitan area networks. The standard is concerned with networks
where packets of variable size are transmitted, and the services are limited
to the Physical Layer and the Data Link Layer. IEEE 802.15 is an
extension of 802, working on Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN).
The standard is further split into seven subgroups, grouped by use and
functionality. The IEEE 802.15.4 is the standard for low-rate personal area
networks, and provides the foundation for wireless protocols like ZigBee,
ISA100.11a and WirelessHART which we will look into later in this chapter.
The IEEE 802.15.4 only defines the Physical Layer and the media access
control, so it is up to the different protocols to define the upper layers on
the stack as can be seen in figure 3.1.
The standard offers low-cost and low speed communication between
nearby devices, which requires no underlying infrastructure to operate.
Standard transfer rate is 250 Kbit/s but tradeoffs for gaining lower power
requirements can be obtained by utilising one of several different Physical
Layer options. This can lead to speeds at either 20 or 40 Kbit/s, which in
turn will offer even lower energy consumption. The standard aims to offer
devices with low production and operation costs, which are technologically
simple with few supported operations. At the same time it is important not
to sacrifice flexibility that will allow its use in different settings.
Despite being simple, IEEE 802.14.5 offers several technical functions
like reservation of timeslots, Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision
1Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
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Avoidance (see section 2.2), security for safe communications and possibil-
ities for managing power through link quality and energy detection. These
technical terms were discussed in section 2.1.
3.2 ISA100.11a
ISA100.11a is a wireless network technology developed by the members of
the International Society of Automation in 2008. The development was
an open process, which meant that everyone could contribute; ranging
from the companies that were already members to users and suppliers.
Everyone could participate, enabling experts’ involvement from every
aspect. The work yielded a successful protocol design in the same manner
as IEEE 802.15.4. The mission stated by the committee were to "decrease
the time, costs, and risks of developing and deploying standards-based
industrial wireless devices and systems"[11]. The standard is supposed
to provide interoperability, compliance, tools, technical support, education
and market awareness for its users, which it largely provides by being
dynamic and flexible.
3.3 Zigbee
Zigbee is a wireless protocol developed and ratified by members of the
Zigbee alliance, consisting of over 300 interested parties. The radio is based
on the 802.15.4 specification and operates on the 2.4 GHz, 900 MHz and 868
MHz bands. Zigbee is often compared with Bluetooth, but is considered a
lighter version as it requires less software [20]. Zigbee does not provide
functionality such as time slots or security however, which makes it more
suitable for home-automation, surveillance and control than industrial use.
To improve usability, Zigbee pro was introduced in 2007 and provides
channel agility for better utilisation of the communication medium.
3.4 Merging of ISA and WirelessHART
ISA100.11a and WirelessHART are often compared as they provide many
of the same functionalities. ISA100.11a consists of routing and non-
routing devices, handheld, backbone devices which can operate as a router,
gateways, system manager and a security manager, just like WHART.
The differences are more apparent on the logical layer, as WirelessHART
only supports the HART standard while ISA100.11a supports several;
WirelessHART, ZigBee, RFID and more. ISA can handle many application
protocols like FOUNDATION fieldbus2 and HART due to a universal
Gateway.
There has been attempts of combining WirelessHART and ISA 100.11a
in a global IEC standard [10]. The standard applies to the same application
2Communication system serving as the ground-level network in a factory automation
environment
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Figure 3.1: The different protocols
areas and uses the same communication protocols based on IEEE 802.15.2.
The merging proves to be hard however. Both standards are supported
by major companies, making the process of choosing technology hard and
tedious as both sides favour their technology.
3.5 Why WirelessHART
It can be discussed which protocol is most favourable, however a few
conclusions can be made. While the protocols use the same communication
standards, Zigbee is more suitable for non-industrial sensor networks [14].
Because the protocol does not support frequency hopping, it is ineligible
due to lack of robustness. Security is also at minimum, which is an essential
factor for larger industrial networks in order to protect the integrity and
confidentiality of installations. The protocol only supports star topology
with 7 slaves per master which is not satisfactory for industrial process
automation, compared to WHART’s star and mesh topology. As seen
in table 3.1 Zigbee does not provide the same quality of service as
WirelessHART.
Zigbee WirelessHART
Robustness Low High
Co-existence Low High
Power Consumption High Low
Security Low High
Table 3.1: Protocol service comparison
ISA100 is built for industrial networks and supports several different
protocols. Native HART is not supported however, and the standard
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provides its own Physical Layer whereas WirelessHART is built upon the
IEEE 802.15 protocol, as seen in figure 3.1. Support for existing HART
networks is a critical factor, and alone makes WirelessHART favourable.
Compared to Zigbee, the standard is dominant within industrial use as
seen in table 3.1.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the reader has been introduced to the wireless standards
IEEE 802.15.4, ISA100.11a, Zigbee and WirelessHART. The different spe-
cifications of each protocol have been highlighted, and compared against
the opposing protocols. A section has been dedicated to the ongoing work
of merging ISA and WirelessHART, before section 3.5 concludes why Wire-
lessHART is the first choice for running a wireless sensor network.
22
Chapter 4
WirelessHART
The following chapter presents the reader with the fundamentals of the
WirelessHART protocol. Section 4.1 introduces general information around
the protocol, followed by an introduction to the different devices running
in a WirelessHART network. Section 4.3 discusses how communication
between the layers are achieved, while the functionality of the different
layers are presented from section 4.4 to section 4.7 on pages 31 - 47. In
sections 4.8 and 4.20 the process of time synchronising a network and
joining a new device are elaborated.
4.1 The WirelessHART protocol
The following sections introduce the reader to the WirelessHART standard
and the old Wired HART protocol.
4.1.1 HART Communication Foundation
The HART Communication Foundation (HCF) is a non-profit international
organization that was founded by members of the HART User Group in
March 1993, in order to support and promote the use of the HART protocol
[8]. The aim of the organization was, and still is "to advance the application
of HART technology, strengthen its position in the global market, and help
users maximize the value of their smart instrumentation investments". The
HCF can be traced back to September 1990 when representatives from 26
companies met and established the HART User Group. HCF has worked
with improving the Wired HART standard since the start, but introduced
the WirelessHART standard as late as 2007.
4.1.2 The WirelessHART standard
The WirelessHART technology is based on the older HART Communica-
tion Protocol standard released in 1993 [8]. Companies saw the need for
a wireless standard specifically designed to meet the needs industrial en-
vironments provided. Supporting the development of a wireless standard
also became important as cabling over long distances proved to be very
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costly. The protocol provides key capabilities opposed to standard wireless
protocols. WHART provides reliability when faced with interference from
outside sources1, or when nodes and links break down. The mechanisms
providing these services such as channel hopping, mesh networking and
time synchronized messages are described in sections 4.5 and 4.6. The pro-
tocol also provides low power consumption by having few commands and
effectively using time slots.
4.1.3 WirelessHART compared to HART
As WirelessHART is the successor of HART, they have certain features
in common while differing on other aspects. On the Application Layer
they both operate on command-basis with predefined data types discussed
in section 4.7. As WHART is a wireless routing protocol, power is an
issue and the Network Layer provides power-optimisation and redundant
paths for mesh networking while HART only provides physical links.
WHART utilises time synchronisation and frequency hopping for sharing
the communication medium, while HART uses a token passing function
where the nodes follow a master/slave protocol2. WHART uses the IEEE
802.15.4 2.4 GHz broadband for transmitting data, where HART uses
analogue and digital signalling with a 4-20 mA wire.
4.2 Network components
A WHART network is comprised of five different types of devices, as can
be seen in figure 4.1 on the facing page. We will look into all of them in
turn in the following sections. However they all share some characteristics.
All devices connected to the WirelessHART network are Field Devices,
Adapters, Routers, Access Points or Handheld Devices. They are all able to
act as routers, sending and receiving packets for other nodes.
4.2.1 Field Devices
The field devices are the basic components in a WHART network. They
monitor and store certain data which they send onward when a timeslot
permits. The field devices are often placed in spots that are difficult to
access for humans, resulting in no human interaction for long periods of
time. For this reason it is important that the devices are energy efficient.
The devices have a simple, minimalistic interface with few commands.
They need to have basic routing capabilities, such as sending and receiving
packets between neighbours. This information is provided by the packet
headers, which is provided by the Network Manager when the packet is
created and sent.
1Data traffic sent on same channel from non WHART devices
2One device sends and all other listens
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4.2.2 Adapter
The adapter is a device that integrates a wired HART network into a
WHART network. As wired HART is close to 20 years older than WHART,
many wired HART networks already exist. It is desirable to utilise WHART
when expanding these networks, while still keeping the old infrastructure.
The adapters make certain that the process of converting data from wired
to wireless transmission works seamlessly. In order to perform routing
between different protocols, the adapter holds an internal routing table to
control traffic flowing between the networks.
4.2.3 Gateway
The task of the Gateway is to bridge the WHART and the plant automation
network, enabling host applications to gain information from the network,
and experts are able to analyse the readings sent from the field devices.
The Gateway also needs to cache burst data from the field devices. As a
network only has one active Gateway it has a fixed, known address 0xF981
0000 02 and the nickname 0xF981. The method of transmitting the data
highly depends on the protocol, and is usually not wireless. Gateways
have a unique clock source, which provides the network with a source to
synchronise clock signals used for timeslots and superframes. As can be
seen in figure 4.1, the Access Points are connected to the Gateway and will
get the clock signal from it, before distributing it onwards to the devices.
The Gateway can be used for several tasks:
• Converting data from one protocol to another
• A connection point for one or more networks using the same protocol
• Converting data from one format to another
Virtual Gateway
The Virtual Gateway serves as a single point of entry with the Gateway and
Network Manager on one side, the Access Points and network devices on
the other. The Virtual Gateway sources the time synchronisation packets
to the Access Points and provides buffering for different data packets such
as publish data messages, event notifications, cached command responses,
diagnostics and large data transfers. The Virtual Gateway is also tasked
with supporting existing HART commands in cases where the Gateway
works as a translator.
4.2.4 Access Points
The Access Point provides access to the wireless network for the Gateway,
Network Manager and the Security Manager, making them able to
communicate with the field devices. The connection to the Gateway does
not have to be a WHART connection. It can also be connected through other
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network connections like Wi-Fi or Ethernet. The Access Point supports
communication to any device part of its subnet.
4.2.5 Network Manager
The Network Manager has the task of configuring the network and
performing scheduling and routing. Although it is possible to have
redundant Network Managers, there is only one active Network Manager
at any time in the network. The Network Manager has a fixed address
(Unique ID = 0xF980 0x000001; Nickname = 0xF980) which is known by
all the devices in the network. The Network Manager is tasked with
scheduling the route packets will take through the network. Additionally
it has to monitor how traffic flows, manage and optimise communication
resources, making it the most critical part of the network as it determines
how the network acts.
4.2.6 Security Manager
The Security Manager is responsible for generating, storing and managing
keys used for device authentication and data encryption in the network.
The Security Manager provides the Network Manager with join, network
and session keys, while the network devices receive a join key. As the
Security Manager is part of the Network Manager, there is only one
Security Manager in a network. However one Security Manager is able to
provide security for several non-related networks. The Security Manager is
completely hidden from the Gateway, as communication goes through the
Network Manager only.
4.2.7 Handheld Device
Handheld devices can be directly connected to a WHART network by
connecting to a field device. The handheld devices are used to control and
perform maintenance on the network, as well as installation and control of
network devices.
4.3 Communication between the layers
The following sections provide an overview of how communication
between the layers are achieved.
4.3.1 Service Primitive types
As the protocol is constructed through a layered approach, the layers
within the stack communicate through sets of Application Program
Interfaces (APIs) which every layer provides to the layer above, also called
Service Primitives (SPs) [6]. There are four message types, namely:
• Request - Upper layer requests data or a service from a lower layer
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• Confirm - The lower layer responds to a request
• Indicate - The lower layer sends a request to the layer above. This
usually only happens when a new message has arrived.
• Respond - Upper layer responds to the indicate message from the
lower layer.
The messages can further be split into two groups; Message service
primitives and Management service primitives. Message SPs are trans-
missions of messages between nodes and Management SPs deal with the
configuration of the stack layers.
The message sequence of a typical transaction can be seen in figure 4.2.
• (1) A transmission is initiated by the Application Layer sending a
request to the layer below at node A.
• (2) Once the message is received at node B, an indicate message is
sent from the Physical Layer to the Application Layer, notifying it of
the transmission.
• (3) Once the Physical Layer has transmitted the message from node
A, it returns a confirm up the stack.
• (4) The Application Layer at node B creates a reply and sends a
request message to the Physical Layer for transmission.
• (5) Node A receives the message and initiates an indicate message,
while the Physical Layer at node B returns a confirm (6).
4.3.2 Layer-specific Service Primitives
Each layer provides a set of service primitives for the layer above and
beneath. In the following sections the service primitives are briefly
explained, while the management primitives are mentioned at the end of
each section.
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Physical Layer Service Primitives
The Physical Layer is mainly tasked with packet transmission on the radio,
and the service primitives are related to the topic.
ENABLE.request - This Service Primitive is used to set a physical channel
to either transmit or receive
ENABLE.confirm - responds to an Enable.request from the MAC layer with
the state a channel has been set to.
ENABLE.indicate - Notifies the MAC layer of an incoming transmission
on the radio.
CCA.request - This service primitive is a request from the MAC layer to
check whether the channel is clear to send on or not.
CCA.confirm - This service primitive is a response to a CCA.request from
the MAC layer.
DATA.request - This service primitive requests transmission of a data
packet
DATA.confirm - This service primitive responds to a Data.request with a
status of the transmission
DATA.indication - This service primitive notifies the MAC layer that a
whole packet is arriving on the radio, in contrast to Enable.indicate
which only notifies of data on the link.
ERROR.indication - This service primitive notifies the MAC layer that an
error occured while receiving a data packet.
The layer also provides a set of management services which is related
the state of the radio and its power level.
Data Link Layer Service Primitives
The service primitives at the DLL are an extension of the services from the
neighbouring layers, but also contains services related to the network.
FLUSH.request - This service primitive requests that a packet stored in the
transmit queue is to be deleted. The given packet to be deleted is sent
along as a parameter.
FLUSH.confirm - This service primitive responds to Flush.request to delete
a packet from the transmit queue.
TRANSMIT.request - This service primitive is used to request a packet
transmission. Depending on the parameters called with, it defines
what address type to use and type of routing.
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TRANSMIT.confirm - This service primitive is a response to a previous
Transmit.request about a transmission.
TRANSMIT.indicate - This service primitive notifies the MAC layer about
a successful reception of a packet on the Physical Layer.
DISCONNECT.indicate - This service primitive notifies the Network
Layer about a device which has disconnected, allowing the Network
Layer to reschedule its routes.
PATH_FAILURE.indicate - This service primitive notifies the Network
Layer about a failing link.
ADVERTISE.indicate - This service primitive notifies the Network Layer
about a received advertisement message. If the device is not part
of the network, the layer can initiate a join process and attempt to
synchronise to the network the advertisement message came from.
NEIGHBOUR.indicate - This service primitive notifies about a neighbour
discovery which is not formerly recognised as a neighbour. Updates
in the routing table can be made accordingly.
RECEIVE.indicate - This service primitive notifies about a received
message which destination is not this device. The Network Layer
will check its routing table, before sending it onwards on the correct
link.
In addition, the Data Link Layer provides a set of management services
which is related to managing superframes, links, edges, network ID and
join related information.
Network Layer Service Primitives
The Network Layer contains services related to transmission.
TRANSMIT.request - This service primitive is called to transmit a packet.
TRANSMIT.indicate - This service is called when a packet is received.
TRANSMIT.response - This service primitive is used to respond to a
Transmit.indicate.
TRANSMIT.confirm - This service primitive is used to confirm a Trans-
mit.request with a status message.
FLUSH.request - This service is used to delete a packet with the handle
sent along as a parameter.
FLUSH.confirm - This service is a response to a Flush.request.
In addition, the layer provides a set of management services providing
network tasks related to sessions, routes and Time To Live (TTL) of a
packet.
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4.4 WHART Physical Layer
The WirelessHART layered approach is similar to that of the OSI model
widely used to describe many communication protocols [17]. The
WirelessHART protocol introduces additional features at some of the
layers, which we will look at in the following sections.
The Physical Layer is based on the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 2.4 GHz Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)3 Physical Layer [6]. It deals with every
characteristic related to transmission such as signalling method, signal
strength and device sensitivity. The radio only operates in the 2400 - 2483,5
MHz ISM band, and is able to send at 250 Kbps. The radio has 16 channels
numbering from 11 to 26, split by a 5 MHz gap.
4.4.1 Clear Channel Assessment
Clear Channel Assessment is a technique used in wireless networks to
determine if a channel is busy or not. CCA has three different modes for
determining a channel as free of traffic:
Mode 0 Energy detection above a specified threshold
Mode 1 802.11 DSSS physical packet signal detection. The receiver is
constantly monitoring the channel for a 802.11 preamble.
3Mechanism to spread transmissions across a wider range of the spectrum
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Mode 2 A combination of mode 0 and 1.
WirelessHART utilises mode 2 of CCA, determining the channel as clear
if no IEEE 802.15.4 traffic is detected.
4.4.2 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum in WHART
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS), also called Channel Hop-
ping, is a technique used in wireless networks to avoid jamming and re-
duce interference by other devices during transmission. The physical chan-
nel is changed for every transmission, ensuring that only the authenticated
devices know which channel to use at any time. The standard uses 16 chan-
nels numbered from 11 to 26, where channels can be blacklisted if they are
already in use or are noise infected. There are two different types that can
be used:
Slotted hopping One message per slot only.
Slow hopping A slot can be shared amongst a group of devices, which is
based on the CSMA/CA channel access described in section 2.2 on
page 13.
Figure 4.6 displays how a network can utilise channel hopping for every
new transaction.
4.4.3 Physical Layer Protocol Data Unit
The Physical Layer PDU consists of three values used by the radio to inform
about an incoming packet. The three values are:
Preamble - A four bytes sequence used by the radio to inform that a packet
is arriving.
Delimiter - Also called Start of Frame Delimter (SFD). Consists of one byte,
notifying the radio that the next byte is part of the packet.
Length - Seven bytes containing the length of the data packet, excluding
the PPDU.
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Figure 4.5: Data Link Layer Architecture
4.5 WHART Data Link Layer
The Data Link Layer (DLL) provides mechanisms for time synchronisation
and transmission between neighbours. As WHART uses TDMA (See
section 2.1 on page 12) to avoid collisions by assigning timeslots (section
4.5.1), it is critical to keep the clocks of all devices in the network
synchronised. Every timeslot is 10 ms, meaning the DLL will have to
constantly update its clock due to clock drift. To keep track of timeslots,
the DLL stores information in superframes (see section 4.5.1). As the DLL
has different tasks, they can be split into six main modules seen in figure
4.5 and described in the following sections:
Interfaces
As the WHART protocol uses a layered approach, every layer needs
interfaces to be able to access and be accessed by its neighbouring layers.
The layer provides services for interacting with the Physical Layer and the
Network Layer. The Interfaces are only represented by bold text in figure
4.5.
Timer
The task of the timer module is to keep the clock of the device synchronised
to the network time, so that the time slots can be met accurately. As the time
slots are of 10 ms, it leaves small room for error.
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Communication Tables
WHART is a mesh network, where every node needs to keep a minimum
of routing information. The communication table maintains a collection of
the node’s neighbours and connecting links. This information is provided
by the Network Manager, and is used for routing packets through the
network. The communication tables are Link Table, Superframe Table,
Neighbour Table and Graph Table in figure 4.5.
Link Scheduler
The link scheduler calculates the next active timeslot based on information
from the superframe (see section 4.5.1) and link tables (see section 4.5.2).
As priorities of transactions and links can change, the link scheduler
continually needs to recalculate the order.
Message Handling Module
The DLL keeps two separate queues; one for packets passing up to the
network layer and one for packets down to the physical layer.
State Machine
The state machine performs the tasks of receiving and sending packets.
As the sending and receiving is connected to timing, this module keeps
a TDMA state machine as well as transmit and receive engines4. The state
machine is responsible for sending and receiving packets during a given
timeslot, to adjust the clock when needed and transition from one state to
another according to the superframe.
4.5.1 Time Division Multiple Access
TDMA is a mechanism for splitting a shared media between devices as
discussed in section 2.1 on page 12. WirelessHART assigns the Network
Manager to allocate how the medium access is distributed. The Network
Manager creates superframes consisting of a variable number of timeslots,
and schedules in what order the superframes are allowed to access the
medium as can seen in figure 4.6.
Timeslot
A timeslot is a period of 10 ms during which a device can communic-
ate with the network. The Network Manager is responsible for allocating
timeslots to devices. Timeslots are assigned to one device and specifically
for one link. During that timeslot a device can send packets on the link, and
the neighbouring device will be set to receive mode. The Network Manager
orders timeslots in superframes (section 4.5.1) distributed among nodes.
4The mechanisms responsible for transmitting and receiving packages
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Superframe
Superframe is used in combination with TDMA (see section 2.1) for
ordering timeslots and assigning a specified time for sending or receiving
at devices as illustrated on figure 4.6. It is possible to have multiple
superframes, where each one determines a specific sequence of time slots.
Every superframe start from ASN 0 (Section 4.8.1) and has a length of
the number of timeslots. The superframe will repeat itself once it reaches
the end. The Network Manager assigns timeslots to devices according to
needs, and specifies whether it is a send or receive timeslot. As timeslots
are only one way, if a neighbouring pair of devices want to communicate
they will require one timeslot each for transmission.
4.5.2 Links
How communication between two devices during a timeslot happens, is
determined by links. Every occupied timeslot is assigned to a link, and
depending on the type of link there is a sender and a number of recipients.
There are four types of links, briefly discussed in the following subsections:
Normal Link
Normal link is the common link connecting two devices, where there is a
sender and a receiver. The link is used by two devices to communicate
between each other once they both are fully connected to the network. The
transmission packets are usually Data DLPDU’s discussed in section 4.5.6,
followed by an ACK DLPDU if there is enough time left in the timeslot.
Broadcast Link
A broadcast link is a link which is assigned to a sending device, and every
device within range is considered as a recipient device. As no one device
is the receiver, the receiving address is set to 0xFFFF. Opposed to messages
sent on a normal link, broadcast link messages are not acknowledged by
the receiving devices.
Join Link
A join link is used during the join process of a new node, and can be
considered as a partly integrated link only. The link is associated with the
joining device, and depending on which way the messages flow, the device
can be either the sender or the receiver. The join link is after a new device
intercepts an advertisement message (see section 4.5.6) and constructs a
join request from information contained within the advertisement message.
The join request message is sent through a neighbouring node as shown in
figure 4.20 on page 56. Once received and processed, the Network Manager
schedules a join link for the joining device.
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Discovery Link
A discovery link is used to maintain and service a network. The link is
used for nodes to discover new neighbours and to maintain connectivity
with already existing neighbours. After a set amount of time5, a device will
send a keep-alive packet (see section 4.5.6) to the neighbouring device it has
not communicated with for the longest amount of time. Discovery links
are downgraded by other links, and will not be used if another link can
be scheduled during that timeslot. If a device is not scheduled to transmit
during a discovery timeslot, it will still listen to record traffic between its
neighbours.
4.5.3 Link Scheduling
All devices maintain a link scheduling function to identify the next slot
within an active superframe. When a node services a timeslot, it either
listens for a new packet or propagates a packet onward. To identify the
next link within a superframe, the calculation shown in 4.1 is performed.
Super f rameSlot = (AbsoluteSlotNumber)%Super f rame.NumSlots (4.1)
Determining the next link is straightforward, but is complicated by
events requiring frequent recalculation of assigned slots. Events affecting
the scheduling are transaction priorities, modification of links, enabling
and disabling of superframes or failed transactions of high priority.
4.5.4 Neighbour Table
Every device keeps and maintains a list of its neighbours; both the
ones communicating with and the ones discovered when overhearing
communications. The neighbour table is critical for communication and
maintaining a mesh network, as each link can either be connected to
one neighbour or a broadcast link, or to a graph referencing multiple
neighbours. The table keeps information relevant for the device to perform
communication successfully, such as:
General neighbour identity information Contains the neighbour’s unique
ID, 2-byte nickname address and if the device is a time source.
Performance and historical statistics contains statistics relevant for com-
munication such as Received Signal Level (RSL), a timestamp for last
communication with neighbour and the number of packets transmit-
ted and received.
Shared slot parameters contains information needed to support the back-
off algorithm.
5default 30 seconds
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4.5.5 The Sub-layers
Several of the functions performed by the Data Link Layer are executed in
its two sub-layers introduced below.
Logical Link Layer Control
The LLC sub-layer is assigned the task of creating the different DLPDU
packet types, and populate the header fields accordingly as discussed in
section 4.8. The layer is also tasked with security and error-correcting at
the Data Link Layer, by generating the Message Integrity Code (section
4.5.7) and the Cyclic Redundancy Check (section 8.1).
Medium Access Control
The MAC sub-layer manages slot synchronisation, identifies slots to be
serviced, and handles listening for packets sent from neighbours as well
as sending DLPDU’s. An overview of the structures kept in the MAC are
presented in table 4.1. The main priority of the sub-layer is to propagate
packets put in the device’s buffer, followed by receiving DLPDU’s from its
neighbours.
Module Presented in section
Neighbour table 4.5.4
Superframes 4.5.1
Links 4.5.2
Link Scheduler 4.5.3
State Machine 4.5
Table 4.1: MAC overview
4.5.6 Data Protocol Data Unit types
The standard specifies different types of DLPDU’s that can be sent between
devices. Depending on the type, the packet contains different information
and are processed accordingly. The type is determined by the value set in
the Packet Type field in the DLPDU specifier seen in figure 4.7. Below we
briefly introduce the different packet types.
Data
Data DLPDU is the standard packet types sent within the network. Data
packets contain network and device data on route to their destination. 1112
in the Packet Type field i the DLPDU specifier determines the packet as a
data DLPDU.
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Priority
11 Command
10 Process Data
01 Normal
00 Alarm
Packet Type
000 ACK
001 Advertise
010 Keep Alive
011 Disconnect
111 Data
Network Key
Figure 4.7: DLPDU specifier
Keep-Alive
Keep-Alive DLPDU is used for managing and servicing the network.
As the device clocks are subject to clock drift, they constantly need to
be adjusted as discussed in section 4.8. Keep-Alive packets are sent
between neighbouring devices at regular intervals for maintaining time
synchronisation. 0102 in the Packet Type determines the Keep-Alive
DLPDU.
Advertise
Advertise DLPDU are data packets sent on the shared medium to provide
neighbouring devices with information needed to synchronse with the
network and initiate a join process. The Advertise DLPDU contains
information such as superframes, ASN of the network, join control, the
security level supported, the channel map array and the Graph ID. The
joining device investigates the superframes and uses the join links until it
is assigned new links by the network manager. 0012 in the Packet Type
determines a packet as an Advertise.
Disconnect
Devices will from time to time leave a network, sometimes in an orderly
fashion and sometimes not. Disconnect DLPDU is sent from a device to its
neighbour when it is about to leave the network. The Disconnect packet
has no payload, only a MIC calculated by the Network Key. The packet
type is set to 0112.
Acknowledge
Acknowledge DLPDU is used as a response to a sending device to inform
that a Data DLPDU has been successfully received on the Data Link Layer.
The ACK DLPDU is determined with 0002 in the packet type field in the
DLPDU specifier. The ACK generates its MIC using the same key used in
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the received DLPDU. An ACK contains a response code determining if the
packet was successfully received or not:
0 - Successfully received
61 - Error due to no buffer space available
62 - Error, no alarm/event buffers available
63 - Error, too low priority
Packets of type Keep-Alive, Advertise and Disconnect addressed to a
device are responded with an ACK. ACK packets also contain a Time
Adjustment Field, containing the difference between expected time of
reception and actual reception. The field is used for time synchronising.
4.5.7 Data Link Layer Protocol Data Unit
The Data Link Layer Protocol Data Unit (DLPDU) is the packet sent
between the Data Link Layer and the Physical Layer when transmitting
and receiving packets. The DLPDU contains information necessary for
neighbour to neighbour transmissions as well as information for ensuring
error free transmission.
0x41
The WHART standard requires the first byte to be set to the value 0x41. No
further description of the use is provided.
Address Specifier
This field is used to determine which addressing mode is used for the
current packet. EUI-64 addressing mode are used during the join process,
while nickname addresses are used once the source and destination devices
are both part of the network.
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Bytes Value
1 0x41
1 Address Specifier
1 Sequence Number
2 Network ID
2/8 Destination Address
2/8 Source Address
1 DLPDU Specifier
- DLL payload
4 Message Integrity Code (MIC)
2 Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC16)
Table 4.2: DLPDU structure
Network ID
The field is used for storing the 2 byte network ID of the network the packet
belongs to.
Destination and Source Address
Destination and source address contains the addresses for the neighbour-
ing pair during this transmission. The values can be either 2 or 8-bytes
long, depending on the current state of the devices. If one device is in the
joining process, 8-byte addresses are used. If not, the 2 byte nicknames are
utilised.
DLPDU Specifier
The DLPDU specifier seen on figure 4.7 provides information about the
DLPDU. Bit 0-2 identifies the type of DLPDU contained in the packet,
further described in section 4.5.6. Bit 3 says whether the network key or
join key is utilised, while bit 4-5 determines the priority of the packet. Bits
6-7 are not used.
DLL Payload
DLL payload is the data sent as well as the headers from the layers above.
Message Integrity Code
4 bytes are used to provide a message integrity code of the DLPDU. The
MIC is used for authentication, and no packets will be processed unless
they are authenticated first.
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Figure 4.9: Network Layer architecture
Cyclic Redundancy Check
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is a value generated to make certain that
an error-free transmission has occurred. An algorithm generating a check
value of the DLL payload is executed, and the value is stored in the CRC
field.
4.6 WHART Network and Transport Layer
In the standard, the Network Layer and the Transport Layer are closely tied
as can be seen in figure 4.3. The two layers work together to provide secure
end-to-end communication for packet transmission. While the Data Link
Layer deals with connections between neighbours, these layers provide the
routing needed to take a packet from the sender to the receiver.
4.6.1 Routing
In WirelessHART there are three different ways of routing a packet from
the source to a sink, namely source, graph and superframe routing. The
two first are introduced in section 2.1.5. The type of routing used depends
on who the communicating devices are. Communication can go between
two devices or between a device and the Gateway.
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Source Routing
In source routing the whole path to the destination are enclosed in the
header of the packet. Each device on the path simply checks the header,
and forwards the packet on the correct link. Source routing is mostly used
by the Network Manager and Gateway, as they know the network topology
and are able to construct the whole path. In the event a device wants to use
source routing, the Network Manager must first provide it with the whole
path by Command 976 Write Source-Route. The path is associated with the
destination address through Command 974 Write Route.
Graph Routing
In graph routing, a message is forwarded on the links according to the 2
bytes graph ID field in the NPDU header. The graph ID is a directional
graph constructed by the Network Manager, containing neighbours and
links which are on the path to the destination device. Every device will
choose the first available link matching an edge in the graph, and forward
the message. As the graph is directional, delivery is guaranteed as no loops
are present.
Superframe Routing
Superframe routing is a special case of graph routing special to Wire-
lessHART. Instead of using the graph ID field, devices use the super-
frame ID in the message for routing. The message follows a superframe,
and every device in the superframe forwards the message regardless of
its neighbours. In order to determine if superframe or graph routing is
used, superframe routing corresponds to values between zero and 255 in
the graph ID field. Values over 255 determine that graph routing is ap-
plied.
4.6.2 Network Layer Protocol Data Unit
The Network Layer PDU contains information used for successful end-
to-end transmissions, as well as security functionality provided by the
security sub-layer.
Control Field
The Network Control Field seen in figure 4.11 contains information on how
the rest of the fields in the header should be read. Bits 0-2 indicate if the
expanded routing information field contains various information seen on
figure 4.10 on the next page. If set, the expanded routing field contains
one or two 8-bytes long routes and a 2-byte proxy route. Bits 3-5 are
reserved according to the standard, while bits 6-7 determine if the source
and destination fields contain EUI-64 addresses.
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Byte Value
1 Control Field
1 TTL counter
2 ASN snippet
2 Graph ID
2/8 Destination Address
2/8 Source Address
0/2/10/18 Expanded Routing Information
1 Security Control
13 Nounce Counter
4 MIC
- Enciphered Payload
Table 4.3: NPDU structure
b7 b0
Destination address
    1 = EUI-64 Address
Source Address
   1 = EUI-64 Address
1st Source Route
2nd Source Route
Proxy Route
Reserved
Figure 4.11: The Network Control Byte
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b7 b0
Reserved Security Type
Figure 4.12: The Security Control Byte
Time To Live
Time To Live (TTL) is a hop counter which determines how many more
hops the packet can make before being dropped. When the packet is
received at the Network Layer, the destination address is checked against
the address of the current device. If it is a match, it is further handled.
If not, the counter is decremented and the packet is forwarded on a link
towards its destination.
ASN Snippet
Contains the two least significant bytes of the Absolute Slot Number (see
section 4.8.1 on page 48), and is used to perform diagnostics on the network
to determine network efficiency. The packet’s ASN is compared to the
current ASN to determine the age of the packet. If the value is greater
than maxPacketAge, the packet is discarded as too old.
Graph ID
The graph ID contains a set of possible nodes to forward the packet to
for reaching the destination. The field is used for routing the packet to
the destination, and can be used in combination with any other routing
information avaliable in the header.
Destination and Source Address
These fields contain the values for the original sender and the final
destination, either which can be two or eight bytes long. These values
are different from the similar fields in the DLPDU, as these fields are not
modified during transmission.
4.6.3 Security Layer Protocol Data Unit
The Security Layer header is used for ensuring that the payload is not
modified or accessed by unauthenticated personnel by providing integrity,
encryption and sender reliability.
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Figure 4.13: Transport byte
Security Control Byte
The first byte of the Security Protocol Data Unit (SPDU) is used to provide
information about the security provided as can be seen in figure 4.12. Bit
zero to three indicates what security is used to encrypt the payload, while
bits four to seven is reserved and not used. The security employed is
determined by a type code:
0 - Session Keyed
1 - Join Keyed
2 - Handheld Keyed
Four bits are reserved for three values in order to be able to expand the
security functionality in the future.
Counter
The nounce counter used for running the encryption algorithm defined in
the Security Control Byte.
Message Integrity Check
MIC provides the SPDU with integrity and authenticity ensurance. It
is similar to a Message Authentication Code, except that the generation
algorithm does not use a secret key. The algorithm generates a value and
stores it in the MIC field. The value is generated again at the receiving end
and compared.
4.6.4 Transport Layer Protocol Data Unit
The Transport Layer is responsible for ensuring successful transmission of
packets across multi-hop connections. TPDU supports both acknowledged
packets like data transmissions and un-acknowledged transactions like
broadcast or advertisement depending on the values set in the transport
byte.
46
Transport
    Byte
          Device/
Extended Status Command #1 Command #2 Command #n
Aggregated Commands Possible
Figure 4.14: Transport Layer
Transport Byte
This byte contains information used to ensure end to end delivery of a
packet, as can be seen in figure 4.13. Bit zero to four contains the sequence
number used to order and track packets. The field is set differently
depending if the traffic is acknowledged or not, or if it is a response
packet. Bit five indicates that a broadcast message is used. Bit six is set
when the NPDU is a response packet, in which case the payload should
only contain command responses. Bit seven is set when the package is to
be acknowledged, and is used to make sure that acknowledgements are
created and sent.
Device status and Extended Device Status
This field contains the status of the device. The standard does not provide
further information on this field, and refers to to HCF Enumeration table
176.
HART Commands
The transport layer is tasked with appending the HART commands to the
final packet to be transmitted. With a few exceptions, several commands
can be aggregated and sent within one packet seen in figure 4.14. This
is useful when reading device configurations, or when several commands
have to be sent between two devices in sequence such as the join process.
4.7 WHART Application Layer
The Application Layer is the upper layer and provides communication
between the network and external applications used for analysing the
network. The communication between Gateway and devices are command
based, and the Application Layer is responsible for extracting command
number from a packet, the arguments enclosed and act accordingly seen
in figure 4.15. The layer holds a queue for packets arriving from the
Transport Layer, which hands them over to the Parser. A Command Processor
communicates with a Command Handler Module to build command packets
put together in the Assembler module. Commands are often relying on
6http://www.hartcomm2.org/hcf/services_tools/doc_sales.html
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Figure 4.15: Application Layer Architecture
information provided by the other layers, which is requested by the System
Manager Module. The Application Layer is also where report packets from
devices end up, making it possible for external programs to act according to
results. The messages passing between layers when requesting commands
can be seen in figure 4.2.
4.8 Time Synchronisation
Time synchronisation is critical in a WirelessHART network to enable
devices to communicate. The Gateway is the ultimate time source, while
the Access Points propagate the time synchronisation in the wireless
network. In a network there can be several Access Points providing clock
signals, and they all have to be synchronised. The communication between
a Gateway and the Access Points is not specified, but by utilising a wired
connection the time challenge between the devices can be solved.
4.8.1 Absolute Slot Number
Absolute Slot Number (ASN) is a counter used by the devices to calculate
when they are scheduled to transmit or send packets. ASN is determined
by the number of timeslots (see section 4.5.1) since the network were
created, at which ASN were 0. By knowing the global time when ASN
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Figure 4.16: Single Access Point with clock
were 0, a device can determine the current time by calculating number of
current ASN * 10 ms7. The device achieves this by receiving Command
793 Write UTC Time Mapping from the Network Manager. This command
informs the device what time it was when the network were created, and
should help the node synchronise to the network.
4.8.2 Providing clock signals
In WirelessHART there are multiple ways to provide time synchronisation
throughout the network. Access Points are usually given the task of
propagating the clock signals throughout the network. As a network has
N8 Access Points, there can be multiple clock providers. The most effective
number of time synchronisation providers depends largely on the size of
the network. Figure 4.16 displays a single Access Point providing time
synchronisation to the whole network.
In figure 4.17 we have one Access Point connected to the Network
Manager which provides time synchronisation, and another AP which does
not. As several Access Points can be favourable to provide redundancy and
7every timeslot is 10 ms
8N = 1,2,..
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Figure 4.17: Access Point without clock
optimal paths, it might not be necessary for each one to propagate a clock
signal.
Figure 4.18 shows a larger network being serviced by two Access Points
providing clock signals. As a network grows larger, it is necessary to have
multiple time providers in order to keep the network synchronised and
prevent clock drift from affecting the efficiency of a network.
4.8.3 Slot Timing
Every communication session between nodes follows the assigned timeslot
as discussed in section 4.5.1. Clocks can drift due to the variance in
crystal oscillation9. This causes the devices to consider timeslots differently,
resulting in shifting and failing transmissions within a timeslot. To keep the
clock of two separate devices aligned, a transmitting device will transmit
its packet when it perceives its timeslot to start. The device scheduled as
the recipient, will enter receive mode when it estimates the timeslot to
begin. From the timeslot start, a TsRxOffset value is calculated before the
receive window(TsRxWait) is allowed to drift while trying to resynchronise
the devices. Once a message is detected after the end of the Physical
9Caused by temperature, ageing and other effects.
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Layer Delimiter, the value TsError is calculated determining the difference
between the device’s calculated start time and the real start time of the
packet. If the packet had a destination address, an ACK is generated and
returned, allowing the source address to align its time window according
to the destination. The values defined in figure 4.19 are listed below:
TsTxOffset Defines the start of the slot to the start of preamble transmis-
sion. (see section 4.4)
TsRxOffset Start of slot to when transceiver should be listening
TsRxWait The minimum amount of time a transceiver has to wait before
a message appears. The value determines the clock drift that can be
tolerated while still being able to communicate.
TsError The time difference between when the message was sent and when
the receiver thought the message was sent. Determines how much the
clock has drifted.
TsMaxPacket The maximum amount of time it will take to transmit the
largest packet. This includes the preamble, delimiter, length and
DLPDU.
TsTxAckDelay The time between the end of a message until an ACK is
generated10.
TsRxAckDelay From end of transmitting a message to when the transmit-
ting device are supposed to listen for an ACK.
TsAckWait The minimum amount of time to wait before an ACK can be
expected.
TsAck The time it takes to transmit an ACK.
TsCCAOffset The amount of time from start of slot to CCA begins.
TsCCA The time it takes to perform CCA.
10Only applies to messages which are not of type broadcast
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TsRxTx Amount of time it takes to switch between the two radio states11.
The Source device
The transaction starts by the source device beginning to transmit the start
of the message (SOM) at TsTxOffset. SOM starts when the Physical Layer
Delimiter has been received. Before the message can be sent however,
the device performs a TsCCA to check if the channel is free of other
transmissions. If the channel is free, the transceiver mode is changed to
transmit (TsRxTX) and the packet is transmitted.
Once the message has been transmitted, the device will change its
transceiver to receive mode and wait for an ACK message TsRxAckDelay
after the packet was transmitted. It will continue to listen for TsTxWait.
The Destination device
The destination device will enter receive mode and listen for incoming
traffic by TsRxOffset during the start of an assigned timeslot. The device will
listen for SOM for the duration of TsRxWait, and if a message is detected it
is received and validated 12.
If the message is validated, the device will inspect the destination
address and acknowledge the message13. The acknowledgement is done by
changing mode to transmit and transmitting an ACK exactly TsTxAckDelay
after the end of the packet was received.
4.8.4 Keep Alive Interval
As two neighbouring devices synchronise during regular transmissions,
they are synchronised as long as communication is upheld on a regular
basis. However, if they do not communicate for some time, Keep-Alive
packets are exchanged to keep synchronisation14. As discussed in section
4.8.3, the communication between two devices rely on different values
coinciding. The values can be calculated by the following equations:
y + TsRxO f f set ≤ TsTxO f f set (4.2)
y + TsTxO f f set + tHead ≤ TsRxO f f set + TsRxWait (4.3)
Equation 4.2 determines that the destination clock cannot be shifted a
larger value than y, in order for the receiving device to start listening before
the sender’s preamble is started in order to receive the packet successfully.
Equation 4.3 determines that the clock cannot be shifted more than y, in
11From transmit to receive or vice versa
12Messages that cannot be validated will not be handled and acknowledged
13Only if it is not a broadcast message
14a packet once every 30 seconds is sufficient
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order for the destination to receive the physical header before the timeslot
is over.
4.9 Join process
The following sections explain the join process of a device in detail.
4.9.1 Overview
When a device wants to join an existing network a communication process
between the device, its neighbours and the Network Manager is started.
Initial Device Provisioning
To be able to join a network, a device requires two values. The first is the
network ID, which is the unique ID of the network the device attempts
to join. The second piece of information is the Join Key, which can be
considered the password required by the device to join the network. Once
these data are in place, the device can attempt to join the network.
Listening for Network Traffic
Once the node has started the join process, the device engages search mode
through its data link. The search mode attempts to synchronise the node
with the network so that the node can receive advertise packets. The node
will identify its neighbours, both the ones that are advertising and the ones
that are not. The device gathers statistics as average signal strength to
determine which node it will send the join request through. The neighbour
picked is usually the one with proper Receive Signal Level and lowest join
priority. The signal level is to ensure that the connection between the nodes
are not broken. The join priority is a value determined by various factors
such as battery power, link load, capacity etc. The lower join priority, the
better. The joining node determines the best suited neighbour according to
these factors.
Presenting Credentials
Once the device is synchronised with the network, it generates a join
request which is sent to the Network Manager. The join request packet
contains information the Network Manager needs in order to determine if
it should allow further communication with the device. The join request
contains:
• The identity of the device
• The long tag which is the MAC address of the node
• The detected neighbouring devices
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• The device’s Join Key, which is its password into the network. All
devices are pre-configured with a Join Key.
The Join Key is used for communication between the device and the
Network Manager until the device receives Session Key and Network
Key from the Network Manager. As the Join Key is a password into
the network, further communication between them means that the Join
Key has been authenticated. If the Network Manager decides on further
communication, it sends a Session Key used for packet transmissions and
a Network Key for Data Link Layer device to device.
For different reasons such as congested links, high join priority or not
satisfactory signal level, a device is not able to join the network through the
first neighbour it picks. To avoid waiting for a reply that may never come,
once the device sends a packet to its picked neighbours it starts a response
timer. When the timer expires, a new join request is generated and sent
to the next advertising neighbour. This process continues until the device
receives a reply or maxJoinTries is reached. If maxJoinTries is reached, the
node goes back to passive search again.
Getting the First Keys
As mentioned in section 4.9.1, there are several factors that needs to be
fulfilled in order for a device to join a network. Once the Network Manager
receives a join request, it has to use the information contained within the
join request packet to establish if certain criteria are met:
• The device has a trusted identity
• The Join Key is a valid password
• The device name and password is satisfactory combined
From the join request packet, the Network Manager has enough informa-
tion to determine if these criteria are met. If everything is in order, the join
request authenticates, the Network Manager assigns a Session Key and a
nickname (2-byte address), and send them back to the device along with
the Network Key. The NPDU (see section 4.10) is enciphered using the Join
Key as this is the only key the device and the Network Manager currently
shared. The NPDU is routed back the same way through the parent of the
node. Once the joining device receives the NPDU, it sends an acknow-
ledgement back using the new Session and Network Keys.
Device Integration
Now that the device has keys and a network ID, it is partially integrated
into the network. Communication between the Network Manager and the
device still has to go through the parent as a proxy, utilising the join link.
The next step is to fully integrate the device into the network, making it a
fully functional node. To achieve this, the device needs at least two time-
source parents [9], update the communication tables in the device’s parents
and transfer the communication from a join link to a regular link.
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Quarantine
After a device has joined a network, it has no session with the Gateway
and is in the state called Quarantined. During this state the device can
only communicate with the Network Manager and can not publish any
data. The device is only allowed to communicate with the Network
Manager, but can collect statistics from neighbours and the network. After
the device is Quarantined it will generate HealthReports whenever the
HealthReportTimer15 expires. It will continue to do so even after a session
with the Gateway is granted. It is up to the Network Manager to decide
when the device is given a session to the Gateway. This can happen right
after it joins the network or it can be given several minutes.
Becoming Operational
Once a Gateway session16 is given to the device, the device becomes fully
operational. The Gateway will begin filling its data cache for this device.
There is usually a surge of activity when a new device connects to the
Gateway as can be seen in figure 4.20, so both the Gateway and the device
need to obtain sufficient bandwidth to meet the demands. The traffic from
the Gateway includes requests from external applications to interact with
the device. The bandwidth assigned to the device is used to process data
(the publish service) and alarms (the event service).
4.9.2 Network Layer join sequence
Searching
When the Network Layer is in the searching state, it looks for the network
and tries to synchronise to it in order to receive DLPDU packets. When the
Network Layer receives an advertise packet, it knows that the device has
found a neighbour and moves over to the Got an Advertising Neighbour.
The Network Layer join process can be seen on figure 4.21.
Got an Advertising Neighbor
In this state the Network Layer starts a timer called AdWaitTimeout and
continues to wait for more advertise packets. Once a sufficient amount
of advertise packets has been received, the state shifts to Requesting
Admission. If the timer runs out, the device tries to connect through the
next neighbour as discussed earlier.
Requesting Admission
In this state, the device sends a join request to the Network Manager, and
starts a clock called JoinRspTimer. JoinRspTimer will run until one of the
followings incidents happen:
15Default value is set to 15 minutes.
16The device can be accessed by host applications through the Gateway
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• The Network Manager responds with a Network Key, the Network
Manager session and a nickname for the device. If this happens, the
device moves onto the Loosely Coupled state.
• The JoinRspTimeout occurs. If so, a join request is resent and the time-
out is started again. This continues until the maximum amount of
retries has been reached or the device gets a reply. If no reply occurs,
the state machine (see section 4.5) exits with an error.
Loosely Coupled
When the device has received the required information in the Requesting
Admission state, it can communicate with the Network Manager. How-
ever, the communication is only semi-operational as they have to commu-
nicate through the shared link and by going through the device’s parent.
They continue to communicate this way until a normal frame and links
have been created for the device. Once this has been ensured, the join pro-
cess at the Network Layer is complete.
4.9.3 Data Link Layer join sequence
It is the Network Layer that initiates the Data Link Layer join process.
The device enters search mode and tries to synchronise its timeslot to the
network’s slot timing. In order to achieve this, the device starts the Active
Search.
Active Search
In the Active Search mode, the device enters receive mode and listens
for packets until the timer ActiveSearchShedTime expires. In order to find
the network, the device often has to scan through multiple channels.
The device sets a time period for listening to every channel called
ChannelSearchTime. Once the time period expires, the next channel is
searched. If a packet is found during the search, the state transitions to
Packet Received. If ActiveSearchShedTime expires, the device enters Passive
Search.
Passive Search
If no packet is found during Active Search, Passive Search is entered. This
mode is a reduced version of the Active Search, where the search cycle is
reduced and power saving mode is entered between search intervals. This
cycle will continue until a packet is received and the device transitions
to Packet Received, or the device is forced back into Active Search by
receiving the Force Join Mode command.
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Packet Received
The device enters this state once during join. During this state, the mission
is to synchronise the device timer to the network time. The device will
continue to receive network packets, and once a non-ACK packet arrives
the timing of that packet is recorded as the device’s slot time. Subsequent
non-ACK packets will be used to create statistics and align the time slot
further. Once the device’s time slot is synchronised to the network’s, the
device is fully synchronised with the network. The device uses packets
received to update its tables and advertise packets to limit its search to
certain channels. When the slot time is synchronised and the absolute slot
time is aligned to the network, the Slot Time Synchronised state is entered.
Slot Time Synchronized
When this state is entered, the device has sufficient information about the
network to only listen at certain slot times. When the device receives
packets during these intervals, the timer is adjusted to keep in sync with the
network. Before the Data Link Layer can do anything else, it has to wait for
a join request from the Network Layer. The Network Layer however, will
not generate the join request until it receives an advertise packet. When
the DLL receives the advertise packet, it signals the Network Layer by
a Advertise.indicate packet. The advertise packet contains information on
how the device has to configure Join frames and links in order to join the
network. When the join request packet is received from the Network Layer,
the DLL can enter the final stage.
Join Frame Active
The device has now configured everything it needs, aligned to the shared
time slots from the advertise packet and is ready to join the network. In
order to join the network, a request has to be sent via a neighbour. The
selection method assigns the neighbour with sufficient receive signal and
lowest join priority. Once the request is sent, Keep-Alive packets are sent to
its neighbours at regular intervals to keep in synchronisation. The reason
for this is to keep an updated overview of its neighbours in case a different
node has to be chosen for sending a join request.
4.10 Chapter summary
This chapter has presented the WirelessHART protocol in depth. An
overview of a WirelessHART network and its components has been
presented in section 4.3, followed by how communication between the
different layers are achieved. The functionality and architecture of each
layer have been presented in section 4.4 - 4.7. Time synchronisation and
the process of joining a new device into a network are two complex tasks,
and are two separate sections are dedicated to explaining these processes
on pages 48 and 56.
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Chapter 5
Planning the project
In the following chapter the reader is introduced to the process of
determining the project goals. The original project goals are listed in
table 5.1, before the final goals are presented as two separate parts:
functional requirements are detailed in section 5.2.2 and the non-functional
requirements in section 5.2.3.
5.1 The process
When we first started on the master dissertation our project focus were on
networking. More specifically, we were set for working on the Network
Layer, to implement a routing protocol and test the performance of a
network. We had a meeting with the last students that worked on this
project before officially taking over. During the meeting we were informed
that our current project goals could not be fulfilled until certain hardware
issues were addressed.
There were some serious problems with getting the RzRaven nodes
synchronised with their assigned timeslots (see section 4.5.1 on page 34).
The reason is that the radios have two clocks; an oscillator and a crystal
oscillator1. It is only possible to get hold of the oscillator, which makes the
nodes miss their timeslots over time due to clock drift.
The result is that no node wakes up during its assigned time, making
contact between nodes based on the chance that the node will hit its
timeslot. To solve the issue, the previous master students did not
implement Time Division Multiple Access (see section 2.1 on page 12)
but instead set every node to always listen when they were not sending
packets. Battery power is spent within a few weeks instead of the intended
years. The amount of power used is not acceptable for a sensor network
and is a direct violation of the WirelessHART standard. As a consequence,
we had to revise our project goals.
After several meetings with our supervisor Stein Gjessing and specialist
on micro controllers at Sintef, Niels Aakvaag, it became clear that we
had to address the timing issue in order to get anywhere. We looked
1The crystal oscillator is far more precise
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at different options, including changing the dissertation if no nodes that
satisfied the response time requirements defined in the standard could be
acquired. After considering different suppliers, we initially decided on
obtaining new micro controllers from Atmel of the type ATMEGA128RFA1
Evaluation Kit [4]. Besides not having to rewrite library calls to a different
api, these chips are a single chip solution providing an API supporting calls
to both clocks. This makes it possible to use the crystal oscillator on the
boards for better accuracy.
Obtaining new nodes proved a greater challenge than expected, as
Atmel were not able to supply us with new nodes at the moment, which
lead us towards obtaining new nodes in a different way.
Our supervisor proposed that we had a meeting with Trygve Harvei at
ABB [2], who were the examiner of the previous students and is an expert
on the WirelessHART protocol. During the meeting with Trygve and his
colleague Waqas Ikram, it became clear that our initial goals had already
been well researched through the years since the WirelessHART protocol
were released. They proposed a new angle on the project since timing
issues and node development were already thoroughly researched. The
new project were to focus more on the Network Manager, optimising QoS
and the time for a node to join the network. This new angle meant we
got proprietary nodes of the type WiMon100 from ABB to remove the
hardware- and timing issues. Unfortunately this also meant most of the
work done by the previous students could no longer be used. We decided
after a conversation with Stein Gjessing that we would change the angle,
and we made a new project plan. The plan had to be modified after some
problems explained in section 7.4.
5.2 Project Goals
The following section provides an overview of the project goals.
5.2.1 General Goals
We started out with a set of goals we thought would be appropriate based
on the future work section of the previous thesis and our own expectations
for the project. The goals were general and soon proved to be unrealistic,
as can be seen in table 5.1. As the project changed, so did our goals. Our
main objectives since the start have been to work on the Network Manager
and provide routing functionality. In section 7.4 we discuss how new nodes
were obtained. Due to new nodes, some of the project goals were reformed
into new goals while some were dropped altogether. Goal OFR01 were
reshaped to implement a time synchronisation function. OFR02, OFR07,
OFR08 and OFR09 were dropped, as these goals were no longer relevant
on the new devices. OFR03 was put on hold as large parts of the program
would have to be rewritten before we would get to implement channel
hopping and blacklisting. OFR06 was met when obtaining new nodes.
OFR04 and OFR05 were migrated to the project’s new goals, since routing
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ID Project goal
OFR01 Debug and fix timing issues between Gateway,
Access Points and sensor nodes
OFR02 Design and implement Network Abstraction Layer
OFR03 Implement channel hopping and blacklisting at the mac layer
OFR04 Identify appropriate routing algorithm
OFR05 Implement routing algorithm on Network Manager
OFR06 Upgrade hardware to support WirelessHart specifications
OFR07 Set up testbed machine with Realtime Linux 2.6 to
satisfy the single-digit latency requirement
OFR08 Port the Data Link Layer to C++ on new chips
OFR09 One-hop downlink to get faster response from nodes
Table 5.1: Original project goals
was still relevant. We decided to determine one set of functional and one set
of non-functional requirements for our system described in the following
sections. This would provide us with two sets of sub-tasks to be completed
in order to get a fully functional network up and running. In tables 5.2 and
5.3 we determine the priority of each goal.
5.2.2 Functional Requirements
Functional requirements deal with specific functionality a system should
be able to provide, often in the form of what a system must be able to do.
Because we are developing a WirelessHART network, specific functionality
from the standard is a logical starting point. Our functional requirements
deal with basic network configuration and transmission functionality, as
can be seen in table 5.2.
FR01 Advertise correctly
In order for devices to initiate the join process of a network the devices
need certain information, elaborated on in section 4.20. The information
is provided in advertise packets transmitted by the Gateway at regular
intervals. Our first goal is to properly build and transmit these packets, in
order for devices to obtain the necessary information to initiate the joining
sequence.
FR02 Join sequence
Once a device has received the advertise packets, a join request can be
implemented. The join sequence is a specific process where communication
goes between the new device, one of its neighbours and the Network
Manager. FR02 deals with setting up the message passing functionality,
where the goal is to have a device become fully integrated into the network.
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ID Functional requirement Priority
FR01 Advertise correctly Medium
FR02 Proper Join sequence Medium
FR03 Proper transmission pattern Medium
FR04 Functioning routing algorithm High
FR05 Time synchronised network High
FR06 Time Division Multiple Access Low
FR07 Build MIC and CRC Medium
FR08 Provide encryption of payload High
Table 5.2: Functional Requirements
FR03 Proper transmission pattern
Asperheim et al. provided the Gateway with a hard-coded transmission
functionality, where the packets were built on the fly and transmitted. After
separating the Gateway into several layers as discussed in NFR01, we need
to apply headers to the packet at the correct layers. On the receiving side,
the headers will be stripped off the packets at the corresponding layers.
This functionality is absolutely critical when operating with proprietary
nodes, as communication will not be established if the transmission pattern
is not according to the standard.
FR04 Functioning routing algorithm
Once a network grows beyond a few devices, more than one hop might be
necessary before a packet reaches its destination. A packet can reach its
destination in two ways; by flooding or by being routed. Since flooding
is expensive and unreliable, we intend to implement a routing algorithm
where a packet can be routed through the network successfully. We intend
to implement a graph routing algorithm, before expanding it to support
source routing as well.
FR05 Time synchronised network
Communication within a WHART network relies on time synchronisation
in order to know when to transmit or listen for packets. Without proper
time synchronisation, communication is based on chance. FR05 deals with
implementing a timing functionality, where every device in the network
have the same time and are able to successfully pass packets between them.
FR06 Time Division Multiple Access
TDMA greatly enhances the transmission quality in a network by provid-
ing simultaneous sending and opens for channel hopping as the clocks
need to be synchronised. We intend to implement a transmission pattern
where two devices can communicate by using several channels during one
timeslot.
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ID Non-functional requirement Priority
NFR01 Module-based applications Medium
NFR02 Failure resistance High
NFR03 Multiple Access Points High
NFR04 Separate Access Points High
NFR05 General security Medium
Table 5.3: Non-functional requirements
FR07 Build MIC and CRC
MIC and CRC are two security mechanisms provided by the Data Link
and Network Layers. They provide secure end-to-end communication and
makes sure that no bit-errors occur within a packet. As a part of the proper
packet transmission, we intend to implement these mechanisms to packets
being transmitted within the network.
FR08 Provide encryption of payload
The data contained in a WHART packet is encrypted to ensure that no
other devices than the recipient are able to read the content. An encryption
algorithm based on AES-128 is discussed in the standard, and will be
implemented to provide confidentiality to a packet.
5.2.3 Non-functional Requirements
Non-functional requirements are qualities a system should provide, and
are often referred to as requirements a system must be able to provide a
user with. We had certain ideas for what our system should be able to
provide for users, listed in table 5.3.
NFR01 Module-based applications
The current system is tightly built, without any possibility to take out
one part of the system and replace it with a new part without doing
major changes. As WirelessHART is designed to be a layered protocol, we
wanted to split the system into modules, where every layer provides one to
many modules. Interaction between the layers would go through provided
interfaces, limiting the amount of information passed between the layers.
NFR02 Failure resistance
We also want to make the system failure resistant, in case an Access Point
or a node should fail. In that case the system will discover the error and
reroute around these nodes.
67
NFR03 Multiple Access Points
NFR03 focuses on the ability to create and maintain several Access Points at
once in a network. Asperheim et al. had one Access Point integrated in the
Gateway, and we want to make it possible to have multiple Access Points
operating at once. The possibility to run Access Points with and without
time synchronisation abilities will also be addressed.
NFR04 Separate Access Points
Currently the Access Point is integrated into the Gateway, which means
there is only one. We intend to separate the Access Point from the
Gateway, making the Access Point able to run on its own platform without
depending on the Gateway.
NFR05 General Security
Lastly, we want to provide some general security in the system. This would
rely on several functional requirements, for instance FR06 and FR07.
5.3 Chapter Summary
The chapter has introduced the reader to the changes made in project goals
during the timespan of the project. Reasons for changing the original
project goals has been highlighted. The original goals as seen in table 5.1
has been modified to the functional requirements in table 5.2 and the non-
functional requirements in table 5.3.
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Chapter 6
Previous work
This chapter looks into the previous work done by Asperheim et al in their
project. A brief description of the changes made on the Access Points,
Gateway and Network Manager are provided. Their main field of work,
the Atmel nodes, are not presented due to the reasons stated in chapter 5.
Towards the end of the chapter, a test run of the code is explained.
6.1 Background
The work done on WirelessHART during the course of this project is based
on the thesis "Design and Implementation of a Rudimentary WirelessHART
Network"[3] by former students Kaja F. L. Skaar, Anders Asperheim
and Rune V. Sjøen at University of Oslo in August 2012. Their work
was a continuation of the master thesis "WirelessHART Gjennomgang og
implementering" [7] by students Håvard Tegelsrud and Jørgen Frøysadal at
University of Oslo in May 2010. Tegelsrud and Frøysadal implemented a
complete Physical Layer on the AVR RZRAVEN nodes, including the send
and receive functionality. Skaar, Asperheim and Sjøen used their work as
a foundation and further expanded on their work. In their thesis they give
a brief introduction to wireless networks and existing technologies, before
delving into the WirelessHART standard in detail. In their implementation
and conclusion sections, they elaborate on accomplishments obtained
during the course of the project, described in the following sections.
6.2 Access Point
The next sections provides an overview of the implementation on the
Access Points.
6.2.1 Adapting 15dot4-tools Sniffer
The Access Points provide an interface for sending packets on the network.
The students started out with the Contiki OS but as they had to adapt the
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project to work with WirelessHART, it was dropped in favour of 15dot4-
tools. 15dot4-tools provides the user with the ability to sniff for traffic on
the RavenUSB radio.
6.2.2 Receiving packets
The 15dot4-tools project is developed as a sniffer, and would therefore
only be able to sniff and receive packets. As Asperheim et al. used the
project both for transmission and receiving, they implemented a basic send
module to support transmission of data packets. A switch were already
existent in the program and by applying another case, the radio could be
set to transmit from a command window in the same manner as setting the
channel by /ravenusb -d /dev/hidraw2 -c 20.
6.2.3 Communication between AP and Gateway
The Access Points were programmed using C based HIDAPI, while the
rest of the program were written in java. In order for the two parts to
be able to communicate, a Java Native Library (JNI) were implemented
which instantiates C methods and objects as java classes. By implementing
the open source project called JavaHIDAPI, a non-blocking communication
could be created between the Access Point and the Physical Layer of the
Gateway.
6.3 Gateway
The following sections provide an overview of the Gateway implementa-
tion.
6.3.1 TX and RX queues
Modifications to the queue systems on the Gateway has been made. A
global, shared RX queue is implemented as well as a separate TX queue for
every neighbour.
6.3.2 Transmit and Receive Engine
The conclusion section states that a working transmit and receive engine
is implemented in the program, where the packet is sent properly and
received at another node. The packet is stripped of the related header
at each layer, before being passed on to the layer above and responded
with an ACK. When evaluating the code, the Gateway and Access Points
had completed transmit engines but no receive engines were as of yet
implemented. As mentioned earlier, the node implementation were not
evaluated.
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6.4 Network Manager
A Network Manager has been partly implemented with basic functionality.
Structures for handling and storing link and neighbour relations are
implemented, as well as superframes. Time Division Multiple Access has
been started, but were not utilised due to the inaccuracy of the device clocks
described earlier. For generating test results, values for creating a network
were hard-coded in using the structures and methods already in place.
6.4.1 HART Command interface
The handler for processing a command and respond accordingly was
implemented. As Asperheim et al. started at the lower layers, the handler
has only been partly implemented due to limited time. The handler
takes a command number as an argument, and fetches the corresponding
command. So far only two commands has been implemented, ReadLongTag
and WriteLongTag, which are not yet called by the program.
6.4.2 Graphical User Interface
A graphical user interface has been implemented to run on the Gateway
to provide the user with a better overview of all the information provided
by the program. The GUI provides four tabs and an additional command
window:
Control - The control tab provides information about the network struc-
ture and communication between devices by displaying the network
as a tree structure. The tree is regenerated every time the structure is
expanded.
Graph - Provides a graph view by utilising the graph description language
DOT to first create the connections between devices. Once all
connections are established, the tool Graphviz is used to generate a
PNG file from the graph which is loaded into the program.
Statistics - Holds statistics about the network, such as number of packets
sent, cpu_usage, queues and more.
Live Incident Log - Records any major changes in behaviour on the
Gateway components. Will log when a device is started, fail or close
down.
Command Line - The command line provides a small interface for extract-
ing information from the program. The commands help, ping and
numbers are implemented. Help provides user guidance, ping con-
tacts every node in the network and numbers displays the number of
connected devices.
To track and gather the information neccessary, the program is configured
to log every relevant information, which enables building the GUI on-the-
fly.
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6.5 Running the program
6.5.1 Initial tests of old code
When we ran the program handed over to us by the previous students for
the first time, we met several challenges. The RavenUSB sticks were not
marked, so actually finding the sniffer proved to be educated guessing.
Configuring Wireshark did not prove as intuitive as we thought, as it had
to be configured with a proper view and the correct channels. Once the
Wireshark was configured and listening for traffic, the Network Manager
was started and test packets were sent. We spotted spikes of traffic on
several channels, some of it surely by other wireless devices in the room.
However, certain channels proved to generate the same pattern of traffic
over and over. We were certain that this traffic came from the Network
Manager, as the generated traffic appeared at the same time as the it
indicated sending packets. As the receive method on the Network Manager
is not implemented, we had no way of testing if the nodes actually received
the traffic and sent something back. As work on the Atmel nodes were
discontinued, we decided not to spend time looking into what had been
done here. We planned on reusing their work on the Gateway, Access
Points and Network Manager, so they were the only parts of interest for
us.
Soon after we ran the first test, the machines running Wireshark and the
Network Manager broke down due to a hard drive failure. The Network
Manager displayed a grub rescue error message, and the solution was to
reinstall Ubuntu along with all the software needed.
6.5.2 Running code in new environment
After setting up the test environment again, we installed the java hidapi.
The installation did not go as seamless as first intended, as several tools
needed for the configuration were not present. In turn, they also needed
configuring which were not documented in the packages or online. After
modifying location and variables in some of the packages, we got eclipse
to recognise the native libhidapi-jni-32 and libhidapi-hidraw. After getting
past this obstacle, we felt certain that our Network Manager would now
be able to communicate with the 15dot4-tools usb stick. However, when
running the program we discovered that the usb stick is not recognised
by the Network Manager during initilization. In the code we identify the
devices connected to the machine when starting the program. The Network
Manager fail to create an Access Point and to identify the 15dot4-tools usb
stick, as can be seen in Appendix D.
After spending many hours on this problem and trying every solution
we could think of, we decided to attempt running the manager on a
windows machine instead. After installing the required software including
the hidapi’s and cygwin, we ran the manager and it instantly recognised
the 15dot4 tools with the correct id. As some native linux methods were
used for resource monitoring, they had to be rewritten in order to compile
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the program. Going over to a windows machine from a linux machine
required us to make some changes to the header of the packets being sent,
as windows did not allow us to use the initial buffer in combination with
the requested operation as can be seen in Appendix D. Not finding any
documentation of this problem, we decided to contact the creator of the
hidapi in hopes of getting an explanation of the problem. The problem
turned out to be related to size of messages passed between a program and
the usb interface, and is further elaborated on in section 7.4 on page 84.
6.6 Chapter Summary
The chapter has provided a brief overview of the work done on the
network components Access Point, Gateway and Network Manager. The
foundation our work is based on has been presented, and explained in
section 6.5 where the execution of the code for the first time is explained.
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Chapter 7
Development environment
The following chapter introduces the reader to the development environ-
ment of the project. Section 7.1 presents the different hardware used, while
section 7.2 elaborates on the software. In section 7.3 and throughout the
chapter, challenges met when establishing the environment are presented.
7.1 Hardware
The following sections present the hardware used during the project.
7.1.1 WiMon 100
The WiMon 100 is a wireless sensor made by ABB and used in different
facilities and environments around the world. WiMon 100 consists of
a vibration sensor, a temperature sensor, a battery and a WirelessHART
radio. The device is designed to work in harsh environments such as the
offshore sector, which goes hand in hand with the demands of our project
partner Statoil. The device is mounted by a tapped hole at the bottom,
making it possible to be installed at a wide range of locations. WiMon 100
are preconfigured with MAC addresses and response syntax, meaning we
are not able to modify anything on the nodes as they work according to the
standard. In table 7.1 on the following page we list relevant specifications
of the WiMon 100 nodes.
7.1.2 AVR JTAGICE MK2
AVR JTAGICE MK2 is the debug tool developed by Atmel for on-chip
compiling and debugging. JTAGICE is connected to a computer through a
usb interface and to the devices by a debugWIRE interface. JTAGICE mk2
is supported by AVR Studio 6 (see section 7.2.4), enabling us to upload our
program to the RavenUSB and modifying the code on the raven boards
through the IDE. However, as we acquired new nodes, we only used
JTAGICE for debugging code at the RavenUSB nodes.
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Data processing
Velocity, range 10Hz - 1KHz
Envelope, range filter 500Hz to 10KHz
A/D conversion 16 bit
Measuring schedule Remotely configurable
Wireless Communication
Network standard WirelessHART (HART 7.2)
Radio standard IEEE 802.15.4
Frequency 2.4 GHz, licence free ISM band
Output power (peak) <10 mW
Range (nominal) >50m @ line-of-sight
Physical
Weight 0.2 kg
Height 10 cm
Case material Stainless steel/Thermoplastic
Mounting 1/4 28 UNF tapped hole
Dimensions 100 x 36 mm
Misc
Battery lifetime <5 years with waveform upload interval
<1/day and vibration rms and temperature
values upload interval <1/hour
Recommended number of
associated sensors 100
Communication protocol HART over RS-485, HART over UDP
MODBUS RTU/TCP
Table 7.1: WiMon 100 specifications
Figure 7.1: Wimon 100
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Figure 7.2: Raspberry Pi
7.1.3 AVR RZ Raven P/N ATAVRRZRAVEN
The kit includes two AVR Raven boards and a usb stick for connecting to
a computer. The Raven card has a 2,4 GHz receiver, a picopower ACR
program processor and LCD screen. Atmel’s radios are developed for the
Zigbee standard, but are capable of transmitting WirelessHART traffic as
both are based on 802.15.4 standard. The AVR Raven radios were used
by the previous students, but proved insufficient for meeting the clock
demands by the WirelessHART standard. We have only used these radios
for testing traffic monitoring on Wireshark (se section 7.2.1). The RavenUSB
sticks work very well with the sniffer software however, and will be used
as they are.
7.1.4 Rasberry Pi
Raspberry pi is a single-board computer at the size of a credit card
developed by the Raspberry Pi foundation. The computer is manufactured
through deals with the companies Element 14/Premier Farnell and RS
Components, and only sold online. It does not contain any extra hardware,
meaning that no hard drive is supplied. Booting and storage is performed
on a SD card. Relevant specifications are listed in table 7.2 and the device
can be seen on figure 7.2. The computer is used by enthusiasts to perform
different minor tasks, and proved to be a helpful tool for our emulations.
We built a network using two raspberry Pi’s connected to a hub over
ethernet.
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Specification
CPU 700 MHz ARM11,
GPU Broadcom VideoCore 4,
OpenGL ES 2.0,
MPEG-2 and VC-1,
AVC high-profile decoder and encoder
Memory (SDRAM) 512 MB (shared with GPU)
USB 2.0 ports 2
Video outputs Composite PRCA, HDMI, raw LCD panels via
DSI
Audio outputs 3.5 mm jack, HDMI, l2S audio
Onboard storage SD/MMC/SDIO card slot
Onboard network 10/100 Ethernet usb adapter
Power ratings 700 mA (3.5 W)
Power source 5 volt via MicroUSB or GPIO header
Size 85.60 mm x 53.98 mm
Weight 45 g
Operating systems Debian GNU/Linux, Raspbian OS, Fedora,
Arch Linux ARM, RISC OS, FreeBSD, Plan 9
Table 7.2: Raspberry pi specifications
7.2 Software
The following sections present the software used for code development.
7.2.1 Wireshark
Wireshark is a network protocol analyser that started out as a small project
in 1998. Over the years it has grown to become the de facto standard in
many industries and educational institutions due to the contributions of
network experts [19]. As it is free of charge and holds a high quality, it is
often preferred over commercial sniffing tools. Wireshark supports a large
number of protocols, but not WirelessHART specifically. As 802.15.4 and
Zigbee traffic is supported, it is possible to transmit packets with Zigbee
headers and strip off those headers before processing the packet. Wireshark
captioning Command and Ack packets can be seen in figure 7.3.
7.2.2 AVR2025
The AVR2025 software package provides a code library for development on
the Atmel MAC architecture supported by all Atmel IEEE 802.15.4 chips [4].
The code library allows flexible firmware configuration, supports different
microcontrollers and allows easy platform porting. As it also supports
Atmel AVR Studio (listed in table 7.3), we can easily develop code based
on this library in AVR Studio 6, and then port the code to the Atmel usb
sticks used as Access Points.
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Figure 7.3: Wireshark
7.2.3 The 15dot4-tools Project
"The 15dot4-tools project is a set of valuable 802.15.4 tools. They are open-
source tools, allowing a community effort to develop them." [1] This project
is written in C and Assembler. It consists of a set of open-source tools for
sniffing, sending and analysing packets sent over the 802.15.4 standard.
The sniffer is available for the RavenUSB-stick (see section 7.1.3) we are
using, but the radio tools are only available for the Dresden Sam7s stick.
This created a challenge for Asperheim et al. on this subject and will be
discussed further in section 7.3.2.
7.2.4 Additional software
We have used a few programs for small parts of our project. Due to their
limited role, we have listed them in table 7.3 along with a brief description.
7.3 Encountered challenges
The following sections provide short explanations of encountered chal-
lenges.
7.3.1 Evaluating the state of the project
Over the course of the project we encountered several issues. The first
challenge was that we had no idea how the network was supposed to
be put together. We had gotten an idea by reading the master thesis of
the previous students and through conversations with them. When we
began the project, the entire network was disassembled and nothing was
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Software Version Use
Eclipse Juno 4.2 Programming Java and C in an
IDE providing easy handling of
larger project files. Enables use
of plugins for synchronising work
through github and SVN.
JUnit testing 4.11 Tests used within our program to
check if correct values are assigned
and the correct program syntax is
followed.
Subversion 1.7.9 Software to provide revision con-
trol and software versioning. Used
until Github proved to be a better
option.
Github 1.0.41.2 Version control software. Provides
a clean interface giving the user
an easy overview of revisions. We
favoured Github due to the amount
of control that is provided to the
user.
Apache Maven 3.0.5 Builds java projects dynamically
by downloading java libraries
and maven plugins defined in
a build.xml file attached to the
project. Reduced the risk of errors
when we moved the code between
machines.
Atmel Studio 6 6.1 beta Integrated development platform
for developing and debugging At-
mel AVR microcontroller-based ap-
plications[5]. Were used to com-
pile via the AVR-GCC compiler and
upload the compiled code to the
Raven-USB device.
Table 7.3: Additional software used
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marked. After reading online guides we got the environment properly
set up, although temporarily which is detailed in section 6.5 on page 72.
We were handed six unmarked RavenUSB sticks, two of them running as
sniffers. After some testing, we found one that were reacting differently to
traffic sent from the raven boards and determined that it was a sniffer. The
rest of the nodes we recompiled the code for, as we were unsure what they
actually contained.
7.3.2 Problems compiling 15dot4-tools
15dot4-tools are used on our RavenUSB sticks to be able to send and receive
data from the sensor network discussed in section 7.2.3. In the master
thesis "Design and Implementation of a Rudimentary WirelessHART
Network" [3] Asperheim et al. modified this project to be able to send
802.15.4 packets over the RavenUSB-stick using the 15dot4-Sniffer-tool as a
base. Configuring RavenUSB-stick with 15dot4-tools were not documented
anywhere, making it a challenge for us to identify the problem. The issue
arose due to a new compiler released since the last time the code was
used. To compile this project we needed to use AVR Studio 6 (see table 7.3)
together with the AVR JTAGICE MK2. The code was last compiled with the
older AVR Studio 5 and with the new AVR Studio came a new AVR-GCC
compiler. The new compiler does no longer accept non-constant variables
in the read-only section of the program memory. Once we discovered the
problem, it was easy to solve the issue by going through the project and
changing the needed variables to constants. After rewriting parts of the
code, the program worked properly again.
7.3.3 Compiling 15dot4-tools
To compile a legacy AVR Studio 5 project we needed to create a new project
from the Makefile with an extension called "Create Project From Makefile
(Beta)", and configure this project to use the external Makefile we used to
make the project. We also needed to choose the correct device we would
like to use, in our case this is the AT90USB12871.
7.3.4 Configuring Wireshark
The following sections provide an overview of the challenges met when
configuring Wireshark for sniffing traffic.
Ubuntu
The former students working on the project had been running Wireshark
on a linux redhat machine in combination with a lua dissector2 for
analysing the packets transmitted. The development environment went
down shortly after taking over the project, which is further described
1The RavenUSB device
2a small script for investigating packets
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in section 6.5. When reconfiguring Wireshark, we discovered that
synchronising all the software and hardware was not intuitive. We first
attempted to run the program on an ubuntu machine. Wireshark were set
up properly, but could not find the usb stick when selecting which interface
to monitor. After reinstalling the hidapi and hidraw api drivers and their
dependencies, we were able to find the ravenUSB when moving through
the directories to /sys/class/hidraw/hidraw2/device/uevent. Using the
command /ravenusb -d /dev/hidraw2 -c 20 we were allowed to set the
device to listen at channel 20. Wireshark would not recognise the
RavenUSB as an interface however. When running a test program to check
which hid devices were found, the RavenUSB were not one of them as can
be seen on figure 7.4. After trying every option that came to mind, we
decided to abandon Ubuntu and try a different approach.
Figure 7.4: HidAPI test application
Windows 7
After setting up Windows 7 on our test machine, we installed all the
required drivers without any problems. Wireshark was running, and
we had an additional java program (atUsbHidGui) for setting the correct
channel for the RavenUSB, acquired from the website of the maker of
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Figure 7.5: atHidUsbGui for setting channels
15dot4-tools [1].
atUsbHidGui seen in figure 7.5 displayed traffic on different channels,
making us confident it was working as intended. However, the program
crashed after a short while caused by an error which made the program
unable to run again. We encountered the same problem as on Ubuntu;
Wireshark could not recognise the RavenUSB as a network device. We sent
a mail directly to the maker of 15dot4-tools, Colin O’Flynn, to ask what
might cause the problem and which operating system would be the optimal
solution. The reply was that it might or might not work on Windows 7, as
the project was discontinued in 2010.
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Windows XP
After spending several hours on this problem, we determined that we
would go back to an operating system that were guaranteed to run the
software without any problems: Windows XP. After going through the
setup for a third time, we followed a guide on Colin’s website [1] for
windows configuration of the usb stick. Where Windows 7 did not
recognise the RavenUSB as a new device, Windows XP did immediately.
After installing the CompositeAtmelRNDIS.inf driver, RavenUSB appeared
as a new network connection. Disabling every item under its properties
and then running Wireshark proved to be working perfectly. As the Raven
commands were troublesome to install on Windows 7, we used Colin’s
AtUsbHidGui for setting the channel with great success. Shortly after
starting the Network Manager, Wireshark started to display traffic.
7.4 From Wimon100 to Raspberry pi
During the project we had to change our way of transmitting packets
in order to gain test results as described in chapter 5 on page 63. The
Wimon100 nodes (section 7.1.1) acquired from ABB were used for a short
time only before the program were restructured and rewritten to strictly
follow the protocol specifications. Asperheim et. al sent small test
DLPDU’s where the headers were hard-coded and did not contain any
payload. Once we had written the layers to apply correct headers to
outgoing packets, and started transmitting traffic, we encountered an error
from the java HidApi3 seen in listing 7.1.
1 java.io.IOException: The supplied user buffer is not
↪→ valid for the requested operation.
2 at com.codeminders.hidapi.HIDDevice.write(Native
↪→ Method)
3 at HIDAPITest.readDevice(HIDAPITest.java :57)
4 at HIDAPITest.main(HIDAPITest.java :29)
Listing 7.1: hidapi problem
Java HidApi only supports transmission of 64 bit packets where 32 are
already used. After contacting the developer of HidApi [15], Alan Ott,
he proposed that we could write a Libusb jni/jna wrapper4. We realised
that we would not be able to communicate with the Wimon100 nodes
before they received a packet identical to the standard specification and
responded to it. In addition, we would not be able to send the proper
packet with the current setup. Writing the wrapper in itself is a whole
new project, and acquiring the new usb sticks would take too much time.
We decided to abandon the Wimon100 nodes for now, and move over to an
approach leaning towards simulation. We still wanted to send packets over
3Java framework enabling communication with the usb devices
4Programming framework enabling java code to call and be called by native applications
and libraries written in other programming languages.
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a network, and looked around for solutions or set-ups that could work.
Raspberry pi, introduced in section 7.1.4, provided us with the possibility
to run a simple program on a device acting as a node. By running several
nodes on the Raspberry pi listening on different ports, the simulation
would resemble a WirelessHART device to a certain extent. Every aspect of
energy restriction and limited resources were removed, but we could test
and evaluate the capabilities of packet construction, communication and
routing.
7.5 Chapter summary
This chapter has presented the development environment of the project
to the user. The different hardware devices and software tools have been
introduced, along with encountered challenges related to establishing the
development environment.
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Chapter 8
Implementation
This chapter presents the implementation part of the project. The chapter is
split into sections according to the network components, with cross-device
functionality towards the end. Section 8.1 details how the overall structure
of the project has changed and how the communication flows between
the layers. Section 4.2.3 on page 26 details the implementation of the
Gateway and how it has been separated into layers. Section 8.3 presents the
implementation of the Device Network Management module containing
information shared by devices in the network. Sections 8.4 to 8.6 discuss
the implementation of the Network Manager, Security Manager and Access
Points. Section 8.7 on page 105 details the implemented security for a
transmission, while section 8.8 presents the construction of the DLPDU.
8.1 Program structure
The program structure has changed to an approach closer to the standard
over the course of the project. Asperheim et al. worked on every aspect
of the WirelessHART network. Due to limited time they integrated the
Network Manager, the Security Manager and the Access Points into the
Gateway. The different parts were running on the same machine, split into
separate processes. Our first task were to separate the Access Point from
the Gateway as seen in figure 4.3 and discussed in section 8.6.1. The Access
Points are only communicating with the Physical Layer at the Gateway
requiring data traffic to go the correct route from layer to layer before being
transmitted to the Access Points.
As seen in figure 8.1, the old project design held one Access Point and
used the Raven USB running 15dot4tools to communicate with the Atmel
AVR devices in the network. In the new design shown in figure 8.2, the
Gateway, Network Manager and Security Manager are still running on the
same machine as different processes. Interaction with the Security Manager
goes through the Network Manager now however, as the Gateway shall not
be aware of the Security Manager according to the standard.
The Access Point has been separated from the Gateway, and the network
are now able to run several Access Points simultaneously. Section 8.6
further elaborates on the changes made on the Access Points, but major
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changes include separate queues between the Gateway and every Access
Point. The Access Points can now act as a time synchronising source, but
depending on the size of the network, not everyone are required to do so.
8.1.1 Communication between the layers
The WirelessHART layered approach is based on the OSI model. In both
standards, interaction between the layers are performed through interfaces,
discussed in section 4.3 on page 27. As mentioned in the previous section,
we restructured the program into a layered approach. We wanted all
communication between the layers to to go through interfaces, in order
to separate the tasks of every layer clearly. The standard specifies a set
of interface calls for every layer listed in section 4.3. Every interface call
has not been implemented, due to time restraint and need-basis. We
implemented the calling syntax between the layers however. If an upper
layer requires a service for a lower layer, a request is sent and is responded
to with a confirm from the lower layer. If the lower layer needs to notify an
upper layer of an event or a received packet, an indicate message is passed
up the stack.
8.1.2 The Common Packet Structure
Besides separating the major parts of the program, every layer has been
separated into clearly defined modules. We determined that clearly
separating the functionality into smaller modules, would provide a better
overview of the program while at the same time making it easier for the
reader to navigate in the code. The modules for every device are described
in their corresponding sections later in the chapter. Below we describe the
common package which contains help methods utilised by all the other
packages.
Common - Contains help methods for value conversion when data
traverse the layers and are transmitted between devices. Also
contains a nickname generator used by the Network Manager when
a new device is joining the network.
Common.Stack - Contains a set of interfaces for the managers and every
layer in the Gateway. Every module contains the necessary values
and methods the inheriting class needs to implement.
Common.Connection - Contains information necessary for establishing
the test network and creating links between neighbouring nodes.
8.2 Gateway
The Gateway has undergone several changes since the previous thesis. The
Gateway used to have integrated Access Points. Communication with the
Security and Network Managers did not follow a specific pattern, but were
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based on the needs of the Gateway. The Gateway contained the queue
systems for the Access Points and generally performed every task in the
network by itself. We decided to split the Gateway into separate layers
and delegate tasks according to the protocol specification. The queue
systems were moved out to the Access Points as specified in section 8.6.
The Security Manager connection were moved to the Network Manager,
and interaction with the NM were included in the Data Link and Network
Layers as can be seen in figure 4.3.
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
Network Layer
Application Layer
     Old
Gateway
New Gateway
Figure 8.4: Gateway changes
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8.2.1 Gateway Packet Structure
The following sections provide an overview of the packet structures of the
Gateway shown in figure 8.5 on the next page. The solid arrows depict the
calling sequence.
ApplicationLayer - Implemented according to the Application Layer
in the standard. Contains modules for building and processing
commands.
ApplicationLayer.Startprogram - The Startprogram contains the neces-
sary information for starting a device in the network. The module
determines what type of device it is running on, and starts the device
accordingly.
ApplicationLayer.Commands - A help package for the Application Layer.
Contains currently implemented commands, separated to make the
system easy to maintain and scale.
ApplicationLayer.commands.Wirelesslesshartcommands - Contains com-
mands specific to the wirelessHART standard, and not available on
HART devices.
NetworkLayer - Implementation of the Network Layer. Attaches and
detaches the NPDU header.
Datalinklayer - Package containing the functionality of the Data Link
Layer. Contains modules for handling PDU’s, schedule links and
keep track of timouts. The DLL also builds packets with the
appropriate values as well as providing the correct sequence for
handling incoming packet types.
PhysicalLayer - Represents the Physical Layer. Currently contains the
module needed for simulating channelhopping over ethernet.
8.2.2 Timer
Timing is essential for a WirelessHART network to be able to function and
communicate correctly. The timing module is located at the Data Link
Layer, and is used in combination with the state machine to determine the
next event. The different timer types can be found in HCF Enumeration
table 431, which we do not have access to. As a consequence, we
have implemented the timer types mentioned in the standard along with
specified values as can be seen in table 8.1. -1 denotes a currently invalid
value. Command 795 writeTimerInterval2 is used for setting the time for each
timer type, and can be used to change the interval of each timer. It is
frequently used during start-up of the network, where the advertisement
interval is short and is changed to a longer interval after the initial phase.
1Tables available for purchase from Hart Communication Foundation
2For full information refer to appendix B on page 143
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Timer type Default time
ACTIVE_SEARCH_SHED_TIME 4.000.000 ms
ADVERTISEMENT_INTERVAL_TIME -1 ms
ADVERTISEMENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT 30.000 ms
BROADCAST_REPLY_TIME 60.000 ms
CHANNEL_SEARCH_TIME 400 ms
DISCOVERY_INTERVAL_TIMER -1 ms
HEALTH_REPORT_TIMER 900.000 ms
JOIN_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT 30.000 ms
KEEP_ALIVE_INTERVAL 30.000 ms
PASSIVE_CYCLE_TIME 600.000 ms
PASSIVE_WAKE_TIMER 6.500 ms
PATH_FAILURE_INTERVAL -1 ms
MAX_PACKET_AGE 300.000 ms
MAX_REPLY_TIME 30.000 ms
Table 8.1: timer types
The timer module handles all timing issues in the system and is used
to determine the next occurring event. The module determines the timing
type handed to it by the state machine, and acts accordingly. For every
case it is important to verify that the time is lower or equal to the ASN (see
section 4.8.1 on page 48), to avoid processing packets that are delayed and
have missed their timeslot. Once the timing type has been determined and
the time checked, the case is executed before the ASN is incremented. In the
test advertisement case, the control is handed over to the message handling
module which creates a new advertisement packet. The advertisement is
transmitted, before the ASN is incremented. In the event of a packet failing
the timer check, the packet is considered too old and is removed from the
queue. The same goes for packets not ACK’ed in time, as they will have to
be discarded and resent.
8.3 Device Network Management
Every WirelessHART network has a container for storing information
shared between devices, as can be seen on figure 8.6.
DeviceNetworkmanagement - Contains data structures necessary to store
and maintain the network topology.
DeviceNetworkManagement.Queue - A large amount of queues has been
implemented. Every queue type is implemented as a separate
module, to distinguish between the packet types queued.
DeviceNetworkmanagement.Pdu - The Pdu package contains the differ-
ent packet types described in section 4.5.6 on page 38. Every mod-
ule contains the necessary information for generating the associated
packet type. A module for handling the payload is also present.
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Figure 8.6: Device Network Management Packet Structure
DeviceNetworkmanagement.Entities - Defines the different structures
needed for keeping a network topology. The containers are specified
in DeviceNetworkManagement.
8.4 Network Manager
The Network Manager’s connections have been modified, and can be seen
in figure 8.2. In the following sections we provide an overview of the
changes made on the NM.
8.4.1 Network Manager Packet Structure
NetworkManager - Contains a single module for initializing the Network
Manager.
NetworkManager.Nodes - The Network Manager stores information
about every network device in a nodecontainer. Also contains a mod-
ule for routing packets to devices.
NetworkManager.Graphs - Stores information about the network graph.
8.4.2 Advertisement
To form a network, the Gateway transmits advertisement packets at spe-
cified intervals. The timer module contains an enumerate ADVERTISE-
MENT_INTERVAL_TIMER set to three seconds. Every three seconds the
timer module will timeout the enumerate and send a new advertisement
on the medium. Once a node receives an advertise, we calculate the
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ASN at which it was sent and check if the Network Layer has started
the join process. If that is the case, we initiate the timer ADVERTISE-
MENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT to 30 seconds. During this time, we wait for addi-
tional advertisement packets to arrive. If no further advertisement packets
arrive, the device returns to active search again. A node will stay in active
search for 4000 seconds, before going over to passive search according to
the standard. In our implementation, we have omitted the passive search
as it was not considered important at this stage.
8.4.3 Join process
All commands mentioned in this section is thoroughly explained in
Appendix B on page 143. When a node is presented with the Network
ID and the Join Key for a network, it starts listening for Advertise
packets. When the first Advertise packet is received, the joining node
synchronise its clock to the clock of the advertiser before activating
ADVERTISE_WAIT_TIMEOUT in the Timer class. During this timer the
node will listen for more advertisements trying to build the neighbour
table and calculate the average RSL3 of all its neighbours. Once it times
out the join process is initiated. The join process is initiated by sending
a join request on one of its neighbour’s join links that are stated in the
Advertise packet. The request contains the commands 20: Read Long Tag
and 787: Report Neighbor Signal Levels. The Network Manager receives
the join request. With the information received, it decides on what node
should be the node’s parent for more traffic and generates a nickname
for the node. This information is then used to create the join reply,
containing the three commands Write Network Key, Write Device Nickname
Address and Write Session. The join reply is then sent to the neighbour the
Network Manager has decided as the joining nodes parent, with the proxy
bit set in the Network Layer PDU. In our implementation the Network
Manager choose the neighbour by getting the first neighbour in the list.
3RSL - Received Signal Level
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It could be implemented in several ways like closest neighbour by jumps,
or the node with the least traffic. Once the node receives the join reply,
it is in a quarantined state, meaning it can communicate only with the
Network Manager. To get to the operational state the node need to receive
superframes, graphs and sessions from the Network Manager.
8.4.4 Superframe calculation
In order to provide reliable communication, WirelessHART schedules the
medium access through superframes, discussed in section 4.5.1 on page 36.
A superframe holds a number of slots, where each one can be assigned to
a link. A link has a transmitter and one to many receivers, depending on
the type of communication scheduled for the slot. The protocol does not
specify the length of a superframe, only that it can be of variable length. It
is the task of the Network Manager to assign which superframes are active,
meaning a device can hold inactive superframes for later use.
In order to keep track of the superframes, a superframeTable was created
with a list of all superframes and a maximum number of 20 superframes
in the system. This restriction is mentioned in the standard, but with no
reason as to why. We guess this is because of the limited resources on the
nodes.
To get a superframe to a device in the network command 965; write su-
perframe is called. The command transfers information like the superframe
ID, slots in superframe and an execution time for the command. Links are
transferred with a separate command 967; write link. These commands are
further explained in appendix B on page 143.
In our implementation the superframe calculation is very basic. All
nodes in range of each other get one data link to communicate and there is
one join link for each device as well as a discovery link. Broadcast links are
not implemented yet. For more details on the link types see section 4.5.2 on
page 36.
8.4.5 Routing
In WirelessHART there are three types of routing used; graph and source
routing discussed in section 2.1.5, and superframe routing which is not
implemented. The type of algorithm used is determined by whom the
sender is. If a node is sending information to the Network Manager as
the recipient, graph routing is utilised. If the recipient is another node,
or the Network Manager sends a packet to a node, source routing is used.
We decided to implement a graph routing algorithm first in order to find all
available paths. Once all the available paths are discovered, using sub-trees
of these we can build the source routing as well.
Implementing graph routing
When researching routing algorithms for mesh networks, we came upon
an article about a graph routing algorithm suitable for the requirements
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of WirelessHART [13]. The protocol named Exhenced Least-Hop First
Routing (ELHFR) determines the network topology as a connected graph
and then generates the shortest paths. The shortest paths are only
determined for leaf nodes, as a sub-graph of any leaf would be the fastest
route to a node part of the route. An example can be viewed in figure 8.8.
We have a partial mesh network, with several routes to each node. The
routing algorithm discovers the shortest path to every leaf node, currently
nodes G, H, I and F. A breadth-first tree4 is constructed as can be seen in
figure 8.9. Complete routes to every node are now generated. As we want
to use the algorithm for building our source routes as well, we decided
to generate all routes for leaf nodes first, but also store every sub-graph
possible.
New device joining
The suggested routing protocol provides one case for the network creation
and one for when a new device is joining. As our network is small and
will be started from scratch, we decided to merge the two cases with the
possibility to expand it with an additional update function later. Part of
the reasoning behind this solution, is that every new joining device will
have two parents. The parents’ neighbour tables will have to be updated
accordingly, as well as the new node. Doing a complete recalculation of the
entire network while it is of a small scale causes low overhead.
As seen in listing 8.1, we first check if we deal with a leaf node. As the
joining device is always a leaf node, this will always be the case. For every
neighbour, we create a graph table containing the route to the Gateway.
If several routes are available for a neighbours, the neighbour is stored
with each path. For every one-hop neighbour, we get its neighbours and
4A tree structure where root is searched first. Afterwards all its children are searched,
followed by their children etc.
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1 updateNewDevice(deviceNode newNode , boolean isLeaf ,
2 GraphTable currTable){
3 if(isLeaf){
4 for(Neighbor n: newNode.returnNeighbors ())
5 ArrayList <Neighbor > refNeighbors = new <Neighbor
↪→ >
6 ArrayList <Neighbor >();
7 GraphTable newRoute = new GraphTable(
↪→ genGraphName (),
8 0, newNode.nickName , refNeighbors);
9
10 newRoute.addNeighborToTable(n);
11 deviceNode d = NodeContainer.getNodeContainer ()
↪→ .
12 getNode(n.getNickname ());
13 updateNewDevice(d, false , newRoute);
14 GraphTableCollection.getGraphTableCollection ().
15 storeGraphTable(newRoute);
16 isLeaf = true; // reset position
17
18 else
19 for(Neighbor n: newNode.returnNeighbors ())
20 deviceNode d = NodeContainer.getNode(n.
↪→ getNickname ());
21 currTable.addNeighborToTable(n);
22 updateNewDevice(d, isLeaf , currTable);
Listing 8.1: New device joining
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recursively call the method again to generate a list of the neighbours until
we are at the Network Manager. As the next node is not a leaf, subsequent
nodes will be appended to the already existing list instead of generating
a new list. Once the current node is the Network Manager, the route is
complete and is stored in the graph table container.
Finding shortest path
Once the device has joined the network and all paths are generated, we can
calculate the most effective route. The Network Manager determine the
most effective route by number of hops, as can be seen in listing 8.2.
Device failing or leaving
If a node fails or leaves the network, one of its neighbours will detect
its absence through the keep-alive Data Link PDU’s they periodically
send between each other. The discovery will be reported to the Network
Manager, which will update its routing tables and forward the change to
all the affected nodes. To perform the updates, the manager will find all
the stored routes and delete the ones containing the node. If a route is part
of a shortest path (currently active routing path), a new route will have to
be set as the active route. Taking node C in figure 8.8 as an example, the
shortest route is calculated to be A→ B→ C in figure 8.9. If node B fails,
the shortest path to node C is deleted, and the route A → E → C is set to
shortest path. Code for this sequence can be seen in listing 8.3.
The failing node is found in the collection of nodes stored at the
Network Manager, and deleted. If the node should reappear in the
network, a new join process has to be initiated. We determined that this
would be the appropriate way to go, as nodes will usually not move
around much and nodes leaving will usually not reappear5. This saves
5Strong temporary electrial interference blocking communication is not taken into
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1 findShortestRoute(deviceNode node){
2 Collection <GraphTable > it =
3 GraphTableCollection.getGraphTableCollection ().
4 returnTable ().values ();
5 GraphTable best = null;
6 int nJumps = 0;
7
8 for(GraphTable t: it)
9 if(t.returnDestNickName () == node.nickName)
10 if(best == null)
11 best = t;
12
13 if(t.returnNeighbors ().size() <
14 best.returnNeighbors ().size() || nJumps == 0)
15 best = t;
Listing 8.2: Shortest route
1 updateDeviceFailing(deviceNode failingNode)
2 NodeContainer.getNodeContainer ().removeNode
3 (failingNode.nickName);
4 Collection <GraphTable > it =
5 GraphTableCollection.getGraphTableCollection
6 ().returnTable ().values ();
7 Iterator <GraphTable > tableIterator = it.iterator ();
8 while(tableIterator.hasNext ())
9 GraphTable curr = tableIterator.next();
10 ArrayList <Neighbor > neighs = curr.returnNeighbors
↪→ ();
11
12 for(Neighbor n: neighs)
13 if(n.getNickname () == failingNode.nickName)
14 tableIterator.remove ();
15 GraphTableCollection.getGraphTableCollection
↪→ ().
16 deleteTable(curr);
Listing 8.3: Update device
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the Network Manager the trouble of storing temporary information which
will have to be re-evaluated if the node should rejoin the network. After the
node is deleted from the collection, all the graphs are parsed and checked
if they contain the deleted node. If the node is part of a graph, the graph is
now invalid and deleted.
8.5 Security Manager
A minimal Security Manager has been implemented in the project. The
Security Manager packet structure is explained below and can be seen in
figure 8.10.
8.5.1 Security Manager Packet Structure
SecurityManager - Contains the necessary values for keeping a session
between two devices secure.
SecurityManager.Common - Contains the security functions implemen-
ted as separate modules. CRC, MIC and the Nounce are implemented
here.
8.6 Access Points
The Access Point acts as a sink for traffic between the network and the
Gateway. Asperheim et al. ran a single Access Point as part of the Gateway.
We decided early on that one of the first tasks would be to separate the
Access Point from the Gateway. The standard does allow the Access Point
to be a part of the Gateway, but the former implementation would have to
be changed in order to support more than one Access Point. The separation
would allow us to create and run multiple Access Points, station them
on separate locations, as well as running them on their own platforms.
Once they had been physically separated, we were able to decide on a
transmission method between the Access Points and the Gateway.
Considerations had been made in the previous project for making several
Access Points as queue systems were implemented and intended to be
account
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shared between the devices. As part of the separation, we provided
a separate TxQueue (transmit queue) and RxQueue (receive queue) to
each running Access Point seen on figure 8.11. Previously, connection
information such as neighbour and link tables were shared between every
Access Point, making more than one Access Point redundant as they
provided the same routes and functionality. The neighbour and link tables
were restructured and every AP now contains their own tables as every
node in the network.
8.6.1 Separating the Access Points
We decided one of our goals would be to separate the Access Point from
the Network Manager to a running program of itself. This would help
the Sensor Network greatly by adding more throughput and reliability, by
providing alternative routes to the Gateway. We implemented two kind of
Access Points; clock-providing and non clock-providing Access Points. The
idea behind this is to enable Access Points over a Wireless LAN connection
that could not accurately get the time from the Gateway, but would still
increase throughput of the network. There must always be at least one
clock-providing Access Point in the network.
For this to work we would have to synchronise clocks between the
Gateway and the clock-providing Access Points. It would also require
dividing the given code from the earlier project into two running programs,
as well as finding a suitable solution for reliable traffic between the
Gateway and the clock-providing Access Points.
Our solution in the end was to implement the Access Points close to
how we implemented the nodes in the network. This was in part to save
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development time, as it would minimise redundancy. But it was also an
excellent way for us to use the security mechanisms in WirelessHART
between the Access Point and Gateway. It is easy to implement a new
connection protocol for the connection between Access Point and Gateway
if it becomes necessary.
8.6.2 Clock Synchronisation
All the clocks in the network need to be synchronised in order for
communication to work. Time Division Multiple Access, as discussed in
section 2.1 on page 12, requires a close to perfectly synchronised network.
The channel hopping further complicates the problem, as this also needs a
very good clock synchronisation. The way we have implemented this is to
use the Absolute Slot Number method as the standard describes. ASN is a
5 byte timer that starts at zero when the Gateway is initiated. Most packets
contain either a full ASN or an ASN snippet to synchronise a device’s clock
to that of its neighbours. The ASN method also gives great possibility
to synchronise commands over multiple devices in the network, such as
collectively changing the Network Key.
To handle the timer in our implementation we have created two classes,
Timer and AbsoluteSlotNumber, to handle all of the time keeping. The
AbsoluteSlotNumber contains methods to set, get and synchronise time, as
well as deciding what slot we are in a superframe. The Timer class contains
all timers on the device, such as how often to send an advertisement or
how often to retransmit un-acknowledged packets. This class also handles
delayed commands as explained above.
8.6.3 Dividing the code
When we started, the Access Point were integrated into the Network
Manager. This made it impossible to have more than one Access Point in
the network. We started implementing this as a secondary program with a
TCP connection between the Access Points and the Network Manager with
some self-made commands like SYNCHTIME, LEAVE, EXIT, DATA, PING,
JOIN and LOG. When we decided to start simulating the nodes instead of
running this on real nodes we had to develop the whole WirelessHART
stack. That opened the possibility to implement an Access Point in the
same way we implemented a node. This would make the Access Points a
lot smarter, and would make it easy to update the project in the future as
all devices ran the same communication protocol.
We wanted to use TCP connections between the Access Points and the
Network Manager, but due to time restrictions we had to down-prioritise
this. To do implement this functionality, a new TCP-Connection class that
implements the Connection interface has to be created and integrated into
the Physical Layer.
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8.7 Security
The WirelessHART standard implements security through a CCM*
(Counter with CBC-MAC)6 encryption algorithm defined in IEEE 802.15.4.
Security is applied at the Data Link Layer for authentication and at the
Network Layer for authentication and encryption. Our intention were to
implement the security according to the standard, but realised that the
amount of work would be too heavy due to the level of detail each im-
plementation would require. The CCM* mode utilises a 128-bit AES en-
cryption key for encrypting the data transmitted. In figure 8.12 we present
the sequence of security for a transmission, description of each step below:
1 The Network Layer sends a packet to the encryption module.
2 The encryption module encrypts the packet with the key specified for
the current transmission.
3 The encrypted packet is attached to the NPDU.
4 The NPDU is sent to the CRC calculation module.
5 The CRC module calculates a value for the NPDU to be transmitted.
The value is put into the CRC field in the DLPDU.
6 The MIC of the DLPDU is calculated. The values of the header from
0x41 to the end of the payload is authenticated.
7 The Generated value is put into the MIC field in the header.
8 The DLPDU is sent to the Physical Layer and transmitted over the
medium to a receiving device. At the receiving device, the DLL
forwards the payload to the CRC calculation method.
9 The CRC module calculates the CRC value of the payload and
compares it to the value in the CRC header field. If the values are
equal, the message is passed to the Network Layer (9a). If not, it is
discarded (9b).
10 The Network Layer strips off the headers, and sends the payload to a
decryption method along with the key to decrypt it with.
11 The module decrypts the payload into cleartext.
12 The data is returned to the Network Layer and further processed.
8.7.1 Data Link Layer Security
The CCM* mode at the Data Link Layer does not provide encryption.
Instead the ciphertext generated is simply the MIC (see section 4.5.7 on
page 41). The MIC is attached to the plain-text to form the MAC payload.
As a consequence, the CCM* is used to authenticate a received message or
6Technique for constructing message authentication code of a packet from a block cipher
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acknowledgement. Once we receive a message at the Data Link Layer, we
generate the MIC of the received message to check whether the message
is authentic or not. Only authenticated messages are forwarded to the
Network Layer, whereas messages failing the check are discarded.
8.7.2 Network Layer Security
The payload of the Network Layer is encrypted, opposed to the payload
of the Data Link Layer which is simply authenticated. The transmitting
device encrypts the message, and only once the packet arrives at the
Network Layer at the destination device is the packet decrypted. As
specified in the standard, intermediate devices will only forward the packet
based on information provided in the Data Link Layer header. Even if
a malicious device should intercept the packet and attempt to read the
content, only the sender and receiver are able to decrypt the message due
to the symmetric key7. As mentioned earlier, we decided to implement a
simpler encryption algorithm than the CCM*. We still wanted to provide
the authentication and encryption properties of CCM*; both for still
maintaining a realistic use of the algorithm and the possibility of expansion
as future work. We did some research and found existing security libraries
in java called javax.crypto.Cipher and javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec. These
libraries provided us with the functionality of cryptographic ciphers for
encryption and decryption [12].
Transmitting side
Listing 8.4 presents the implementation providing encryption of a plain-
text for the Network Layer.
1 public byte[] encrypt(String key , byte[] payload){
2 byte[] encrypted = null;
3 byte[] raw = key.getBytes ();
4 SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(
↪→ raw , "AES");
5
6 try{
7 Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES")
↪→ ;
8 cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE , skeySpec
↪→ ); // set mode along with byte key
↪→ and algorithm
9 encrypted = cipher.doFinal(payload);
10 return encrypted;
11 }
12 catch(Exception e){
13 e.printStackTrace ();
14 }
7encryption key shared between two parts
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15 return null;
16 }
Listing 8.4: General encryption algorithm
The method takes an encryption key and the payload as input. The key
is first converted to raw bytes, before a SecretKeySpec object is generated by
determining the raw byte key and the algorithm to be applied. We decided
to use the AES encryption key for a few reasons; it is a secure algorithm and
WHART’s encryption use AES-128 in combination with additional security
functions. The encryption key used within listing 8.4 are checked to be
under 128 bits before calling on the method, which ensures AES-128 as
keys lower than 128 bits are padded. A Cipher object is created with AES
encryption, and initialised with mode set to encrypt and the secret key. The
payload is encrypted using the cipher, and returned afterwards.
Receiving side
At the receiving end the process is close to reversed. Once a packet is
received at the Network Layer, we check the four least significant bits of
the security control byte by shifting the remaining bits out. The four bits
determine which security type is utilised, and what type of key we need
to use to decrypt the packet. The same method seen in listing 8.4 is used,
except for line eight which is changed to:
1 cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE , skeySpec);
The security mode is now set to decrypt, and the module will get
the key corresponding to the value set in the security control byte before
decrypting the message and passing it on to the Transport Layer. The
standard does not specify which values in the control byte correspond to
the different keys, as it only refers the user to check a HCF Enumeration
table8. We made it general and implemented it as 0 - Session Key, 1 -
Join Key, 2 - Handheld Key. We used the Join Key for communication
between the Network Manager and a joining device until full integration
was completed. Once full integration was accomplished, a Session Key was
generated at the Network Manager and distributed to the node encrypted
by the Join Key. Safe distribution of the key was accomplished, and the
session key can now be used for encryption. The case for encrypting
handheld devices were created, but not implemented as we had no such
devices.
8.8 Packet Construction and transmission
8.8.1 Implementation of the Protocol Data Units
The Protocol Data Units are the headers and tails of the different layers.
There are 3 different main PDUs together with 5 sub-layer PDUs, all of
8available for purchase from HART Communication Foundation
107
Key(                 )
Data
Decryption module
DataKey(                 )Data
Encryption module Network layer
Data link  layer Data link  layer
Network layer
CRC (NPDU)
MIC (DLPDU)
Authenticated
      packets
Dismissed
  packets
Transmitting side Receiving side
NPDU
1
2
3
7
4
6
5
CRC (NPDU)8
9a
9b
10
11
12
 WHART
Network
Figure 8.12: Security functions
108
which are implemented in our solution and are described throughout
chapter 4. The PDUs got two constructors, one for constructing the object,
and one for unmarshalling9 the object, as can be seen on line 6 and 7 of
listing 8.5. The method toByteArray() on line 9 will marshal the object
into a series of bytes that can be used to send over a socket. Here we
could use Java’s Serializable interface, but as this would create an XML10
based data structure it would not create a byte stream equal to that of the
standard. Therefore it would not be possible for a proprietary node to read
the data, so we had to manually create the methods for marshalling and
unmarshalling the objects. A full implementation of the Data-Link Protocol
Data Unit can be found in appendix E.1.
1 public interface PDU {
2 /* ******************* *
3 * Enums and Variables *
4 * ******************* */
5 public PDU(byte[] data) ;
6 public PDU(/* VARIABLES */) ;
7 public byte[] toByteArray () ;
8 /* ******* *
9 * Getters *
10 * ******* */
11 }
Listing 8.5: PDU class skeleton
8.8.2 Data Link Protocol Data Unit
The following section presents the DLPDU construction implemented.
Cyclic Redundancy Check
WirelessHART uses Cyclic Redundancy Check based on the 16 bit ITU-
T CRC polynomial (CRC16). CRC is used to detect bit errors occurring at
the Data Link Layer payload during transmission. At the receiving side, a
value is generated of the DLL payload and compared to the value stored
in the CRC field at the header. If the values match, the transmission has
been error free. The CRC is calculated using the polynomial displayed in
equation 8.1, equalling 0x1021 in hex.
G16(x) = x16 + x12 + x5 + 1 (8.1)
In order to calculate CRC, a set of values are needed. We solved this
by creating a table of 256 values as seen in listing 8.6. The table is filled by
parsing over every position, assign a value to the position and again run
over this field eight times while shifting the values based on the position of
the table, in combination with the polynomial value.
9Extracting a data structure from a series of bytes
10Extensible Markup Language - a format that is both human- and machine-readable
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1 // values needed for CRC
2 private static final int poly = 0x1021;
3 private static final int[] table = new int [256];
4
5 // fill CRC table
6 static{
7 for(int i = 0; i < 256; i++){
8 int crc = i << 8;
9 for(int j = 0; j < 8; j++){
10 if((crc & 0x8000) == 0x8000)
11 crc = (crc << 1) ^ poly;
12 else
13 crc = (crc << 1);
14 }
15 table[i] = crc & 0xffff;
16 }
17 }
Listing 8.6: CRC initialization
1 public int generateCRC(int crc , byte[] bytes , int off
↪→ , int len){
2 for(int i = off; i < (off + len); i++){
3 int b = (bytes[i] & 0xff);
4 crc = (table [((crc >> 8) & 0xff) ^ b] ^ (
↪→ crc << 8)) & 0xffff;
5 }
6 return crc;
7 }
Listing 8.7: CRC calculation
The table generation is performed the same way on every device,
ensuring the devices have the same tables when generating and checking
the CRC values. Listing 8.7 shows how we calculated the CRC of a packet.
The module takes arguments CRC which determines the value into the
table, the payload, the offset which CRC is calculated from and the length
of the payload. We loop through the payload byte by byte, applying a
bitwise AND operation, before using the table as a lookup to calculate the
final value which is returned. If the generated CRC corresponds to the
value stored within the header, the packet is acknowledged and sent to the
Network Layer.
Message Integrity Code
Keyed Message Integrity Code (MIC) is a technique used at the Data Link
Layer for authenticating packets. The process is necessary to determine if
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the receiving packet is coming from an approved device. Only packets that
are successfully authenticated are processed and if necessary, responded
to. To provide MIC, the protocol uses CCM* mode combined with AES-
128 block cipher, both introduced in section 8.7. The DLPDU is not
enciphered, but instead the content is authenticated with the four-byte
MIC. To successfully generate a message integrity code, four values are
needed:
- Data to be authenticated but not enciphered.
- The message to be enciphered.
- A 13-byte nounce, following it the next section.
- The 128-bit AES key used for encryption.
We started implementing a CCM* encryption method for the MIC, but
discovered that the level of detail required for a correct implementation
were too heavy. The method in itself is a few hundred lines of advanced
code, which would require too much time considering what we would
gain from implementing it. As we already had implemented an encryption
algorithm at the Network Layer, we decided to skip the CCM* calculation
for now and focus on other, more important areas.
Nounce
The nounce calculation is dependant on the addressing mode used for the
current packet. Independent of the addressing mode, position zero to four
is populated by the current ASN. If the packet is part of communication
with a device not yet fully integrated into the network, the EUI-64 address
is used. To determine how the nounce is generated, we perform a simple
test to determine the addressing scheme employed in the packet by the
Network Layer. If it is a EUI-64 address, we put values 0x00, 0x1b, 0x1E
into position five through seven in the nounce. Position eight and nine are
populated by the expanded device type code, and 10 through 12 are assigned
to device ID. If nicknames addressing is used, we fill position five to 10 with
0x00 and place the nickname in position 11 to 12.
8.8.3 Network Protocol Data Unit
The Network Protocol Data Unit ensures end-to-end communication in the
network. We implemented this according to the standard, described in
section 4.10 on page 44.
8.8.4 Transport Protocol Data Unit
The Transport Protocol Data Unit is handled in the Application Layer of our
Implementation. It is implemented according to the standard, described
in section 4.6.4 on page 46. The TPDU contains commands sent between
devices.
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Command Based Communication
The Application Layer of the WirelessHART stack is command driven.
A Transport Layer PDU (Section 4.6.4) is constructed of a number of
commands separated into different commands using a Parser and a
CommandHandler. The CommandProcessor then processes the commands by
calling the executeCommand() method inside the command. All commands
extend the abstract class Command as can be seen in listing 8.8. The enum
CommandName contains the command’s command number, the size of the
marshalled object and ways to get commandName from the commandNumber.
In the implementation each command is an object, much like the PDUs
described in section 8.8.1. It contains constructors depending on the
differences between request and response packets, a toByteArray() method
together with the executeCommand() and generateResponse() methods. When
a node in the network requests a service it sends a Request Command to
the node. This usually look the same as the Response Command, but can
be different. Appendix B describes the variables needed for the Request and
Response of each implemented command together with the specific Response
Codes the command uses. We have implemented the commands as close
to the standard as we can, but since we do not have the HCF Enumeration
tables we had to make educated guesses on some of the bytes. We have only
implemented the Response Codes needed in order to make the network
work, but it should be easy to extend if needed.
1 public abstract class Command {
2 CommandName commandName ;
3 byte length ;
4 long executionTimeOfCommand = 0l ;
5
6 ArrayList <ResponseCode > responses = new
↪→ ArrayList <ResponseCode >() ;
7
8 protected Command(CommandName commandName) {
9 this.commandName = commandName ;
10 }
11
12 public CommandName getCommand () {
13 return commandName ;
14 }
15
16 public short getCommandNumber () {
17 return commandName.getCommandNumber () ;
18 }
19
20 public long getExecutionTimeOfCommand () {
21 return executionTimeOfCommand ;
22 }
23
24 public void setExecutionTimeOfCommand(long
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↪→ executionTimeOfCommand) {
25 this.executionTimeOfCommand =
↪→ executionTimeOfCommand ;
26 }
27
28 public abstract byte[] toByteArray () ;
29 public abstract ResponseCode executeCommand () ;
30
31 public void addResponseCode(ResponseCode
↪→ responseCode) {
32 responses.add(responseCode) ;
33 }
34
35 public ArrayList <ResponseCode >
↪→ getAllResponseCodes () {
36 return responses ;
37 }
38
39 public abstract byte[] generateResponse () ;
40 }
Listing 8.8: abstract class Command
8.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter has looked at the work and changes made on the code.
The changes to program structure were first presented, followed by the
implementation of each network device in sections 8.2 to 8.6. At the end
of the chapter, security functionality applied to a packet transmission were
detailed in section 8.7, followed by DLPDU construction and transmission
in section 8.8.
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Chapter 9
Testing and Evaluation
The following chapter presents the reader with the test environment and
test results obtained when running the implementation. Section 9.1 details
the test network established and assumptions made when configuring the
network. Section 9.2 provides an overview of the test results obtained.
Section 9.3 evaluates the implementation of each device, followed by
sections 9.4 and 9.5 evaluating each result against the requirements
determined in chapter 5 on page 63. The chapter concludes with a review
of the development process.
9.1 Test Bed
In order to test the implementation and how devices act, we created a test
network consisting of nine devices. To specify communication and device
roles we created a file containing the Join Key and Network ID, usually
provided to a new device by a hand-held device. It also holds connection
information as can be seen in table 9.2. Lastly it contain the device’s Unique
ID, a 8 byte address as per the standard.
Since we simulate a wireless environment on a wired network, we had
to give the nodes information about their neighbouring devices. We used
UDP1 multicast in order to simulate that all devices in range received all
information2.
For all this to work we had to create a connection module. We currently
have a fully developed UDP module that we use for testing and simulating
devices. We have also started work on a TCP module that we wanted to use
between the Network Manager and the Access Points in the real network.
The UDP module implements channels by adding a one byte header
containing the channel it was sent on. When a device receives this packet, it
compares the sent on channel with its current channel. If these are different,
the packet is discarded. We have also implemented methods for packet-loss
and packet-distorting.
We had three computers acting as hosts for the devices:
1User Datagram Protocol - A stateless transmission protocol
2As long as they are listening on the correct channel
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• A server running an Intel Atom 1.8 Gigahertz Dual Core Central
Processing Unit and 4 gigabytes of Random Access Memory. This
device is nicknamed Server.
• Two Raspberry Pi computers described in section 7.1.4. These are
nicknamed PI1 and PI2.
Name IP Devices on machine
Server 192.168.1.100 NM, AP1, N1
PI 1 192.168.1.101 N2, N3, N6
PI 2 192.168.1.102 AP2, N4, N5
Table 9.1: Computers and Devices
These three computers ran the nine devices needed to test our
implementation. It consists of one Network Manager, two Access Points
and six Nodes. The nodes were spread on the three computers as can be
seen on in table 9.1. An easier view on how the nodes were connected can
be found in figure 9.1.
N6N5N4
N3N2N1
AP2AP1
NM
Figure 9.1: Test Bed Network
We created a superframe with 30 slots. We then added a discovery, join
and broadcast link. This meant that every three seconds the superframe
would repeat itself.
All devices in the network run the software described in chapter 8.
9.1.1 Nodes
The nodes were connected in a topology as can be seen in figure 9.1.
Addresses and ports for the different nodes can be found in table 9.2.
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Name Long Address Computer Port Connects to
NM 0xF980 0000 001 Server 4450 localhost:4451,
192.168.102:4452
AP 1 0x001B 1EEA 2000 0001 Server 4451 localhost:4453,
192.168.1.101:4454
AP 2 0x001B 1EEA 2000 0002 Pi 2 4452 192.168.1.101:4454,
192.168.1.101:4455
Node 1 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0001 Server 4453 192.168.1.102:4456,
192.168.1.102:4457
Node 2 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0002 Pi 1 4454 localhost:4455,
192.168.1.102:4457
Node 3 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0003 Pi 1 4455 localhost:4458
Node 4 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0004 Pi 2 4456 192.168.1.100:4453
Node 5 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0005 Pi 2 4457 192.168.1.101:4458
Node 6 0x001B 1EEA 3000 0006 Pi 1 4458 localhost:4455
Table 9.2: Test bed set-up
9.2 Test Results Overview
This section presents our results from the tests we performed at the end
of the development cycle. During the development we actively used Unit
Tests in order to test methods, modules and mechanisms as we developed
them. The tests gave for the most part true or false outputs and is not
mentioned in this section.
9.2.1 Synchronising to the network
Once a node is switched into JOINING mode the node starts to listen
for AdvertisementDLPDUs. These packets are sent from all nodes where
ADVERTISEMENT_INTERVAL_TIMER != -1, meaning it will send an
advertisement every ADVERTISEMENT_INTERVAL_TIMER milliseconds.
In our tests this was 3000 ms.
A device that is not synced to the network uses the CHAN-
NEL_SEARCH_TIME3 to switch channels while a synced device uses the
algorithm
channelNumber = (channelO f f set + ()ASN%numberO f ActiveChannels)
(9.1)
This means actually hitting the correct channel at the exact time frame
of which the AdvertisementDLPDU is sent is based on luck as can be seen in
figure 9.2.
There are ways to battle this. We could make a superframe to an
advertising device that only was broadcast and join links. Another way
to maximise the chance to hit the correct time frame is to blacklist as many
3Default value is 300 milliseconds
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Figure 9.2: Average synchronisation time of a node
channels as possible. Both these options have their drawbacks as the first
option will use a lot of bandwidth and battery on the advertising device.
The second option makes the network more vulnerable to jamming, both
incidental and deliberate.
The test is based on simulations and self made restrictions of which
may be error prone and could give results that would not be seen in a real
WirelessHART network.
We found one glitch during testing where the device synchronised to
the network, but was always one channel ahead or behind the sender.
This make it impossible for the device to hear any traffic as it thinks it is
synchronised. The timer is so far behind that it listens to another channel,
even though it is inside the correct time frame.
9.2.2 Joining the network
To get a device to join the network proved to be one of the most challenging
requirements during the project. It is a complex routine as illustrated in
figure 9.3.
The node needs to synchronise to the network as described earlier, then
collect as much information it could before sending a join request. The
node collects this information by sniffing for traffic, reading header in-
formation as well as getting AdvertisementDLPDUs. After a ADVERTISE-
MENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT4 and a random wait timer5, the node sends the join
request to one of the neighbours it had found during the sniffing period.
This request needs to be sent on a join link. It is important for this node
to listen to all join links in the superframe, as the Network Manager will
4Default value is 30 seconds
5This timer is 0 - 120 seconds
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Figure 9.3: Node Join Sequence Diagram
send the join reply on the link it finds most suited based on variables such
as signal strength, traffic paths and so on.
The Network Manager now receives the join request and uses it to
calculate data, the node’s parents, give a nickname, the Network Key and
a session for further communication. The Network Manager sends a join
reply to the designated parent of the joining node. The parent reads the
packet and finds the proxy bit in the Network Layer Protocol Data Unit set,
meaning it should send the packet on its join link.
When the joining node gets the join reply it enters a quarantined
state where it has successfully joined the network, but only got security
clearance to communicate with the Network Manager. For the node to
become operational it needs to be provisioned with superframes, graphs
and links from the Network Manager. Until then all communication need
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Figure 9.4: Time for a device to go from JOINING to QUARANTINED state
Figure 9.5: Average time for a device to go from JOINING to QUARANT-
INED state
to be done by the parent proxy. The time used for a node to go from joining
state to quarantined is shown in figure 9.4 and 9.5.
Improvements to the Joining Sequence
The join sequence is slowed down considerably by the random wait
timer. A way to remove the need for this timer is to implement two new
commands; Clear to Join and Ready to Join. These commands will act exactly
as the Clear to Send and Ready To Send control frames in Carrier Sense
Multiple Access described in section 2.2 on page 13.
When a joining node is ready to join it sends a Clear to Join command on
a join link. A node already in operational state then sends a Ready to Join
command back to the node.
9.2.3 Security
There are three security mechanisms implemented in WirelessHART.
Message Integrity Check, Cyclic Redundancy Check and Encryption.
These mechanisms are described in detail in section 8.7. A short description
of these mechanisms is presented in the following sub sections before
evaluating our implementation.
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Message Integrity Check
Message Integrity Check is a way to authenticate the sender of the packet.
It is used both in the Data Link Layer for hop-to-hop authentication, and in
the Network Layer for end-to-end authentication. As described in section
8.8.2, MIC uses a CCM* based encryption technique for authenticating
packets. As we only partly implemented the encryption, we did not apply
the algorithm to packets sent between the devices. Our implementation of
the algorithm can be seen in appendix E.3 on page 172.
Cyclic Redundancy Check
Cyclic Redundancy Check is implemented on the Data Link Layer for
detecting errors in the packet. This implementation can not be used to
correct bit errors in the packet, only detect the errors. If a bit error is
detected, the receiver discards the packet and the sender will have to
retransmit the packet. The value max_reply_time currently set to 30 seconds,
is used at the Network Layer to trigger retransmissions. In listing 9.1
we demonstrate the calculation implementation. A payload with the text
"Device 0x23354 has discovered a leak in gasline 2!" is calculated a CRC value
for, resulting in the value 56359 by starting at position 0 in the CRC table.
We send the message to four different devices, each receiving the payload
differently.
Node 1 Verifies that the correct packet is received as calculated CRC value
corresponds to the CRC field in the packet header.
Node 2 Determines that an incorrect CRC value is generated. In the
example, we have started at table position one instead of zero, which
results in a large difference in the CRC values.
Node 3 CRC value is incorrect. Table position is set to 98 instead of zero. A
larger differential error occurred in case 2, which means that there is
no linear connection between CRC value and starting table position.
Node 4 - Received a packet where 0x23354 has been modified to 0x23359
during transmission. The CRC value generated is wrong, and the
packet is discarded.
1 Payload sent: ’Device 0x23354 has discovered a leak
↪→ in gasline 2!’
2 CRC value generated is ’56359’ using 0 as the
↪→ starting position in the table
3
4 ---Receiving side node 1---
5 Payload received is ’Device 0x23354 has discovered a
↪→ leak in gasline 2!’
6 CRC value generated is ’56359’ using 0 as the
↪→ starting position in the table
7 Generated CRC value is correct
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89 ---Receiving side node 2---
10 Payload received is ’Device 0x23354 has discovered a
↪→ leak in gasline 2!’
11 CRC value generated is ’24899’ using 1 as the
↪→ starting position in the table
12 Generated CRC value is incorrect. Bit -errors exist in
↪→ packet or table position
13
14 ---Receiving side node 3---
15 Payload received is ’Device 0x23354 has discovered a
↪→ leak in gasline 2!’
16 CRC value generated is ’62485’ using 98 as the
↪→ starting position in the table
17 Generated CRC value is incorrect. Bit -errors exist in
↪→ packet or table position
18
19 ---Receiving side node 4---
20 Payload received is ’Device 0x23359 has discovered a
↪→ leak in gasline 2!’
21 CRC value generated is ’7068’ using 0 as the starting
↪→ position in the table
22 Generated CRC value is incorrect. Bit -errors exist in
↪→ packet or table position
Listing 9.1: CRC calculation results
Message Encryption
The encryption of the message is used by the Security sub-layer. It encrypts
the Network Protocol Data Unit payload with one of the following keys:
session, handheld or join key. The module takes a key and the payload as
arguments, and attempts to decrypt the payload with the key. In listing 9.2,
we show encryption of a packet and several decryptions. The text "This
is a packet transmission to test encryption" is encrypted and sent to several
devices. Each of the cases are elaborated on below:
Sender 1 - We encrypt the packet with the key "ThisIsCorrectKey" and
transmit it.
Node 1 - Decrypts with the correct key, and correct value is extracted.
Node 2 - Decrypts with the wrong key, and an error message is returned.
The algorithm throws an exception as the returned value cannot be
compared to a value in the utf-8 table. We print an error message,
and discard the packet.
Sender 2 - The packet is encrypted with the "wrong" key and transmitted.
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Node 3 - We attempt to decrypt the message with the correct key. As the
message was encrypted with the wrong key, the same case as for
Node 2 happens. This is also the case for when a malicious node
intercepts a message and attempts to decrypt it with a wrong key.
1 The payload sent: ’This is a packet transmission to
↪→ test encryption ’
2 payload is encrypted with key: ThisIsCorrectKey
3 encrypted value is: 53 EB 6E A6 CB 4B 7E A5
↪→ D4 F0 F0 42 31 DB F0 82 34 D4 84 0C
↪→ 14 28 89 32 A1 B0 07 DA 34 58 3B C6
↪→ 5F 56 BB 87 42 89 79 1D 37 74 AB
↪→ 20 E8 F4 6E 22 FD BB 0A 58 51 6B B6
↪→ 49 5D 5A 81 70 8E F9 C6 7F
4
5 ---Receiving side node 1---
6 Received encrypted value: 53 EB 6E A6 CB 4B 7E
↪→ A5 D4 F0 F0 42 31 DB F0 82 34 D4 84
↪→ 0C 14 28 89 32 A1 B0 07 DA 34 58 3
↪→ B C6 5F 56 BB 87 42 89 79 1D 37 74
↪→ AB 20 E8 F4 6E 22 FD BB 0A 58 51 6B
↪→ B6 49 5D 5A 81 70 8E F9 C6 7F
7 Decrypting with key: ThisIsCorrectKey
8 Gives ’This is a packet transmission to test
↪→ encryption ’
9
10 ---Receiving side node 2---
11 Received encrypted value: 53 EB 6E A6 CB 4B 7E
↪→ A5 D4 F0 F0 42 31 DB F0 82 34 D4 84
↪→ 0C 14 28 89 32 A1 B0 07 DA 34 58 3
↪→ B C6 5F 56 BB 87 42 89 79 1D 37 74
↪→ AB 20 E8 F4 6E 22 FD BB 0A 58 51 6B
↪→ B6 49 5D 5A 81 70 8E F9 C6 7F
12 Decrypting with key: ThisIsWrongKey88
13 Decryption failed due to wrong decryption key
14
15 ---Sending side 2---
16 The payload sent: ’This is a packet transmission to
↪→ test encryption ’
17 payload is encrypted with key: ThisIsWrongKey88
18 encrypted value is: 53 EB 6E A6 CB 4B 7E A5
↪→ D4 F0 F0 42 31 DB F0 82 34 D4 84 0C
↪→ 14 28 89 32 A1 B0 07 DA 34 58 3B C6
↪→ 5F 56 BB 87 42 89 79 1D 37 74 AB
↪→ 20 E8 F4 6E 22 FD BB 0A 58 51 6B B6
↪→ 49 5D 5A 81 70 8E F9 C6 7F
19
20 ---Receiving side node 3---
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21 Received encrypted value: 1E 69 D4 5E C1 A9 EC
↪→ 98 30 AD 9A A0 66 99 31 E6 AB 97 A5
↪→ CC 0F DB BE 43 1A 40 2C 2C 47 4E 7
↪→ A FA C4 DD 3E 7B 17 1E 53 9D 83 05
↪→ 93 94 52 79 4E 3C 62 B3 40 3D 1B 3B
↪→ 5A 5B FB E8 9F 62 D8 55 3A 47
22 Decrypting with key: ThisIsCorrectKey
23 Decryption failed due to wrong decryption key
Listing 9.2: Encryption results
9.3 Evaluation of the Implementation
In the following sections we evaluate the implementation performed
during the project. First the different layers are discussed before Gateway,
Network Manager and Security Manager are evaluated.
9.3.1 Evaluation of the Layer Implementation
In this section we evaluate the implementation of the layer structure.
Our project introduced a layered architecture according to the standard,
explained in the chapters WirelessHART at page 23 and implementation
at page 87. We used most of our time on the Data Link Layer and the
Application Layer. A minimal Physical and Network Layer was also
implemented.
Physical Layer
We implemented a minimal Physical Layer based on an UDP6 connection.
The connector is easily replaced with a 802.15.4 connector by replacing
UDPConnection.java with another file that implements the Connection
interface and replacing a few lines of code. This layer does require
more work, but as we worked in a simulation environment we could not
implement and test it as we wanted.
Data Link Layer
Most of our efforts went to implement this layer. Most of the simulation
is abstracted away in the physical layer, resulting in that the rest of the
layers should work on an implementation towards a real network. We
have implemented a fully working Message Handling and Timer module
as well as a mostly working Link, Superframe, Neighbour and Graph Table.
A message queue and retransmit queues are partially implemented. We
have also implemented a working State Machine to send in the correct time
windows.
6User Datagram Protocol - A stateless transmission protocol
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We have implemented all Protocol Data Units needed for the Data Link
Layer to operate. These PDUs carry data, acknowledgements, keep-alives,
advertisements etc. as explained in section 4.5.6 on page 38.
We feel we have developed this layer according to the standard. There
are however some implications as we did not have the enumeration tables
that needed to be acquired from the HART foundation as seen in table C.1.
Therefore we had to make some educated guesses on what different bits
meant.
Network Layer
The Network Layer was the layer were we thought we would do most
of our work at the start of this project. However, it did not turn out as we
wanted due to problems with the code handed to us and with the hardware
in use. We needed to implement a new Physical and Data Link Layer in
order to start working on this layer which took more time than anticipated.
We implemented a minimal Network Layer that managed some basic
routing. We also partially implemented the Session Table, but this is not
in use as the implementation of the Security Manager is minimal. Queues
for incoming and outgoing packets are implemented as well as a packet
re-transmitter handled by the Timer in the Data Link Layer.
The PDUs in the Network Layer was implemented. The Network Layer
PDU is handled as well as the Security Sub Layer PDU. We decided on
handling the Transport Layer PDU in the Application Layer because it
made more sense.
There are some future work to be done on this layer, as listed in
chapter 11 on page 137.
Application Layer
The Application Layer is the most complete layer of this project. We
implemented a Parser that split the Transport Layer PDU into commands
and sends them to a Command Processor. The Command Processor then
decides what commands were sent and runs the executeCommand method
inside the command. We decided to implement commands in the same
way we implemented the PDUs since we felt it is easier to work on objects
rather than a raw byte string.
We implemented a basic set of commands as can be seen in appendix
B. We did not implement the response codes however, as we did not need
this to get our results.
9.3.2 Evaluation of the Gateway Implementation
The Gateway implementation inherited by the last students were virtually
non existent as they focused their work on the nodes that we decided to
discontinue. We therefore had to do a lot of work to make it work. We
feel we have built a good foundation to continue working on, even though
some core features are partially or not implemented.
127
Access Points
We now have an implementation that allows multiple Access Points. All
devices in the network communicate using the same layered structure
evaluated in the last section. This means that an Access Point needs to go
through the same Join Process. We turned off all except one channel here so
Channel Hopping was disabled. This made joining the network a lot faster.
It is easy to add a new connection to the Physical Layer if we want a TCP7
connection instead. We decided not to use too much time on implementing
multiple connection possibilities as we felt it was not necessary for our
thesis.
Network Manager
The Network Manager determines the logic within the network. It
sets up routing tables, manages joining nodes, sets up superframes etc.
Implementing a fully working Network Manager is in itself a thesis. We
managed to create some basic routing tables, let devices join the network
and set up basic superframes. There is no QoS and limited failure handling
implemented.
Security Manager
To implement a working join procedure we had to do some work on the
Security Manager. We created a SessionFactory for creating 128-bit keys for
AES8 encryption. We also added ways to generate and check MIC and CRC
as mentioned earlier in the chapter. The Security Manager also manages
Join-, Network- and the Well-Known-Key as discussed in chapter 8.
9.4 Review of Functional requirements
This section evaluates our test results and implementation against the
requirements discussed in chapter 5 on page 63.
9.4.1 FR01 - Proper Advertise
Proper Advertise is implemented in the Data Link Layer. We have a AD-
VERTISEMENT_INTERVAL_TIMER that can be turned on by sending com-
mand 795 Write Timer Interval9 to the device that should start advertising.
The device will then advertise every N milliseconds, as defined in the com-
mand. We feel this requirement is fulfilled and is working according to the
standard.
7Transmission Control Protocol - provides reliable, ordered, error-checked delivery
8Advanced Encryption Standard
9Command 795 is described in appendix B.3
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9.4.2 FR02 - Join Sequence
The joining sequence is tested and discussed in 9.2.2. The join request
and join response is correctly propagated to the target device through the
parent proxy as described in the standard. We feel this requirement is
fulfilled according to the standard. We did not, however, implement any
improvements to the join sequence due to time constraints. One possible
improvement is described in section 9.2.2.
9.4.3 FR03 - Send pattern
The correct send pattern is implemented as per the standard. Correct
headers are added in each of the layers and are evaluated in section 9.3.1.
9.4.4 FR04 - Functioning routing algorithm
A working routing algorithm is in place and described in detail in
section 8.4.5 on page 97. The Network Manager uses a special Node Table
that holds the whole topology of the network to create paths. To get the
routing to nodes command 974 Write Route10 is used to supply a node with
graph routing and 97611 to supply source routing information.
We feel we got as far as we could with the routing between devices. We
had more low-layer implementation to do than we had expected and did
not have enough time to fulfil this requirement the way we intended at the
start of the project.
9.4.5 FR05 and FR06 - Time Synchronisation and Time Division
Multiple Access
Our implementation has implemented a time synchronisation module that
is tested in section 9.2.1. We did encounter problems with time synchron-
isation and channel hopping as explained earlier. Time synchronisation is a
complex thing to achieve in a wireless environment. We feel with the time
and expertise we had during this project, that the requirement has been ful-
filled. There are however improvements to be made here to further increase
the accuracy of the synchronisation.
9.4.6 FR07 - Apply MIC and CRC
In section 9.2.3 the test results from running our implementation were
presented. We demonstrated how the CRC algorithm calculated the value
and compared the generated value with the value contained in the packet
header. We also presented how the algorithm discovered bit errors in
the packet, and that a small error resulted in a major change in the CRC
value. The algorithm discovered the errors we introduced and fulfilled the
requirements of a cyclic redundancy check. We determine this requirement
10Command 974 is described in appendix B.3
11Command 976 is described in appendix B.3
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to be fulfilled. Due to limited time, we did not implement the CCM
algorithm applied in MIC, as discussed in section 9.2.3.
9.4.7 FR08 - Provide encryption of payload
In section 9.2.3 we presented test results of packet encryption and
decryption. We have successfully implemented an algorithm that encrypts
a packet using a key shared between two devices. The opposing device
is able to decrypt and read the payload, while interfering nodes are not.
The level of confidentiality provided by the algorithm makes us certain
we have accomplished implementing an encryption algorithm that keeps
packet content secret.
9.5 Review of Non-functional requirements
In the following sections the implementation is evaluated against the non-
functional requirements determined in chapter 5 on page 63.
9.5.1 NFR01 - Module-based application
One of the first tasks were to separate the program into modules, where
every module performed a specific task according to the standard. Having
one large program where everything was done sequentially instead of
separating the tasks into multiple, smaller processes were something we
wanted to achieve. The separation greatly helped us during our work and
will benefit future development of this project. After the modularisation,
we ended up with a large program split into smaller parts as can be seen in
figures 8.3, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 and 8.10. The figures display the packets in each of
the respective devices, grouped by their task in the project.
By separating the program into clearly defined cases, we feel that
NFR01 has been clearly achieved. It is easy to get an overview of what
is happening where and the task of every function. Some of the modules
can be further split up once the program grows and more functionality is
implemented, but as of yet this has no meaning .
9.5.2 NFR02 - Failure resistant network (NFR02)
One of the major strengths of mesh networks are the ability to detect and
repair a failing link or device. WirelessHART only provides partial mesh,
where certain nodes are connected to multiple nodes. The network is still
vulnerable to errors at the Gateway or Access Points as they act as sinks
for traffic heading to the Gateway. Maintaining multiple Access Points will
make sure that even in the event of a failing AP the network can reroute
traffic to another sink, preventing total isolation. During the join process
of a new node, we demand a minimum of two parenting nodes if possible,
to reduce the risk of isolated nodes if their only connection should fail or
leave the network. To discover errors in a network, nodes communicate
at regular intervals. If nodes have not communicated for over 30 seconds,
130
a keep-alive packet is sent between the nodes to get status updates and
synchronise clocks. If no response is returned, a fault is assumed and
the incident is reported to the Network Manager. The Network Manager
updates the routing tables, generates alternative routes for the affected
routes, and transmits the changes to the concerning nodes. This is called
a "messy exit", as the leaving device does not notify its neighbours of its
departure. The opposite instant is when a node knows that it is about to
leave, and sends a packet to its neighbours to notify about its departure.
We handle both cases the same way, but the disadvantage of the messy
departure is that some time might pass before the fault is discovered.
During this period, many packets might have been lost due to the error.
9.5.3 NFR03/NFR04 - Multiple and separate Access Points
As discussed in section 8.6, we have separated the Access Points from
the Gateway. The separation allowed us to have several Access Points,
each having their own subnets. In our test network, we ran a total of
nine devices and determined that two Access Points would be sufficient
to provide enough coverage. Both Access Points were implemented with
time synchronisation capabilities, although a small change could turn off
the time provisioning.
9.5.4 NFR05 - General security
To demand that our program provides general security is a broad
statement, and it can be discussed how general security it determined.
For us, it was to ensure that two devices could safely communicate
between them without any one else being able to read the exchanged
packets. WirelessHART provides security at the Data Link Layer and the
Network Layer, and by implementing the security functionality specified
in these layers we concluded that security would be sufficient. FR07
and FR08 further elaborates on the specific security mechanisms and
demonstrates how integrity and confidentiality is maintained during
packet transmission.
9.6 Evaluation of development process
Evaluating the development process of a project cycle is difficult, especially
when evaluating your own performance. The project got a slow start due
to awaiting arrival of radio devices and multiple hardware failures on the
equipment running the project, detailed in section 7.3 on page 79. Once
these hurdles were dealt with, work was continued and the project were
going well until the transfer limitation of JavaHidAPI [15] were discovered.
Once again, the project had to be re-evaluated to determine the further
route to take. We ended up emulating the project on a device acting as
a WirelessHART node, which appeared to be quite successful.
As seen in table 9.3, several major changes were undergone during the
course of the project. We have gone from working on proprietary nodes,
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Initial New Reason for change
Atmel Raven
boards
ABB Wimon
100
Inaccurate crystal clocks
ABB Wimon
100
Raspberry Pi JavaHidAPI packet size limitation pre-
vented sending proper WHART pack-
ets
Redhat Linux Windows Xp RavenUSB interfacing proved more
reliable on Xp
Table 9.3: Project development
Ark1
Side 1
Time
Jan 12 2
Feb 12 4
6
Apr 12 8
10
Jun 12 12
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Aug 12 12
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20
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Figure 9.6: Workload spread over months
to simulating on Raspberry Pi which has changed the working situation
to some extent. However, our main focus have been on the Gateway
and Network Manager since the start. We feel that we have managed to
highlight relevant issues on the area, and our proposed solutions meet the
criteria specified in the project goals chapter at page 63.
The workload distribution over the months can be seen in figure 9.6. We
got off at a slow start as was expected, which is how the master projects are
scheduled at our program. The workload from January 2012 to August
2012 mostly consisted of studying the protocol and building a general
foundation of knowledge. The workload arose steadily, but stopped during
some of the major milestones as marked on the graph. Once the hurdles
were overcome towards the end, the amount of work accelerated fast and
the major parts of the thesis writing and implementation were done over
the last months. Figure 9.7 displays the workload distribution between
the tasks. As expected, studying the standard and writing the report have
taken a large portion of the time as these are two time-consuming tasks. On
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Ark1
Side 1
27
10
5
20
15
15
9
10
33
10
154
Study protocol specification
Test previous implementation
Separate access points
Restructure implementation
Time synchronisation
DLPDU creation
Implement routing
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Write report
Provide encryption
18%
6%
3%
13%
10% 10%
6%
6%
21%
6%
Study protocol specification
Test previous implementation
Separate access points
Restructure implementation
Time synchronisation
DLPDU creation
Implement routing
Test implementation
Write report
Provide encryption
Figure 9.7: Work distribution between tasks
the implementation part, DLPDU creation and restructuring the Gateway
have taken most time. Both tasks are very detailed and complicated,
requiring a lot of time to implement every mechanism and value according
to the standard.
9.7 Chapter Summary
The chapter has presented the reader with a test bed used to run the
implementation. The implementation has been evaluated piece by piece,
and test results has been evaluated against the requirements determined in
chapter 5 to determine the level of accomplishment of each requirement.
At the end, the development process and time distribution have been
reviewed.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this report we have provided an overview of wireless network proto-
cols and functionality, as well as a detailed description on how the Wire-
lessHART protocol works. Our own work has been documented, and sev-
eral key functionalities have been implemented. The implementation in-
cludes superframes, separate and multiple Access Points and a routing al-
gorithm. We have also created the packet generation process where headers
are applied as the packet passes through the different layers, before being
successfully transmitted. The program has been restructured to correctly
resemble the WirelessHART layered approach at the Gateway, where the
layers communicate through interfaces.
We feel that the necessary restructuring of the program has been
performed, as Asperheim et al stated in their thesis. The project has come
to a stage where the foundation is according to the standard, but no further
real work can be performed on proprietary nodes before the HCF tables
listed in table C.1 have been acquired.
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Chapter 11
Future Work
Our project has not covered everything needed for a full-fledged Wire-
lessHART network. In the following sections we propose several key areas
which are natural to continue working on.
11.1 Port to DresdenSam7s
RavenUSB and DresdenSam7s are the two prominent usb devices suitable for
running the 15dot4-tools project. The project is tailored for the DresdenSam7s
devices according to Colin O’Flynn [1], which provides more memory and
faster processing. It would be a natural and beneficial step to port the
project to run on DresdenSAM7s devices, enabling the network to support
larger amounts of traffic.
11.2 Develop libusb wrapper
In section 7.4 on page 84 we discussed the problems with using HidAPI
for sending packets between the Network Manager and Access Points, as
it only supports packet size up to 64 bytes. Only 32 bytes are available to
the user, which is not enough for WirelessHART packets. Developing a
Libusb jni/jna1 wrapper for sending commands to libusb would circumvent
the problem, and allow the user for sending packets of any size.
11.3 Channel blacklisting
WirelessHART has 16 channels that transmissions can channel hop on in
order to provide more efficient communication between nodes. In the event
channels are affected by consistent interferences, the channel can be put on
a blacklist by the network administrator to prevent further use. We did
not have the time to implement this function, but it is recommended under
future work to provide better quality of service transmissions.
1Java Native Access
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11.4 Channel offset
Calculation of the active channel is so far determined by
ActualChannel = (ChannelOffset + ASN) % NumChannels where Chan-
nelOffset is set to zero to simplify the calculation. To further improve chan-
nel switching, implementing a function to distribute ChannelOffset between
two communicating devices has to be implemented.
11.5 Session
According to the standard, a device has to request a session in order
to communicate with another device. In our implementation, two
devices communicate once the Network Manager has scheduled the
communication. Future work would be to implement a method for the
device to request a session from the Network Manager, which is responded
to with a session the device can use for communication.
11.6 Quality of Service routing
Currently routing is only implemented on a least hop-count basis. Future
quality of service routing could also provide routing based on traffic load
on a link, device battery power, guaranteed delivery or signal level.
11.7 Source and Superframe routing
The current system only supports graph routing for transmitting a packet
to its destination. The algorithm can be expanded to support additional
routing algorithms by providing the devices with parts of the routing table
and modifying the header fields in the packet.
11.8 HCF Enumeration tables
The time values implemented so far are specified in the WirelessHART
standard [9]. More specific values are being referred to HCF enumeration
tables currently not available to us. In order to successfully communicate
with the proprietary nodes Wimon100, these values need to be implemen-
ted. A natural step would be to obtain the enumeration tables specified in
table C.1 in appendix C on page 155.
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Appendix A
Definitions
ACK - Acknowledgment
AP - Acess Point
API - Application Programming Interface
ASN - Absolute Slot Number
avgRSL - Average Received Signal
CCA - Clear Channel Assessment
CRC - Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSMA/CA - Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Avoidance
CSMA/CD - Carrier Sense Multiple Access Collision Detection
CTS - Clear To Send
DDL - Data Link Layer
DLPDU - Data Link Protocol Data Unit
DSSS - Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
EUI - Equipment Unique Identifier
FHSS - Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
HART - Highway Addressable Remote Transducer
HCF - Hart Communication Foundation
HID - Human Interface Device
IDE - Integrated Development Environment
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISA - International Society of Automation
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JDK - Java Development Kit
JNI - Java Native Interface
JoinRspTimer - Join Response Timer
JRE - Java Runtime Environment
LLC - Logical Link Control
MAC - Medium Access Control
MIC - Message Integrity Check
NL - Network Layer
NM - Network Manager
NPDU - Network Protocol Data Unit
NTP - Network Time Protocol
OSI - Open Systems Interconnection
OS - Operating System
PAN - Personal Area Network
PDU - Protocol Data Unit
PIB - PAN Information Base
PPDU - Physical Protocol Data Unit
RECV - Receive
RNDIS - Remote Network Driver Interface Specification
RTS - Ready To Send
RX - Receive
SPDU - Security Protocol Data Unit
SP - Service Primitive
TDMA - Time Division Multiple Access
TTL - Time To Live
TX - Transmit
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Appendix B
HART Commands
This appendix lists all implemented commands in our solution. A complete
implementation of one of these commands can be found in appendix E.2
B.1 Universal (Commands 0-30 + 38, 48)
Command 20: Read Long Tag
This command request the receiving node to send its Unique ID. This is
used in the join request. The Request is empty while the response contains
an 8 byte body.
B.2 Additional Common Practice (Commands 512-
767)
Command 961: Write Network Key
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to write the network key on a Network Device. It is important
that this command is rejected with Response Code 16 (Access Restricted)
by the node if it is not sent from the Network Manager. The command is
part of the join reply.
Byte Format Description
0-15 Unsigned-128 Key value
16-20 Unsigned-40 Execution time for command
(ASN). 0 - execute immediately
Table B.1: Command 961 Request and Response Data Bytes
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Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error Key change failed
66 Error Invalid execution time
Table B.2: Command 961 Command-Specific Response Codes
B.3 WirelessHART (Commands 768-1023)
Provisioning
Command 962: Write Device Nickname Address
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to set a Network Device’s Nickname. This command shall be
rejected with a response code 16 (Access Restricted) if the source is any
device other than the Network Manager. It is used in Join Reply to tell the
newly joined node its nickname.
Byte Format Description
0-1 Unsigned-16 Nickname
Table B.3: Command 962 Request and Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error Invalid Nickname
Table B.4: Command 962 Command-Specific Response Codes
Managing Superframes and Links
Command 965: Write Superframe
If Superframe already is on the device, this will modify the data in
the superframe specified. This command shall always be rejected with
response code 16 if source is not the Network Manager.
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Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 SuperframeID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Number of slots in Superframe
3 Enum-8 Superframe Mode Flags
4 Unsigned-8 Reserved, shall be set to 0
5-9 Unsigned-40 Execution time of command (ASN).
0 - Execute immediately
Table B.5: Command 965 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 SuperframeID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Number of slots in Superframe
3 Enum-8 Superframe Mode Flags
4 Unsigned-8 Number of Superframes remaining
5-9 Unsigned-40 Execution time of command (ASN)
Table B.6: Command 965 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more entries available
66 Error Invalid number of slots
67 Error Invalid Superframe mode
Table B.7: Command 965 Command-Specific Response Codes
Command 967: Write Link
This is a Wireless Network Manager command. It is used by the Network
Manager to add a link assignment to a Network Device. The link is
uniquely identified by the combination of the following key parameters:
<Superframe ID, Slot Number, Neighbour Address>. Modification of
existing links is not supported. A Network Manager shall delete an existing
link and then write a new link to accomplish a modify operation. This
command shall be rejected with a response code 16 (Access Restricted) if
the source address is any device other than the Network Manager.
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Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 SuperframeID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Slot number in the Superframe for
this link
3 Unsigned-8 channelOffset for this link
4-5 Unsigned-16 Nickname of the neighbour for this
link (or 0xFFFF if broadcast link)
6 Bits-8 linkOptions (See HCF Enumeration
Table 46. Link Option Flag Codes)
7 Enum-8 linkType (See HCF Enumeration
Table 45. Link Type)
Table B.8: Command 967 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 SuperframeID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Slot number in the Superframe for
this link
3 Unsigned-8 channelOffset for this link
4-5 Unsigned-16 Nickname of the neighbour for this
link (or 0xFFFF if broadcast link)
6 Bits-8 linkOptions (See HCF Enumeration
Table 46. Link Option Flag Codes)
7 Enum-8 linkType (See HCF Enumeration
Table 45. Link Type)
8-9 Unsigned-16 Number of link entries remaining
Table B.9: Command 967 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more links available
66 Error Link already exists
67 Error Unknown Superframe ID
68 Error Invalid slot number
69 Error Invalid link options (e.g., neither
transmit nor receive set)
70 Error Invalid channel offset
71 Error Invalid link type
72 Error No more neighbours available
Table B.10: Command 967 Command-Specific Response Codes
Managing Graph and Source Routes
Command 969: Write Graph/Neighbour Pair
This is a Wireless Network Layer Manager Command. It is used by
the Network Manager to add a connection assignment for a Network
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Device. This command shall be rejected with a response code of 16 (Access
Restricted) if the source address is any device other than the Network
Manager.
Byte Format Description
0-1 Unsigned-16 GraghID
2-3 Unsigned-16 Nickname of Neighbour
Table B.11: Command 969 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0-1 Unsigned-16 GraghID
2-3 Unsigned-16 Nickname of Neighbour
4 Unsigned-8 Number of Connections Remaining
Table B.12: Command 969 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more entries available
66 Error Unknown Nickname
Table B.13: Command 969 Command-Specific Response Codes
Command 974: Write Route
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to set or modify a route for a particular service. This command
shall always be rejected with response code 16 (Access Restricted) if the
source address is any other device than the Network Manager.
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Peer Nickname
3-4 Unsigned-16 Graph ID
Table B.14: Command 974 Request Data Bytes
Command 975: Delete Route
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to delete a route that was previously written. It is deleted using
the Route ID that was used to write the route information. This command
shall be rejected with a response code 16 (Access Restricted) if the source
address is any device other than the Network Manager.
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Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
1-2 Unsigned-16 Peer Nickname
3-4 Unsigned-16 Graph ID
5 Unsigned-8 Number of Routes remaining.
Table B.15: Command 974 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more entries available
66 Error Invalid Nickname
67 Error Invalid Graph ID
Table B.16: Command 974 Command-Specific Response Codes
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
Table B.17: Command 975 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
1 Unsigned-8 Number of Routes remaining.
Table B.18: Command 975 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error Invalid Route ID
Table B.19: Command 975 Command-Specific Response Codes
Command 976: Write Source-Route
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It is used by the Network
Manager to write a source route. Broadcast addresses are not legal address
values in this command and shall not be included in Source-Routes or the
requests or responses for this command. This command shall be rejected
with a response code of 16 (Access Restricted) if the source address is any
device other than the Network Manager.
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Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
1 Unsigned-8 Number of hops
2-3 Unsigned-16 Nickname of hop entry 0
4-... Unsigned-16 Repeated for number of entries
Table B.20: Command 976 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Route ID
1 Unsigned-8 Number of Routes remaining.
Table B.21: Command 976 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
8 Warning Broadcast addresses deleted in re-
sponse
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more entries available
66 Error Invalid Route ID
67 Error Invalid Nickname
68 Error Invalid number of hops
Table B.22: Command 976 Command-Specific Response Codes
Security
Command 961: Write Network Key
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to write the network key on a Network Device. This command
shall be rejected with response code 16 (Access Restricted) if the source
address is any device other than the Network Manager. The command is
used in the Join Reply.
Byte Format Description
0-15 Unsigned-128 Key value
16-20 Unsigned-40 Execution time for command
(ASN). 0 - execute immediately
3 Enum-8 Superframe Mode Flags
4 Unsigned-8 Number of Superframes remaining
5-9 Unsigned-40 Execution time of command (ASN)
Table B.23: Command 961 Request and Response Data Bytes
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Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error Key change failed
66 Error Invalid execution time
Table B.24: Command 961 Command-Specific Response Codes
Command 963: Write Session
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. This command allows the
Network Manager to write the session parameters required to establish a
session between the device the message is addressed to and the peer device
contained in the request. This command shall be rejected with a response
code of 16 (Access Restricted) if the source address is any device other than
the Network Manager. Used in Join Reply to create the session for initiating
the node.
Byte Format Description
0 Enum-8 Session type. (See HCF Enumera-
tion Table 48. Session Type Code)
1-2 Unsigned-16 Nickname of peer device
3-4 Unsigned-16 Peer expanded device type code
5-7 Unsigned-24 Peer device Id
8-11 Unsigned-32 Peer Nounce counter value
12-27 Unsigned-128 Key value
28 Unsigned-8 Reserved shall be set to 0
29-31 Unsigned-40 Execution time of command (ASN)
Table B.25: Command 963 Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0 Enum-8 Session type. (See HCF Enumera-
tion Table 48. Session Type Code)
1-2 Unsigned-16 Nickname of peer device
3-4 Unsigned-16 Peer expanded device type code
5-7 Unsigned-24 Peer device Id
8-11 Unsigned-32 Peer Nounce counter value
12-27 Unsigned-128 Key value
28 Unsigned-8 Number of sessions remaining
29-31 Unsigned-40 Execution time of command (ASN)
Table B.26: Command 963 Response Data Bytes
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Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
5 Error Too few Data Bytes Received
16 Error Access Restricted
65 Error No more entries available
66 Error Session type invalid
Table B.27: Command 963 Command-Specific Response Codes
Bandwidth Management
No commands implemented!
Device Management
Command 960: Disconnect Device
This is a Wireless Network Manager Command. It allows the Network
Manager to force a device off the network, clear all its network information
and rejoin the network. This command shall be rejected with response code
16 (Access Restricted) if the source address is any device other than the
Network Manager.
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Reason. (See HCF Enumeration
Table 50. Disconnect Cause Codes)
Table B.28: Command 960 Request and Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
16 Error Access Restricted
Table B.29: Command 960 Command-Specific Response Codes
Network Maintenance
Command 795: Write Timer Interval
This is a Wireless Data Link Command. This command allows the Network
Manager to set an interval for a timer on a Network Device.
Byte Format Description
0 Enum-8 Timer Type. (See HCF Enumeration
Table 43. Wireless Timer Code)
1-2 Unsigned-32 Timer Interval (in ms)
Table B.30: Command 795 Request and Response Data Bytes
151
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-Specific Errors
3 Error Passed Parameter Too Large
4 Error Passed Parameter Too Small
5 Error Too Few Data Bytes Received
6 Error Device-Specific Command Error
7 Error In Write Protected Mode
8 Warning Set To Nearest Possible Value
16 Error Access Restricted (i.e., this com-
mand shall be accepted only from
the Network Manager)
32 Error Busy (A DR Could Not Be Started)
33 Error DR Initiated
34 Error DR Running
35 Error DR Dead
36 Error DR Conflict
65 Error Invalid Timer Type
66 Error Invalid Timer Interval
Table B.31: Command 795 Command-Specific Response Codes
Coexistence
No commands implemented!
Network Health Reporting and Status
Command 787: Report Neighbour Signal Levels
This command is periodically published to the Network Manager (see
Command 795 and HCF Enumeration Table 43) indicating discovered
(but not linked) neighbours. The command response is transmitted ad
"Process Data" level priority. Command 780 reports linked neighbours. The
neighbour table is treated as a list with entries being added as neighbours
are detected. Neighbours with links to device are at the beginning of the
list and neighbours without links at the end. Used in Join Request.
Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Neighbour table index
1 Unsigned-8 Number of neighbour entries to
read
Table B.32: Command 787 Request Data Bytes
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Byte Format Description
0 Unsigned-8 Neighbour table index
1 Unsigned-8 Number of neighbour entries to
read
2 Unsigned-8 Total number of neighbours
3-4 Unsigned-16 Nickname of neighbour
5 Signed-8 RSL of neighbour in dB
6-8 Repeats (as needed) based on re-
sponse byte 1
Table B.33: Command 787 Response Data Bytes
Code Class Description
0 Success No Command-specific Errors
5 Error Too Few Data Bytes Received
8 Warning Set To Nearest Possible Value
Table B.34: Command 787 Command-Specific Response Codes
Gateway Commands
No commands implemented!
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Appendix C
HCF Tables
Protocol Revision Price
HART Field Communication Protocol
Specifications
7.4 (HCF_KIT-13) $975.00
HART Field Communication Protocol
Test Specifications
7.4 (HCF_KIT-210) $500.00
DDL Specifications (HCF_KIT-215) $250.00
HART Field Communications Protocol, A
Technical Overview
(HCF_LIT-020) $60.00
The HART Data Link Layer, A Require-
ment Analysis
(HCF_LIT-067) $50.00
Application Note: Information for HART
Modem Designers
(HCF_LIT-073) $50.00
HART Server (HCF_KIT-175) $500.00
Table C.1: Required HCF_tables
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Appendix D
Runtime problems
D.0.1 Access Point problem during runtime
1 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.ui.
2 NetManShell <init >
3 INFO: Starting shell..
4 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM
5 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.manager.NetworkManager <init >
6 INFO: Instantiating Network Manager
7 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM
8 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.pal.
9 HIDRawUSBpalgetHIDDevice
10 INFO: Failed to connect to Access Point.
11 Trying to open device
12 Failed to open device.
13 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM
14 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway <init >
15 INFO: Started Network Manager ...
16 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM
17 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway <init >
18 INFO: Started Access Points ...
19 Jan 30, 2013 1:17:37 PM
20 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway run
21 INFO: Started Virtual Gateway ...
D.0.2 Buffer problems moving to Windows
1
2 jan 30, 2013 1:47:57 PM no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.ui.
↪→ NetManShell
3 <init >
4 INFO: Starting shell..
5 jan 30, 2013 1:47:57 PM
6 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.manager.NetworkManager <init >
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7 INFO: Instantiating Network Manager
8 jan 30, 2013 1:47:58 PM
9 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.pal.
10 HIDRawUSBpal getHIDDevice
11 INFO: Found Atmel device "ATMEL 8226"
12 jan 30, 2013 1:47:58 PM no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.
↪→ accesspoint.pal.
13 HIDRawUSBpalgetHIDDevice
14 INFO: Connecting to: \textbackslash \textbackslash
15 ? \textbackslash
16 hid\#vid\_03eb\&pid\_2022\&mi\_02 \#7\&28 cec948
↪→ \&0\&0000\#{4 d1e55
17 b2-f16f -11cf -88cb -001111000030} jan 30, 2013 1:47:58
↪→ PM
18 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.pal.HIDRawUSBpal
↪→ <init >
19 INFO: Successfully connected to device.
20 jan 30, 2013 1:47:58 PM
21 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway <init >
22 INFO: Started Network Manager ...
23 jan 30, 2013 1:47:58 PM
24 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway <init >
25 INFO: Started Access Points ...
26 jan 30, 2013 1:47:58 PM
27 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.gateway.VirtualGateway run
28 INFO: Started Virtual Gateway ...
29 java.io.IOException: The supplied user buffer is not
↪→ valid for
30 the requested operation.
31 at com.codeminders.hidapi.HIDDevice.write(Native
↪→ Method) at
32 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.pal.HIDRawUSBpal.
↪→ send(HIDRaw
33 USBpal.java :103) at
34 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.dll.HIDRawUSBdll.
↪→ send(HIDRaw
35 USBdll.java :17) at
36 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.net.HIDRawUSBnet.
↪→ send(HIDRaw
37 USBnet.java :15) at
38 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.tl.HIDRawUSBtl.
↪→ send(HIDRawUS
39 Btl.java :15) at
40 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.session.
↪→ HIDRawUSBses.send(HI
41 DRawUSBses.java :15) at
42 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.
↪→ HIDRawUSBAccessPoint.send(HI
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43 DRawUSBAccessPoint.java :195) at
44 no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.accesspoint.
↪→ HIDRawUSBAccessPoint.run(HID
45 RawUSBAccessPoint.java :120)
46 ASN: 5501567370 ASN2: 5502145209 wait: 552630 ms: 0
↪→ ns: 552630
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Appendix E
Code
In this appendix there are specific code from the implementation that is
being refered to in the thesis.
E.1 DLPDU
The Data Link Protocol Data Unit. This is one of the most advanced DPUs
in the implementation.
1
2 package no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.devicenetworkmanagement.pdu;
3
4 /**
5 * TODO Add Network key (bit 3 in DLPDUSpecifier)
6 *
7 * @author Magnus
8 * @date 27. feb. 2013
9 *
10 */
11 public class DLPDU {
12 public enum PayloadType {
13
14 ACK , ADVERTISE , KEEP_ALIVE , DISCONNECT , DATA;
15
16 static PayloadType getPayloadType(byte b) {
17 if((b & 0b00000111) == 0b00000111) return DATA ;
18
19 if((b & 0b00000011) == 0b00000011) return
↪→ DISCONNECT ;
20
21 if((b & 0b00000010) == 0b00000010) return
↪→ KEEP_ALIVE ;
22
23 if((b & 0b00000001) == 0b00000001) return
↪→ ADVERTISE ;
24
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25 if((b & 0b00000000) == 0b00000000) return ACK ;
26
27 return null ;
28 }
29
30 }
31
32 public enum Priority {
33
34 COMMAND , PROCESS_DATA , NORMAL , ALARM;
35
36 static Priority getPriority(byte b) {
37 if((b & 0b00110000) == 0b00110000) return COMMAND
↪→ ;
38
39 if((b & 0b00100000) == 0b00100000) return
↪→ PROCESS_DATA ;
40
41 if((b & 0b00010000) == 0b00010000) return NORMAL ;
42
43 if((b & 0b00000000) == 0b00000000) return ALARM ;
44
45 return null ;
46 }
47 }
48
49 final static byte startByte = (byte) 0x41 ;
50 byte addressSpecifier = (byte) 0x88 ;
51 byte sequenceNumber ;
52
53 byte[] networkID ;
54 byte[] srcAddr ;
55 byte[] dstAddr ;
56
57 byte dlpduSpecifier ;
58
59 Priority priority ;
60
61 PayloadType payloadType ;
62 byte[] payload ;
63
64 byte[] mic = new byte [4] ;
65 byte[] crc = new byte [2] ;
66
67 int sizeOfHeader = 6 ;
68 int sizeOfPayload ;
69 int sizeOfTail = 6 ;
70
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71 /**
72 * Constructor for the DLPDU when recieveing a bytearray
73 *
74 * @param data bytearray setup as a dlpdu.
75 */
76 public DLPDU(byte[] data) {
77 ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(
↪→ data) ;
78 DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(bais) ;
79
80 try{
81 dis.readByte () ;
82 addressSpecifier = dis.readByte () ;
83 sequenceNumber = dis.readByte () ;
84
85 networkID = new byte [2] ;
86 dis.read(networkID) ;
87
88 if(( addressSpecifier & (1 << 2)) == 1 << 2) {
89 dstAddr = new byte [8] ;
90 dis.read(dstAddr) ;
91 sizeOfHeader += 8 ;
92 }else {
93 dstAddr = new byte [2] ;
94 dis.read(dstAddr) ;
95 sizeOfHeader += 2 ;
96 }
97
98 if(( addressSpecifier & (1 << 6)) == 1 << 6) {
99 srcAddr = new byte [8] ;
100 dis.read(srcAddr) ;
101 sizeOfHeader += 8 ;
102 }else {
103 srcAddr = new byte [2] ;
104 dis.read(srcAddr) ;
105 sizeOfHeader += 2 ;
106 }
107
108 dlpduSpecifier = dis.readByte () ;
109
110 payloadType = PayloadType.getPayloadType(
↪→ dlpduSpecifier) ;
111 priority = Priority.getPriority(dlpduSpecifier) ;
112
113 sizeOfPayload = data.length - sizeOfHeader -
↪→ sizeOfTail ;
114 payload = new byte[sizeOfPayload] ;
115
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116 dis.read(payload) ;
117
118 mic = new byte [4] ;
119 dis.read(mic) ;
120
121 crc = new byte [2] ;
122 dis.read(crc) ;
123
124
125 } catch(IOException e) {
126 e.printStackTrace () ;
127 }
128 }
129
130 /**
131 * Constructor when generating a DLPDU in the Network
↪→ Manager
132 *
133 * @param sequenceNumber is the least significant byte in
↪→ the ASN
134 * @param networkID 2 byte networkID
135 * @param dstAddr Next hop dst addr (2 or 8 bytes)
136 * @param srcAddr This node’s addr (2 or 8 bytes)
137 * @param priority The priority of the DLPDU. Command is
↪→ highest priority , Alarm is lowest.
138 * @param payloadType The type of the payload.
139 * @param payload A byte array of the payload , depending
↪→ on the payloadType
140 */
141 public DLPDU(byte sequenceNumber , byte[] networkID , byte[]
↪→ dstAddr ,
142 byte[] srcAddr , Priority priority , PayloadType
↪→ payloadType , byte[] payload) {
143 this.sequenceNumber = sequenceNumber ;
144 this.networkID = networkID ;
145 this.dstAddr = dstAddr ;
146 this.srcAddr = srcAddr ;
147
148 if(dstAddr.length == 8) addressSpecifier = (byte) (
↪→ addressSpecifier |= 1 << 2) ;
149 if(srcAddr.length == 8) addressSpecifier = (byte) (
↪→ addressSpecifier |= 1 << 6) ;
150
151 this.priority = priority ;
152
153 this.payloadType = payloadType ;
154 this.payload = payload ;
155
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156 generateDLPDUSpecifier () ;
157
158 generateMIC () ;
159 generateCRC () ;
160
161 sizeOfPayload = payload.length ;
162 sizeOfHeader += dstAddr.length + srcAddr.length ;
163 }
164
165 /**
166 * Generates a MIC for the PDU.
167 * This must be called after all variables have been set!
168 *
169 * @author Magnus
170 * @date 5. mars 2013
171 */
172 public void generateMIC () {
173 mic = MIC.generateMIC(payload) ;
174 }
175
176 public boolean confirmMIC () {
177 return MIC.confirmMIC(payload) ;
178 }
179
180 /**
181 * Generates a CRC for the PDU.
182 * This must be called after all variables have been set!
183 *
184 * @author Magnus
185 * @date 5. mars 2013
186 */
187 public void generateCRC () {
188 crc = CRC.generateCRC(payload) ;
189 }
190
191 public boolean confirmCRC () {
192 return CRC.confirmCRC(payload) ;
193 }
194
195 /**
196 * This method creates the DLPDUSpesifier byte dependent
↪→ on the priority ,
197 * network key and packet type
198 *
199 * @author Magnus
200 * @date 5. mars 2013
201 */
202 private void generateDLPDUSpecifier () {
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203 switch(priority) {
204 case ALARM:
205 break;
206 case COMMAND:
207 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 5)
↪→ ;
208 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 4)
↪→ ;
209 break;
210 case NORMAL:
211 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 4)
↪→ ;
212 break;
213 case PROCESS_DATA:
214 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 5)
↪→ ;
215 break;
216 }
217
218 switch(payloadType) {
219 case ACK:
220 break;
221 case ADVERTISE:
222 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 0)
↪→ ;
223 break;
224 case DATA:
225 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 0)
↪→ ;
226 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 1)
↪→ ;
227 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 2)
↪→ ;
228 break;
229 case DISCONNECT:
230 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 0)
↪→ ;
231 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 1)
↪→ ;
232 break;
233 case KEEP_ALIVE:
234 dlpduSpecifier = (byte) (dlpduSpecifier |= 1 << 1)
↪→ ;
235 break;
236 }
237 }
238
239 /**
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240 *
241 * @return The object as a byte array for sending over
↪→ socket
242 *
243 * @author Magnus
244 * @date 5. mars 2013
245 */
246 public byte[] toByteArray () {
247
248 ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream
↪→ () ;
249 DataOutputStream dos = new DataOutputStream(baos) ;
250
251 try{
252 dos.write(startByte) ;
253 dos.write(addressSpecifier) ;
254 dos.write(sequenceNumber) ;
255 dos.write(networkID) ;
256 dos.write(dstAddr) ;
257 dos.write(srcAddr) ;
258 dos.write(dlpduSpecifier) ;
259 dos.write(payload) ;
260 dos.write(mic) ;
261 dos.write(crc) ;
262
263 } catch(IOException e) {
264 e.printStackTrace () ;
265 }
266
267 return baos.toByteArray () ;
268 }
269 }
270
271 }
Listing E.1: The DLPDU
167
E.2 Command 787: Report Neighbor Signal Levels
The implementation of command 787: Report Neighbor Signal Levels. All
commands extend the Command class seen in listing 8.8.
1
2 package no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.applicationlayer.commands;
3
4 /**
5 * Command 787 Report Neighbor Signal Levels
6 *
7 * size of command should be:
8 * REQUEST: 2 bytes
9 * RESPONSE: 3 + (3* numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead)
10 *
11 * @author Magnus
12 *
13 */
14 public class ReportNeighborSignalLevels extends Command {
15
16 // GENERAL DATA BYTES
17 byte neighborTableIndex ; //byte 0
18 byte numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead = 0 ; //byte 1
19
20 // RESPONSE DATA BYTES
21 byte totalNumerOfNeighbors ; //byte 2
22
23 ArrayList <Node > nodes = new ArrayList <Node >() ;
24
25 byte[] shortByteArray = new byte [2] ;
26
27 /**
28 * Build from bytes constructor
29 *
30 * @param data raw byte array of the structure
31 */
32 public ReportNeighborSignalLevels(byte[] data) {
33 super(CommandName.REPORT_NEIGHBOR_SIGNAL_LEVELS) ;
34
35 ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(
↪→ data) ;
36 DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(bais) ;
37
38 try {
39 neighborTableIndex = dis.readByte () ;
40 numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead = dis.readByte () ;
41 length = 2 ;
42
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43 if(data.length > 2) {
44 totalNumerOfNeighbors = dis.readByte () ;
45 length ++ ;
46
47 for(int i = 0; i <
↪→ numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead; i++) {
48 dis.read(shortByteArray) ;
49 byte rsl = dis.readByte () ;
50
51 nodes.add(new Node(HelpMethods.toShort(
↪→ shortByteArray), rsl)) ;
52 length += 3 ;
53 }
54
55 }
56
57 dis.close() ;
58
59 }catch(IOException e) {
60 e.printStackTrace () ;
61 }
62 }
63
64 /**
65 * Request constructor
66 *
67 * @param neighborTableIndex table index of neighbors
68 */
69 public ReportNeighborSignalLevels(byte neighborTableIndex)
↪→ {
70 super(CommandName.REPORT_NEIGHBOR_SIGNAL_LEVELS) ;
71
72 this.neighborTableIndex = neighborTableIndex ;
73 totalNumerOfNeighbors = -1 ;
74 length = 1 ;
75 }
76
77 /**
78 * Response constructor
79 *
80 * @param neighborTableIndex table index of neighbors
81 * @param totalNumberOfNeighbors total number of neighbors
↪→ of the node
82 */
83 public ReportNeighborSignalLevels(byte neighborTableIndex ,
↪→ byte totalNumberOfNeighbors) {
84 super(CommandName.REPORT_NEIGHBOR_SIGNAL_LEVELS) ;
85
169
86 this.neighborTableIndex = neighborTableIndex ;
87 this.totalNumerOfNeighbors = totalNumberOfNeighbors ;
88 length = 3 ;
89 }
90
91
92
93 @Override
94 public byte[] toByteArray () {
95 ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream
↪→ ();
96 DataOutputStream dos = new DataOutputStream(baos);
97
98 try {
99 dos.write(HelpMethods.toByteArray(getCommandNumber
↪→ ())) ;
100
101 if(commandName.getSize () != -1)
102 dos.write(commandName.getSize ()) ;
103 else
104 dos.write(length) ;
105
106 dos.write(neighborTableIndex) ;
107 dos.write(numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead) ;
108
109 if(totalNumerOfNeighbors != -1) {
110 dos.write(totalNumerOfNeighbors) ;
111
112 for(Node n : nodes) {
113 dos.write(HelpMethods.toByteArray(n.
↪→ neighborNickname)) ;
114 dos.write(n.rsl) ;
115 }
116 }
117
118 } catch(IOException e) {
119 e.printStackTrace () ;
120 }
121
122 return baos.toByteArray () ;
123 }
124
125 @Override
126 public ResponseCode executeCommand () {
127 // TODO Not implemented as of 15.apr. 2013.
128 // REMEMBER TO UPDATE APPENDIX WHEN DONE!
129 return null;
130 }
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131
132 @Override
133 public byte[] generateResponse () {
134 return toByteArray () ;
135 }
136
137 /* *********************
138 * Getters and Setters *
139 * ******************* */
140
141 /**
142 * @param nickname nickname of the neighbor
143 * @param rsl the nodes average Received Signal Level
144 *
145 * @author Magnus
146 * @date 15. apr. 2013
147 */
148 public void addNeighbor(short nickname , byte rsl) {
149 nodes.add(new Node(nickname , rsl)) ;
150 length += 3 ;
151 numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead ++ ;
152 }
153
154 /**
155 * @return the Table index of the neighbor
156 *
157 * @author Magnus
158 * @date 15. apr. 2013
159 */
160 public byte getNeighborTableIndex () {
161 return neighborTableIndex;
162 }
163
164 /**
165 * @return number of Neighbors in this report
166 *
167 * @author Magnus
168 * @date 15. apr. 2013
169 */
170 public byte getNumberOfNeighborEntriesToRead () {
171 return numberOfNeighborEntriesToRead;
172 }
173
174 /**
175 * @return The total number of neighbors at the node (
↪→ response only)
176 *
177 * @author Magnus
171
178 * @date 15. apr. 2013
179 */
180 public byte getTotalNumerOfNeighbors () {
181 return totalNumerOfNeighbors;
182 }
183
184
185 /**
186 * @return a Hashmap of the neighbors on the node (
↪→ response only)
187 *
188 * @author Magnus
189 * @date 15. apr. 2013
190 */
191 public Map <Short , Byte > getNeighbors () {
192 Map <Short , Byte > tmp = new HashMap <Short , Byte >() ;
193
194 for(Node n : nodes) {
195 tmp.put(n.neighborNickname , n.rsl) ;
196 }
197
198 return tmp ;
199 }
200
201 private class Node {
202 short neighborNickname ;
203 byte rsl ;
204
205 public Node(short neighborNickname , byte rsl) {
206 this.neighborNickname = neighborNickname ;
207 this.rsl = rsl ;
208 }
209
210 }
211
212 }
Listing E.2: Command 787: Report Neighbor Signal Levels
E.3 CCM implementation
In listing E.3 we have provided the code currently implemented for our
CCM algorithm. The code is not yet tested, but should provide the
foundation needed for finishing the algorithm.
1 package no.uio.ifi.wirelesshart.securitylayer;
2
3 import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
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45 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.BlockCipher;
6 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.CipherParameters;
7 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.DataLengthException;
8 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.InvalidCipherTextException;
9 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.Mac;
10 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.macs.CBCBlockCipherMac;
11 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.modes.AEADBlockCipher;
12 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.modes.SICBlockCipher;
13 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.AEADParameters;
14 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.ParametersWithIV;
15 import org.bouncycastle.util.Arrays;
16
17 public class L4_testCCM implements AEADBlockCipher {
18 private BlockCipher cipher;
19 private int blockSize;
20 private boolean forEncryption;
21 private byte[] nounce;
22 private byte[] associatedText;
23 private int macSize;
24 private CipherParameters keyParam;
25 private byte[] macBlock;
26 private ByteArrayOutputStream data = new
↪→ ByteArrayOutputStream ();
27
28
29 public L4_testCCM(BlockCipher c){
30 this.cipher = c;
31 this.blockSize = c.getBlockSize ();
32 this.macBlock = new byte[blockSize ];
33
34 if(blockSize != 16){
35 throw new IllegalArgumentException("cipher
↪→ required with a block size of 16.");
36 }
37 }
38
39
40
41 public int doFinal(byte[] out , int outOff) throws
↪→ IllegalStateException ,
42 InvalidCipherTextException {
43 byte[] text = data.toByteArray ();
44 byte[] enc = processPacket(text , 0, text.length);
45
46 System.arraycopy(enc , 0, out , outOff , enc.length);
47 reset();
48 return enc.length;
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49 }
50
51 public String getAlgorithmName () {
52 return cipher.getAlgorithmName () + "/CCM";
53 }
54
55 public byte[] getMac () {
56 byte[] mac = new byte[macSize ];
57 System.arraycopy(macBlock , 0, mac , 0, mac.length);
58 return mac;
59 }
60
61
62 public int getOutputSize(int len) {
63 if(forEncryption)
64 return data.size() + len + macSize;
65 else
66 return data.size() + len - macSize;
67 }
68
69 public BlockCipher getUnderlyingCipher () {
70 return cipher;
71 }
72
73 public int getUpdateOutputSize(int len) {
74 return 0;
75 }
76
77
78 public void init(boolean forEncryption , CipherParameters
↪→ params)
79 throws IllegalArgumentException {
80 this.forEncryption = forEncryption;
81
82 if(params instanceof AEADParameters){
83 AEADParameters param = (AEADParameters) params;
84
85 nounce = param.getNonce ();
86 associatedText = param.getAssociatedText ();
87 macSize = param.getMacSize () / 8;
88 keyParam = param.getKey ();
89 }
90 else if(params instanceof ParametersWithIV){
91 ParametersWithIV param = (ParametersWithIV) params
↪→ ;
92
93 nounce = param.getIV();
94 associatedText = null;
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95 macSize = macBlock.length / 2;
96 keyParam = param.getParameters ();
97 }
98 else{
99 throw new IllegalArgumentException("invalid
↪→ parameters passed to CCM");
100 }
101
102 }
103
104 public int processByte(byte in, byte[] out , int outOff)
105 throws DataLengthException {
106 data.write(in);
107 return 0;
108 }
109
110 public int processBytes(byte[] in, int inOff , int inLen ,
↪→ byte[] out ,
111 int outOff) throws DataLengthException {
112
113 data.write(in, inOff , inLen);
114 return 0;
115 }
116
117 public void reset () {
118 cipher.reset();
119 data.reset();
120 }
121
122 private boolean hasAssociatedText (){
123 return associatedText != null & associatedText.length
↪→ != 0;
124 }
125
126 private int calculateMac(byte[] data , int dataOff , int
↪→ dataLen , byte[] macBlock){
127 Mac cMac = new CBCBlockCipherMac(cipher , macSize * 8);
128 cMac.init(keyParam);
129
130 byte[] b0 = new byte [16];
131
132 if(hasAssociatedText ())
133 b0[0] |= 0x40;
134
135 b0[0] |= ((( cMac.getMacSize () - 2) / 2) & 0x7) << 3;
136 b0[0] |= ((15 - nounce.length) - 1) & 0x7;
137
138 System.arraycopy(nounce , 0, b0 , 1, nounce.length);
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139
140 int q = dataLen;
141 int count = 1;
142 while(q > 0){
143 b0[b0.length - count] = (byte) (q & 0xff);
144 q >>>= 8;
145 count ++;
146 }
147
148 cMac.update(b0, 0, b0.length);
149
150 /*
151 * Process associated text
152 */
153
154 if(hasAssociatedText ()){
155 int extra;
156
157 if(associatedText.length < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8)))
↪→ {
158 cMac.update ((byte) (associatedText.length >>
↪→ 8));
159 cMac.update ((byte) associatedText.length);
160 extra = 2;
161 }
162 else{
163 cMac.update ((byte) 0xff);
164 cMac.update ((byte) 0xfe);
165 cMac.update ((byte) (associatedText.length >>
↪→ 24));
166 cMac.update ((byte) (associatedText.length >>
↪→ 16));
167 cMac.update ((byte) (associatedText.length >>
↪→ 8));
168 cMac.update ((byte) associatedText.length);
169
170 extra = 6;
171 }
172 cMac.update(associatedText , 0, associatedText.
↪→ length);
173
174 extra = (extra + associatedText.length) % 16;
175 if(extra != 0){
176 for(int i = 0; i != 16 - extra; i++)
177 cMac.update ((byte) 0x00);
178 }
179 }
180 /*
176
181 * add the text
182 */
183 cMac.update(data , dataOff , dataLen);
184 return cMac.doFinal(macBlock , 0);
185 }
186
187 public byte[] processPacket(byte[] in, int inOff , int
↪→ inLen)
188 throws IllegalStateException ,
↪→ InvalidCipherTextException{
189
190 if(keyParam == null)
191 throw new IllegalStateException("CCM cipher
↪→ uninitialized");
192
193 BlockCipher ctrCipher = new SICBlockCipher(cipher);
194 byte[] iv = new byte[blockSize ];
195 byte[] out;
196
197 iv[0] = (byte) (((15 - nounce.length) -1) &0x7);
198 System.arraycopy(nounce , 0, iv , 1, nounce.length);
199 ctrCipher.init(forEncryption , new ParametersWithIV(
↪→ keyParam , iv));
200
201 if(forEncryption){
202 int index = inOff;
203 int outOff = 0;
204
205 out = new byte[inLen + macSize ];
206 calculateMac(in, inOff , inLen , macBlock);
207 ctrCipher.processBlock(macBlock , 0, macBlock , 0);
208
209 while(index < inLen - blockSize){
210 ctrCipher.processBlock(in, index , out , outOff)
↪→ ;
211 outOff += blockSize;
212 index += blockSize;
213 }
214
215 byte[] block = new byte[blockSize ];
216 System.arraycopy(in, index , block , 0, inLen -
↪→ index);
217 ctrCipher.processBlock(block , 0, block , 0);
218 System.arraycopy(block , 0, out , outOff , inLen -
↪→ index);
219 outOff += inLen - index;
220 System.arraycopy(macBlock , 0, out , outOff , out.
↪→ length - outOff);
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221 }
222
223 else{
224 int index = inOff;
225 int outOff = 0;
226 out = new byte[inLen - macSize ];
227 System.arraycopy(in, inOff + inLen - macSize ,
↪→ macBlock , 0, macSize);
228
229 ctrCipher.processBlock(macBlock , 0, macBlock , 0);
230
231 for(int i = macSize; i != macBlock.length; i++){
232 macBlock[i] = 0;
233 }
234
235 while(outOff < out.length - blockSize){
236 ctrCipher.processBlock(in, index , out , outOff)
↪→ ;
237 outOff += blockSize;
238 index += blockSize;
239 }
240
241 byte[] block = new byte[blockSize ];
242 System.arraycopy(in, index , block , 0, out.length -
↪→ outOff);
243 ctrCipher.processBlock(block , 0, block , 0);
244 System.arraycopy(block , 0, out , outOff , out.length
↪→ - outOff);
245
246 byte[] calculatedMacBlock = new byte[blockSize ];
247 calculateMac(out , 0, out.length ,
↪→ calculatedMacBlock);
248
249 if(! Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(macBlock ,
↪→ calculatedMacBlock))
250 throw new InvalidCipherTextException("mac
↪→ check in CCM failed!");
251 }
252 return out;
253 }
254
255 }
Listing E.3: CCM code implementation
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